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Chapter 1: General introduction and outline of the thesis
Case formulation
 Mr. Z. has recently experienced a depression. During these four months, he felt 
terribly sad, not motivated to undertake anything and he could not enjoy some of the things 
which were enjoyable before, such has his long-time hobby of hiking. What is more, at nights 
he had much trouble falling asleep and he usually woke up early in the morning, feeling 
tired. Because he felt so low and inert, he did not go to work for almost three months and 
he avoided most social commitments. Mr. Z. has seen his father go through the same thing 
several times when he was young. After a recovery process supported by psychotherapy, Mr. 
Z. is now back on his feet. He has regained his previous interest in things and his sleeping 
has improved as well. However, he still noticed that he is easily drawn towards negative 
thinking, especially when he feels stressed or down. Negative messages in the newspaper 
easily catch his attention and past unpleasant experiences seem to pop up in his memory 
more easily than positive events. Although he has recovered from the depression, it seems 
that there is a lingering vulnerability in him that is triggered by stress or sad mood. 
Major depressive disorder 
 Major depressive disorder (or depression) is characterized by a sad mood 
accompanied by loss of interest or pleasure in normally enjoyable events commonly referred 
to as anhedonia (according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 4th 
Ed., DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Individuals suffering from a depressive 
episode may be preoccupied with thoughts and feelings of worthlessness, inappropriate 
guilt, helplessness, hopelessness and self-hatred (DSM-IV). Other symptoms include poor 
concentration, withdrawal from social situations and activities, and thoughts of death 
or suicide. Depressed individuals often sleep and eat much less than before, although 
hypersomnia and an increase of appetite are also symptoms of depression. Depression is 
associated with considerable morbidity and mortality. For a diagnosis of depression, the 
depressed mood and/or the loss of interest in almost all things must have been present 
for more than two weeks (DSM-IV). The symptoms typically cause impairment in daily 
functioning across different domains of social, personal and occupational functioning 
 Approximately 17% of the population will experience at least one depressive 
episode during their life (Bijl et al., 1998; Kessler et al., 2005). The personal and societal 
costs of depression are high (Murray & Lopez, 1996) with the World Health Organization 
(2012) declaring depression as the most debilitating disorder worldwide. On a personal 
level, people tend to experience low quality of life, sense of isolation, feeling like a burden, 
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inability to enjoy life, and many individuals commit suicide (Joiner, 2010). To date, depression 
is the leading cause of medical disability for people aged 14 to 44 (Stewart et al., 2003). 
Depressed individuals show great losses in productivity (Adler et al., 2006; Greener & Guest, 
2007; Kessler et al., 1999; Pratt & Brody, 2008) and many depressed individuals seek medical 
and/or psychological treatment. However, the relapse rates are estimated to be between 50-
80% (Judd, 1997; Pettit et al., 2006; Ramana et al., 1995), with more than 75% of depressed 
individuals experiencing more than one episode (Boland & Keller, 2002). Beyond personal 
distress for the patient, depression is burdensome on an economical level due to loss of 
productivity.
 Depression is a clinically heterogeneous disease and the expression of depression 
can differ greatly between individuals. This diversity is also present in the responses to both 
antidepressant (pharmacological) and psychological treatment. To illustrate, approximately 
60% patients show a clinically significant response to medication (Hollon et al., 2005). The 
same holds for psychological treatment: approximately 60% of the patients improves after 
treatment (Hollon et al., 2005). The diversity in depressive manifestations and response to 
treatment together with the severe disease burden of depression, underscores the necessity 
for studies on vulnerability factors for depression. When we learn more about the individual 
differences in factors contributing to depression onset and recurrence, customized and 
targeted individual treatments are more likely, hopefully yielding improved clinical outcomes 
(Kato & Serretti, 2010; Lester & Eley, 2013). Together, this knowledge argues for a dire need to 
continue research into depression etiology and treatment. 
Cognitive vulnerability for depression
 The cognitive theories of depression posit that depressed individuals show 
preferential processing of negative information and less advantageous processing of positive 
information (Beck, 1976, 2008; Bower, 1981; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Williams et al., 1997). 
These theories suggest that negative schemas or networks characterize individuals who are 
at elevated risk for depression and that they are activated in the face of stress or sad mood, 
leading to clinically significant depression. The cognitive theories by Beck and Bower (Beck, 
1976, 2008; Bower, 1981) proposed that negative internal representations lead individuals to 
filter information from the environment in such a way that their attention is directed toward 
information that is congruent with their schema or network. This means that biases in the 
processing of emotional information are considered a vulnerability factor for depression 
(Beevers & Carver, 2003; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). 
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Attention, memory and behavior
 Biased processing has been established in different cognitive domains, such as 
attention and memory. Because of this bias, depressed individuals attend selectively towards 
negative information and away from positive information (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). 
Reaction time task such as the Emotional Stroop task and the Dot Probe task are widely used 
to assess attentional bias (Bradley et al., 1997a; Gotlib et al., 2004a). Depressed individuals 
generally experience attentional interference as well as impaired attentional disengagement 
from negative information (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). In addition to attentional biases, 
depression is also characterized by biased processing in memory. In fact, more attentional 
focus toward negative information may stimulate encoding of negative information which 
in turn may cause an overrepresentation of negative information in memory (Joormann et 
al., 2007a). Depressed individuals tend to have trouble recalling positive information, while 
negative information is generally recalled more easily (Matt et al., 1992). Memory bias has 
most frequently been found for self-referential information and in explicit memory tasks 
(Denny & Hunt, 1992; Ellwart et al., 2003; Matt et al., 1992; Ridout et al., 2009; Watkins et al., 
1992; Williams et al., 2007). Based on the cognitive theories, one could expect biases to prevail 
in other automatic processes as well, such as basic motivated approach-avoidance behavior. 
In anxiety, automatic behavioral approach-avoidance tendencies have been measured using 
the Approach-Avoidance Task (Rinck & Becker, 2007). Behavioral biases have received little 
attention so far. It is important to note that parallel processing of negative and positive 
information can occur: preferential processing of negative information is a process that can 
operate separately from the processing of positive information (Goeleven et al., 2006).
Biased processing as vulnerability factor for depression
 These cognitive processing biases are also present in sub-clinical depression and 
transient sad mood state (Bradley et al., 1997b; Matt et al., 1992). In non-depressed samples, 
experimentally induced sad mood is used as analogue for depression to study biased 
processing (Bradley et al., 1997b; Fitzgerald et al., 2011). What is more, after recovery from 
depression, exposure to stress or a sad mood induction can trigger biased processing (Gupta 
& Kar, 2012; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; McCabe et al., 2000; Scher et al., 2005). This is in 
contrast to processing in healthy never-depressed individuals, who tend to give priority to 
positive over negative information (Deldin et al., 2001; Gotlib & McLachlan, 1988; Karparova 
et al., 2007; McCabe et al., 2000). However, biased processing has also been found in never-
depressed girls at high risk for depression due to their mothers’ psychopathology (Joormann 
et al., 2007b). Taken together, cognitive biases have been found in currently depressed 
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individuals, in subclinical depression, after remission and also in non-depressed vulnerable 
individuals. This indicates that biased processing of emotional information represents a 
stable vulnerability factor for depression, which may in turn contribute to recurrence of 
depressive episodes (Gotlib & Cane, 1987; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Gupta & Kar, 2008; 
Joormann & Gotlib, 2007). 
Attentional bias versus memory bias
 In response to theories put forth by Beck and Bower (Beck, 1976, 2008; Bower, 1981), 
Williams and colleagues (1997) stated that biased memory is most characteristic of depression, 
while attentional biases might be more strongly related to anxiety and not depression. 
In contrast to anxiety, attentional biases favoring negative information in depression are 
presumed to occur at later, controlled stages of processing, such as elaboration(Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2005). More specifically, depressed individuals tend to show impaired attentional 
disengaging from negative information rather than enhanced attentional engagement 
with negative information (De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Rinck & Becker, 2005). This has been 
substantiated by studies using free-viewing eye-tracking paradigms (Caseras et al., 2007; 
Eizenman et al., 2003; Kellough et. al, 2008). The results on attentional bias in depression 
are, however, mixed as a recent meta-analysis by Peckham and colleagues (2010) found 
consistent evidence for biased attentional processing for both short and long presentation 
times (attentional engagement and disengagement, respectively). Although there are mixed 
ideas and results on attentional and memory biases in depression, cognitive theories have 
now coalesced that biased processing is indeed an important characteristic of depression.
Working memory bias
 Biased processing has also been established in executive function processes 
especially working memory (Hertel, 1997; Joormann et al., 2007a). Depressed individuals have 
difficulties in limiting the access of irrelevant negative information into working memory 
and removing negative content that is no longer relevant from working memory. This results 
in a overrepresentation of negative and an underrepresentation of positive information in 
working memory. Joormann and colleagues’ impaired cognitive control account (2007a, 
2010) even specifies a causal pathway linking biased working memory processing to 
difficulties in disengaging attention from negative information, which in turn may result 
in storage in long-term memory, setting the stage for memory biases. Taken together, the 
cognitive theories of depression overlap in that they assume biased processing of negative 
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over positive information in different cognitive domains, such as attention and (working) 
memory (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010) and perhaps also in other automatic processes. 
Measuring biased processing
 There is a large range of instruments and experimental paradigms available 
to measure different biased processes. Some of the most widely used measures are the 
Emotional Stroop task, the Dot Probe task and self-referent explicit memory tasks (Bradley et 
al., 1997a/b; Gotlib et al., 2004a). In the Emotional Stroop task, colored emotional words are 
presented and participants are instructed to name the color in which the word is printed while 
ignoring the semantic meaning. In depressed individuals, negative words tend to intervene 
with color-naming, resulting in longer reaction times compared to positive or neutral words. 
The Dot Probe task assesses selective attention by presenting two stimuli, simultaneously, 
and replacing one of the two stimuli by a probe. Participants are instructed to indicate the 
location of the probe. If depressed participants are focusing their attention on, e.g. a negative 
stimulus, reaction time to the probe in the same location will be shorter than then the probe 
replaces the competing stimulus, e.g. a neutral item. Eye-tracking tasks provide a valuable 
addition to these reaction time tasks. An advantage of this technique is that it can provide 
both a direct and continuous record of the allocation of attention over an extended interval 
of time while multiple stimuli compete for attention. Depression researchers utilizing 
eye-tracking technology have typically used free-viewing tasks, in which participants are 
presented with multiple emotional stimuli and are given few instructions (Caseras et al., 
2007; Eizenman et al., 2003; Kellough et al., 2008). For assessment of memory bias, tasks 
often involve an incidental encoding phase in which participants are presented with self-
referential positive and negative words. Incidental encoding improves ecological validity 
as demand characteristics are low (Helmstaedter et al., 1998). After a brief distraction, 
an unannounced free recall phase follows in which participants are asked to write down 
the words they recall. Depressed individuals tend to encode and subsequently recall more 
negative and less positive words than non-depressed individuals. The measures presented 
here are widely used for studying attentional and memory biases (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). 
However, it is important to note that the retest reliability of specifically the Emotional Stroop 
task and the Dot Probe task is low (e.g. Eide et al., 2002; Schmukle, 2005). 
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Overview of bias tasks and the domain-specific measure :
Task Bias type
Emotional Stroop task Attentional interference
Dot Probe task Selective attention 
Free-viewing eye-tracking task Complex attentional deployment (onset, maintenance, 
disengagement)
Self-referent memory task Explicit memory
Approach Avoidance Task (AAT) Behavioral tendencies (approach-avoidance)
Bias manipulation
 Because cognitive biases are regarded as a vulnerability factor for depression 
(Beevers & Carver, 2003; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), a logical next step is to explore the causal 
relationship between biased processing and depressive symptoms. This can be accomplished 
by the experimental manipulation or reversal of biases, or Cognitive Bias Modification 
(CBM). In CBM, cognitive biases are directly altered using computerized training procedures, 
and the consequences for clinically relevant symptoms are assessed (Mathews & MacLeod, 
2002). Negative mood and motional reactivity to stress are characteristics of depression and 
anxiety (Myin-Germeys et al., 2003). Studies applying CBM paradigms to healthy samples 
have shown that, in addition to manipulating biases, CBM also affects emotional reactivity 
to subsequent stressors, such as a social stressful situation or an extremely difficult anagram 
solving task (Beard et al., 2012; MacLeod et al., 2002; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Wilson 
et al., 2006). Individuals who have been trained to preferentially process negative over 
positive information exhibit elevations of negative mood state in response to stress, relative 
to individuals who have been trained towards positive information. In addition to altering 
stress reactivity in healthy individuals, CBM has been found to be effective in the treatment 
of anxiety (see review and meta-analyses: Beard et al., 2012; Hakamata et al., 2010; Hallion & 
Ruscio, 2011). In contrast, investigators examining CBM have focused far less frequently on 
depression (Beard et al., 2012; Hertel & Mathews, 2011) and the results are somewhat mixed 
(Baert et al., 2010; Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Wells & Beevers, 2010). 
This underscores the point that more research into depression vulnerability factors is timely 
and necessary. 
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Genetic vulnerability for depression
 Depression is a complex multifaceted condition with considerable evidence pointing 
towards genetic inheritance (Sullivan et al., 2000). Studying the genetic underpinnings of 
depression will increase understanding of the biology of this disease. This will in turn aid 
tailoring treatment - both pharmacological as psychological - to the individual. Selecting 
treatment modality based on the expected response related to the individual’s genetic 
susceptibility, will expectantly lead to an increase in treatment success rates (Beevers & 
McGeary, 2012; Kato & Serretti, 2010; Lester & Eley, 2013). Many different genetic variants 
have been associated with depression and the genetic effects are generally extremely small 
(Hamer, 2002). Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS) present a hypothesis-free approach 
that has been used to identify genetic variants associated with depression without any prior 
hypothesis about biology or function (Bush& Moore, 2012). As can be expected from such 
a complex disorder, there is not a single gene responsible for the occurrence of depression. 
Instead, GWAS have resulted in the identification of multiple candidate genes for depression. 
Replication of these results has, however, been limited (Wray et al., 2010). When studying 
depression, candidate genes are still selected based on their biological working mechanisms.
Depression candidate genes 
 Based on biological working mechanisms, clinical evidence and associations with 
depression characteristics, e.g. stress-sensitivity or altered cognitive processes, some of the 
currently most frequently studied depression candidate genes are:
 ● Solute Carrier Family 6 (Neurotransmitter Transporter, Serotonin), Member 4 (SLC6A4): 
this gene encodes an integral membrane protein that transports the neurotransmitter 
serotonin from synaptic spaces into presynaptic neurons. The encoded protein 
terminates the action of serotonin and recycles it in a sodium-dependent manner. A 
functional polymorphism (5-HTTLPR) in the pro moter region (Lesch et al., 1996) has been 
frequently related to depression and stress-sensitivity (Karg et al., 2011). The presence of 
one or two short alleles leads to less transcription, lower transporter levels and reduced 
update of serotonin (Hariri & Holmes, 2006; Lesch et al., 1996; Lotrich & Pollock, 2004).
 ● Brain-Derived Neurotrophic Factor (BDNF): this gene encodes the BDNF neurotrophin 
that exerts long-term effects on neuronal survival, migration and growth (Chen et al., 
2004a). BDNF is active in the hippocampus, cortex and basal forebrain – brain areas 
vital to learning, memory and executive functioning (Yamada & Nabeshima, 2003). A 
large body of evidence supports the involvement of the BDNF Val66Met polymorphism 
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in depressive states, as well as emotional responses and stress-sensitivity (Gatt et al., 
2007; Kempton et al., 2011; Lau et al,. 2010; Montag et al., 2008; Scharinger et al., 2010; 
Schofield et al., 2009; Shirayama et al., 2002; Urani et al,. 2005; Van Oostrom et al., 2012). 
The Met allele has been associated with lower BDNF secretion (Egan et al., 2003) and 
reduced hippocampal activity (Chen et al., 2004a).
 ● Catechol-O-MethylTransferase (COMT): the COMT enzyme is a key modulator of dopamine 
levels in the prefrontal cortex of the human brain (Akil et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2004b). 
A G-to-A transition at codon 158 influences dopamine catabolisis, resulting in higher 
synaptic dopamine levels following neurotransmitter release for the Met allele (Chen et 
al., 2004b; Lachman et al., 1996). The COMT Val158Met polymorphism is associated with 
depression, stress-sensitivity and executive functioning (Barnett et al., 2008; Egan et al., 
2001; Goldberg et al., 2003). More specifically, the Met allele has been associated with 
risk for depression, bias and sensitivity to stressful life events (Aberg et al., 2011; Bishop 
et al., 2006; Buckert et al., 2012; Drury et al., 2010; Enoch et al., 2003; Massat et al., 2005; 
Schellekens et al., 2012; Smolka et al., 2005; Williams et al., 2010).
 ● Mineralocorticoid receptor (NR3C2): the NR3C2 gene codes for a receptor that interacts 
with the stress hormone cortisol. Together with the glucocorticoid receptor, the 
mineralocorticoid receptor regulates the hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal axis and 
responds to stress-induced increases in cortisol levels through which it presumably 
mediates the effects of stress (Joels et al., 2008). The NR3C2 gene has been associated 
with depression, rumination and hopelessness (the latter two being characteristics of 
depression; Hlavacova et al., 2010; Karst et al., 2010; Klok, 2011a, 2011b; Otte, 2010). The 
A allele of the NR3C2 SNP rs5534 has been associated with memory bias and sensitivity 
to stressful life events (Vogel et al., 2014). 
Stressful life events and gene-environment interactions
 The interaction between genetic and environmental factors has been studied in the 
context of biased processing of emotional information as an endophenotype for depression. 
This is based on findings indicating that certain polymorphisms may not function simply 
as vulnerability factors but instead perform a more complex role by regulating reactivity 
to environmental effects. The diathesis-stress model postulates that some individuals are 
at heightened risk - because of their genetic make-up - of succumbing to psychological 
disturbance when they encounter adversity, whereas others, lacking the genetic vulnerability, 
are less affected even when exposed to the very same adversity (Monroe & Simons, 1991). 
Caspi and colleagues (2003) found that the expression of genes may in fact depend on the 
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environment, a concept they refer to as gene-environment interactions. In their seminal 
paper, they show the short allele variant of the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism interacting with 
the experience of life events to increase the risk of developing depression (Caspi et al., 2003). 
On their own, experiencing stressful life events is considered a risk factor for depression 
(Gibb et al., 2001; Hovens et al., 2010; Kendler et al., 1999). The effect of genotype on 
vulnerability to depression may differ depending on the experience of environmental stress 
(Caspi et al., 2003; Caspi et al., 2010; Caspi & Moffitt, 2006). This is important because finding 
gene-environment interaction effects communicates that both specific genes and specific 
environmental risks can have conceivably much stronger connections with depression 
than previously thought, within vulnerable groups (Moffitt et al., 2006). If the interaction 
between genes and environmental stress is in fact that important, focusing on genes or 
environmental risk may lead to underrepresentation of results on depression vulnerability. 
For example, not including environmental effects may possibly have contributed to the lack 
of association of the widely studied BDNF Val66Met polymorphism with depression reported 
in a recent meta-analysis (Gyekis et al., 2013). Hence, it seems crucial to define under what 
environmental circumstances genetic vulnerabilities are likely to be expressed or repressed. 
This is especially important in the context of translational science as environmental settings 
may be manipulated to optimize treatment.
 More recently, Belsky and his colleagues (Belsky et al., 2007; Belsky & Pluess, 2009a/b; 
Ellis et al., 2011a) elaborated on the diathesis-stress model by proposing that individuals that 
who are genetically most susceptible to adversity are simultaneously most likely to benefit 
from supportive or enriching experiences, or the differential susceptibility hypothesis (e.g. 
Aguilera et al., 2009; Firk & Markus, 2007; Fox et al., 2009; Hayden et al., 2008, 2013). For 
example, Aguilera and colleagues (2009) found that childhood trauma had a greater impact 
on depressive symptoms in Met allele (i.e. risk allele) carriers of the BDNF gene than in the 
Val/Val group, as well as in the short allele carriers of the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism. It is 
important to note that most of the gene-environment interaction studies have focused on 
(the absence of) adverse environmental contexts and only few on positive environmental 
effects, such the positive effects of psychotherapeutic interventions (Lester & Eley, 2013). 
Another critical note is that many of the reported gene-environment interaction effects have 
low statistical power and have not been replicated (Munafò et al., 2009; Risch et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, there seems to be little consensus on the environmental variables studied. 
More effects should therefore be directed at substantiating and extending previous findings 
(Uher & McGuffin, 2008, 2010)
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Biased processing as an endophenotype for depression
 In addition to studying the association between genes and depressive symptoms, 
research has focused on the genetic basis of the behavioral characteristics of depression 
that are assumed to be more stable and more clearly linked to genetics than psychiatric 
diagnoses, so called endophenotypes (Gottesman & Gould 2003; Kendler & Neale, 2010). 
Endophenotypes are measurable components of a disorder that lie in-between genes and 
the disorder and hence bridge the gap between high-level symptom presentation and 
low-level genetic variability, such as single nucleotide polymorphisms. The criteria of an 
endophenotype are (Gottesman & Gould 2003; Leboyer et al., 1998):
 ● The endophenotype is associated with illness in the population.
 ● The endophenotype is heritable.
 ● The endophenotype is primarily state-independent (manifests in an individual whether 
or not illness is active or expressed).
 ● Within families, endophenotype and illness co-segregate.
 ● The endophenotype found in affected family members is found in non-affected family 
members at a higher rate than in the general population.
 Endophenotypes are implemented at an increasing rate in research into the genetics 
of psychiatric disorders (Flint & Munafò, 2007) as genetic analyses offer less heterogeneity 
in depression research (Gottesman & Gould, 2003). Endophenotypes are present at different 
intermediate levels: cell function, brain function and behavior. As graphically presented in the 
figure below (adapted from Franke et al., 2009), biased processing of emotional information 
as an endophenotype lies in between the genes (genotype) and the depressive symptoms 
(phenotype):
Endophenotype  depression
behavior
disease  
symptoms
genotype
endophenotype
phenotype
genesSLC6A4 NR3C2COMT BDNF
bias
depression
cell function
brain function
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Biased processing as an endophenotype
 Biased processing of emotional information is considered a promising endophenotype 
for depression (De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Hasler et al., 2004). Biased processing is regarded as 
a trait characteristic of depression as it has been observed in remitted depressed individuals 
(Bhagwagar et al., 2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Ramel et al., 2007). Furthermore, biased 
processing has been examined in first degree relatives of formerly depressed individuals. For 
example, Joormann and colleagues (2007b) investigated whether never-depressed daughters 
whose mothers have experienced recurrent episodes of depression during their daughters’ 
lifetime were characterized by attentional bias, assessed by a Dot Probe task. Daughters at 
elevated risk for depression showed more negative attentional bias than daughters of never-
depressed mothers, who attended more to positive stimuli. This pattern of results has been 
further evidenced in never-depressed first degree relatives of formerly depressed individuals, 
using an Emotional Stroop task (Van Oostrom et al., 2013). Never-depressed individuals with 
a family history of depression, like depressed patients, showed more negative attentional 
bias than relatives of never-depressed individuals. 
 Moreover, evidence is now emerging that biased processing of emotional information 
may be heritable (Hasler et al., 2004), since it has been associated with variation in the 
aforementioned candidate genes for depression. The 5-HTTLPR polymorphism in the SLC6A4 
gene has been related to attentional, memory and working memory biases in non-depressed 
individuals (Beevers et al., 2007, 2009, 2011; Fox et al., 2009; Hayden et al., 2008, 2013; 
Jonassen et al., 2013; Kwang et al., 2010; Pergamin-Hight et al., 2012). For example, non-
depressed carriers of the 5-HTTLPR short allele (i.e. risk allele) tend to display both reduced 
positive attentional bias (Fox et al., 2009) as well as biased attention towards negative 
information (Beevers et al., 2007; Kwang et al., 2010; for meta-analysis see Pergamin-Hight 
et al., 2012), compared to individuals with two long alleles. Also of importance is that the 
BDNF gene, the COMT gene and the NR3C2 gene have been previously associated with biased 
processing of emotional information (Hayden et al., 2013; Gerritsen et al., 2011; Gong et al., 
2013; Lau et al., 2010; Montag et al., 2008; Schofield et al., 2009; Van Oostrom et al., 2012; 
Vogel et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2010). To illustrate, the Met allele of the BDNF Val66Met 
polymorphism has been associated with attentional bias away from positive information in 
non-depressed individuals (Gong et al., 2013). Taken together, the results indicate that biased 
processing of emotional information is indeed a fitting endophenotype for depression, as it 
is a heritable trait factor that is related to both the disorder as well as genetic variability and 
present itself in non-affected family members. 
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Gene-environment interactions in relation to biased processing as an endophenotype for 
depression
 As presented above, gene-environment interactions provide valuable information 
when studying depression characteristics. Recently, studies have started examining the 
interaction between environmental stress and depression candidate genes in association 
with endophenotypes for depression. To illustrate, Disner and colleagues (in press) found that 
5-HTTLPR short allele homozygote army war soldiers showed stronger negative attentional 
bias than long allele carriers after stressful deployment to a war zone. 5-HTTLPR short allele 
homozygotes also showed more negative attentional bias under current experimentally 
induced stress (Markus & De Raedt, 2011). Gene-environment interactions have also been 
found in relation to memory bias: individuals carrying the BDNF Met allele who experience 
stressful life events showed most negative memory bias (Van Oostrom et al., 2012). A 
similar pattern of results was found in risk allele carriers of the NR3C2 rs5534 genotype who 
experienced stressful life events (Vogel et al., 2014).
Aims and outline of this thesis
 Emotional processing biases are a vulnerability factor and, in relation to genetic 
vulnerability, a complimentary endophenotype for depression. Both genetic factors and 
stressful life events contribute to the development of depression. In fact, depression candidate 
gene risk allele carriers seem to be differentially affected by stressful events, indicative of 
gene-environment interactions. During the last decade, the focus seems to have been on 
defining and mapping the concept of ‘biased processing’; to study in which cognitive and 
behavioral domains does biased processing occur and under which circumstances. Given that 
so much knowledge has been gained on the specifics of biased processing in depression (and 
often co-occurring anxiety), the field now appears to have shifted towards requiring more 
in-depth examination of different bias measures and variables to come to a more integrated 
approach (Everaert et al., 2012). The general purpose of this thesis is to provide a systematic 
examination of processing biases as endophenotype for depression. 
 Although studies have started combining and comparing well-established bias 
measures, only few studies up to date have examined different biases in one sample. We 
aimed to examine and compare different cognitive as well as environmental depression 
vulnerability factors. The vast majority of research on processing bias as endophenotype 
for depression has been executed in samples of healthy non-depressed individuals. This 
has provided valuable information on the cognitive and biological underpinnings of biased 
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processing as well as aided selection of bias measures and candidate genes. However, if we 
want to know about depression vulnerability factors, we should also examine individuals 
who have a high change of developing a subsequent depressive episode. A remitted depressed 
sample offers the possibilities to study cognitive processes in individuals highly at risk for 
depressive episodes (Bockting et al., 2006; Kanai et al., 2003), while minimizing the effect 
of depressive symptoms or concomitants on cognitive biases or retrospective report of life 
events (Bhagwagar & Cowen, 2007). Hence, another aim of this thesis was to study biased 
processing of emotional information as an endophenotype for depression in individuals who 
are at risk for a repeated depressive episode.
 This will expectantly advance the cognitive theories of depression (e.g. theories 
of Beck, 1976, 2008; Bower, 1981; Williams et al., 1997) and provide information on which 
biased processes may be especially promising as an endophenotype for depression. The 
studies discussed in this thesis will hopefully guide research on depression vulnerability as 
well as stimulate future research on experimental, psychological and biological interventions 
for depression. The implications of the thesis will be elaborated on in the Discussion section. 
Specifically, we aimed to study biased processing in different cognitive and behavioral 
domains in a non-depressed, remitted depressed and currently depressed sample and 
examine the cohesion between biases (Chapters 2, 3, & 4). The results of these studies guided 
us to compare the contribution of different life events and bias variables to depressive case 
status and recurrence of depressive episodes (Chapter 5). Based on these results, we studied 
appropriate cognitive bias measures as endophenotypes for depression in relation to gene-
environment interaction effects (Chapters 6 & 7). Lastly, we examined the causal effect of 
manipulation of a possible bias endophenotype on biased processing and stress-sensitivity 
(Chapter 8). 
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A schematic overview of the studies and respective samples of this thesis is presented in the 
figure below: 
Depression vulnerability
Biases
Behavioral  
Selective  
attention
Working memory
Memory
Stressful life events
Genes  
Attention  
interference
Attentional 
disengagement
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Chapter 2
Coherence between attentional and memory biases in 
sad and formerly depressed individuals
This chapter is based on Vrijsen, J.N., van Oostrom, I., Isaac, L., Becker, E.S. & Speckens, A. (in press). 
Coherence between attentional and memory biases in sad and formerly depressed individuals. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research.
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Abstract
 Cognitive theories assume a uniform processing bias across different samples, but 
the empirical support for this claim is rather weak and inconsistent. Therefore, coherence 
between biases across different cognitive domains in a sample of 133 non-depressed (Study 1) 
and a sample of 266 formerly depressed individuals (Study 2) was examined. In both studies, 
individuals were selected after a successful sad mood induction procedure. A Dot Probe task, 
an Emotional Stroop task and a self-referential Incidental Learning and Free Recall task were 
administered to all participants. Principle component analyses indicated coherence between 
attentional and memory bias in non depressed, while in formerly depressed individuals 
distinct components for attentional biases and for memory bias were uncovered. The data 
suggest that in formerly depressed individuals, self-referent processing during encoding 
may be related to memory bias, whereas in non-depressed individuals memory bias may be 
related to both attentional bias and self-referent processing.
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Introduction
 The cognitive theories of depression (Beck, 1976, 2008; Bower, 1981; Gotlib & 
Joormann, 2010) posit that depressed individuals show preferential processing of negative 
over positive information (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994, 2005). Processing biases endure 
beyond a depressive episode and are activated by stress or negative mood (Joormann & 
Gotlib, 2007; McCabe et al., 2000). After recovery from depression, exposure to a negative 
mood induction can trigger biased processing (Scher et al., 2005), suggesting that biases 
may play an important role in the vulnerability to depression (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). 
In fact, preferential processing of negative information is regarded as a determinant of the 
development and recurrence of depression (Beevers & Carver, 2003; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). 
In non-depressed individuals, induced sad mood is also associated with biased processing 
of emotional information (Bradley et al., 1997b; Matt et al., 1992). It has generally been 
found that sad and (formerly) depressed individuals recall negative information more easily 
than positive information (Matt et al., 1992; Ridout et al., 2009). Biased memory has most 
frequently been found for self-referential information (Matt et al., 1992). Sad and depressed 
individuals also show preferential attentional processing of negative information (Peckham 
et al., 2010). 
 The cognitive theories assume uniformity among biases in multiple cognitive 
domains and the ‘combined cognitive bias hypothesis’ has elaborated on this notion by 
arguing that biases influence each other (Hirsch et al., 2006). However, only a handful of 
studies have looked at the coherence between attentional and memory biases in the same 
sample and these findings are inconsistent (Everaert et al., 2012). In their review paper, 
Everaert and colleagues discuss studies examining the association between biases which 
provide information about uniformity among biased cognitive processes. Attentional biases 
for verbal and facial stimuli and memory bias for verbal stimuli were not interrelated in a 
sample of depressed individuals, as the different bias indices did not correlate significantly 
(Gotlib et al., 2004a). Another study found coherence between attentional and memory 
biases for identical verbal stimuli in a sample of dysphoric students, but not in non-
dysphoric students (Koster et al., 2010). Similarly, evidence was reported for a meditational 
role of attentional bias in the association between dysphoria status and memory bias in 
undergraduate students (Ellis et al., 2011b; Wells et al., 2010). In these studies, attention for 
respectively verbal and facial stimuli measured with eye-tracking free viewing paradigms 
was associated with dysphoria status as well as with recognition of the previously presented 
stimuli. In summary, the studies report coherence between biases in dysphoria and no 
coherence between biases in currently depressed and healthy individuals. This may reflect 
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different processes depending on depressive status. To date, there is little evidence for 
coherence between biases in clinical samples and coherence has not yet been studied in sad 
transient mood or formerly depressed individuals. 
 Gaining more insight into the interrelatedness between biases seems especially 
important now studies have started examining the causal relationship between biases and 
their effect on emotional symptoms, using Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) techniques. 
In CBM, cognitive biases are altered using computerized training procedures, and the 
consequences for clinically relevant symptoms are assessed (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). 
Studies have found that manipulation of a cognitive bias can transfer to another cognitive 
domain (Hertel & Mathews, 2011), indicating coherence between biases. Most CBM studies 
have, however, focused on healthy individuals and the few studies in depression have 
yielded mixed results (Beard et al., 2012; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). This also indicates that 
perhaps biased processing operates under different conditions in clinically depressed than in 
healthy (sad) individuals. Therefore, examining interrelations between biases in depressive 
mood state as well as depression vulnerability will advance our understanding about the 
relationship between biases. 
 We explored the coherence between attentional and memory biases in sad mood 
state (Study 1) and remitted depression (Study 2) using three well-established tasks similar 
to those in the study of Gotlib and his colleagues (2004; Dot Probe task, Emotional Stroop 
task, self-referential explicit memory task). If, as predicted by the cognitive theories, biased 
processing is a prominent characteristic of depressive mood state as well as depression 
vulnerability, uniformity on different bias measures should be uncovered in both studies. 
This is based on the prediction that individuals displaying a pronounced negative bias on one 
task should also be more sensitive to negative stimuli on the other tasks.
Study 1
Method
Participants
 This study is part of a larger study, which aims to link cognitive biases to 
genetic susceptibility to depression and includes several computer tasks. A sample of 180 
undergraduate female students of the Radboud University Nijmegen participated in this 
study. All non-depressed participants (NDs) gave informed consent and received course credit 
in return for their participation. Demographics and sample descriptives are presented in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1 Means, percentages and standard deviations (SD) of demographics and BDI-II scores per sample (NDs 
in Study 1, FDs in Study 2*)
Dot Probe Emotional Stroop Incidental Learning and 
Free Recall
Dependent
variable
Sample Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N 
Age (years) NDs 21.2 3.9 133 20.5 2.5 91 21.1 3.9 116
FDs 47.4 11.9 266 47.1 12.0 226 47.4 11.7 256
Sex
(%female)
NDs 100.0 133 100.0 91 100.0 116
FDs 66.0 266 66.0 226 65.0 256
BDI-II
(total)
NDs 5.7 5.4 133 6.3 5.9 91 5.6 5.6 116
FDs 14.7 10.0 266 14.2 10.0 226 14.7 9.9 256
*NDs refers to non-depressed individuals and FDs refers to formerly depressed individuals
Materials and Apparatus
 Mood Induction Before each task, participants saw a highly emotional sad scene 
(respectively 12, 6 and 4 minutes in length) from the movie ‘‘Sophie’s choice’’ (see Fitzgerald 
et al., 2011). Participants were instructed to let the emotionality of the film influence their 
mood and to maintain the sad mood state. Participants were asked to rate their current mood 
state using a computerized visual analogue scale, that ranged from -10 (indicating saddest 
mood) to 10 (indicating happiest mood), at baseline and after each mood induction. Only 
participants for whom the mood induction was successful (i.e. who rated their mood state 
after the mood induction as more sad than happy) were selected. This resulted in a sample of 
135 NDs, which represents 75% of the total sample of NDs. Using this selection criterion for 
all three mood inductions engendered some differences in sample size per task. 
 Dot Probe Task The design of the Dot Probe task was identical to the version used 
by Joormann and colleagues (2006). Sixty pairs of images were selected from the Karolinska 
Directed Emotional Faces database (Lundqvist et al., 1998). Each pair depicted an individual 
with two different facial expressions: 20 pairs had angry and neutral facial expressions, 20 
pairs sad and neutral and 20 pairs happy and neutral expressions. The 1,000 ms presentation 
of a face pair was preceded by a black fixation cross in the middle of the screen (for 500 ms). 
Following the offset of the pictures, a small gray dot appeared on the screen location where 
one of the pictures had been and remained on the screen until the participant indicated 
whether the gray dot was on the left or right side of the computer screen by pressing one 
of two keys on the keyboard. Participants were instructed to determine the location of the 
probe as quickly and accurately as possible. The inter trial interval was 1,000 ms. Participants 
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first practiced with only responding to the dot. Then, 12 neutral–neutral face pairs were used 
for practice trials. Each of the picture pairs was presented in each of four blocks, for a total of 
240 trials, with a brief rest period between each block. The four presentations of each picture 
pair, the side on which the emotion face was presented and the side on which the dot was 
presented was counterbalanced for the four presentations each of picture pair, such that one 
of each of the four possible iterations was presented in each block for each pair. 
 Emotional Stroop Task A computerized Emotional Stroop color-naming task with 
word-by-word presentation was used to measure attentional interference. A word-byword 
version instead of a card version was chosen because the experimenter could not be present 
during testing. The order of the three valenced blocks (negative, neutral and positive) was 
randomized for each participant. Words were presented in red, yellow, green or blue against 
a white background. The testing phase was preceded by 18 practice trials of mixed valence 
including color words. Participants were instructed to indicate the ink color by pressing 
the corresponding key on the key board. Corresponding color dots were presented at the 
bottom of the screen during practice. During testing, the dots appeared for 1,000 ms in case 
of an error, simultaneously presented with the Dutch for ‘ERROR’ in red. The valenced blocks 
each consisted of 18 different words, presented 3 times, resulting in 54 trials per block. The 
words were presented in fixed order, with the restriction that a certain word would not be 
presented more than twice in a row. The words were selected from a database (Phaf et al., 
2006) and matched for length across the valences.
 Incidental Learning Task and Free Recall Participants were presented with 12 negative 
and 12 positive words in fixed order, with the restriction that no more than two words of the 
same valence would be presented consecutively. Words were selected from two databases 
(Dutch translation of the Affective Norms for English Words database, Bradley & Lang, 
1999; Phaf et al., 2006). Each word was presented for 10 s in capital black letters against a 
white background. To make encoding self-referential, participants were instructed to vividly 
imagine themselves in a scene with the presented word (Rogers et al., 1977). Participants 
were asked to rate how well they were able to imagine themselves in the scene on a 5-point 
Likert scale. The next word would appear after the number corresponding with their answer 
was selected and confirmed. This task was followed by a short paper-and-pencil distraction 
task (Raven matrices; Raven, 1958). Upon completion, participants were instructed to return 
to the computer for an unannounced free recall of the words from the previous computer 
task. Participants were instructed to type in all the words they could remember within 3 
minutes. 
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Procedure
 Participants first filled out the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) as 
well as some questions about sociodemographic information. Then the first mood induction 
started. Subsequently, participants went through the Emotional Stroop task, the second 
mood induction, the Incidental Learning Task and Free Recall, a third mood induction and 
finally the Dot Probe task.
Statistical Analysis
 Reaction time (RT) trials associated with incorrect responses and mechanical errors 
were eliminated from the data (5% of all Stroop data and 1% of all Dot Probe data) as well 
as extreme RT trials in the top and bottom 2% of the variance. We corrected for the effects 
of potential outliers by computing the median RT of each participant, on each task, group 
and trial type. On the Dot Probe task, bias-scores were computed for each participant and 
for each emotional expression type, by subtracting the compatible trials (dot appeared on 
the side of the emotional face) from the incompatible trials (dot appeared on the side of the 
neutral face). The effect of the mood induction and the bias effects were examined using 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
 To examine the underlying structure of the biases, we created one bias difference-
score per task that would best represent the relevant bias. On Dot Probe task: bias-score 
happy - bias-score sad faces, on Emotional Stroop task: (RT positive - RT neutral) - (RT negative 
- RT neutral), and on the Incidental Learning task and Free Recall: positive - negative scores. 
A higher/more positive score would represent stronger bias towards positive information 
compared to negative information. Correlations between the bias difference-scores were 
calculated and the coherence among the three different cognitive processing tasks was 
examined using principle component analyses (PCA) with oblique rotation (oblimin) to 
assess the covariance between factors. PCA allows for determining linear combinations of 
the variables while retaining as much information from the original measured variables 
as possible (Fabrigar et al., 1999). It allows for studying underlying structures above and 
beyond associations. The dot probe angry condition was left out of the PCA because the aim 
was to study the coherence between interference, selective attention and memory for similar 
(i.e. sad) stimuli. Also, we wanted to include comparable variables in Study 1 and 2. The 
association of the components scores derived from the PCA with depressive symptomatology 
(BDI-II total score) was analyzed using linear regression. 
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Results
Mood Induction
 NDs showed a significant decline in mood rating between baseline (M=4.42 
SD=3.69) and after the mood inductions (M=-2.87 SD=1.96; M=-4.00 SD=2.62; M=-4.96 
SD=1.99 after the first, second and third mood induction, respectively), F(3,21)=52.79, 
p<.001, f=2.75. Due to a programming error, baseline mood state ratings of only 39 NDs 
were available.
Table 2 Means and SDs of the reaction times, bias-scores and recall rates on the cognitive tasks per sample 
(NDs in Study 1, FDs in Study 2*)
Task and stimulus type
Non-depressed (Study 1) Formerly depressed (Study 2)
Mean SD Mean SD
Dot Probe
(bias score in ms)
Angry faces -4.43 35.83
Sad faces 5.17 30.37 -4.19 40.22
Happy faces -2.80 27.76 -5.24 47.15
Emotional Stroop
(in ms)
Negative/depr. words 590 90 35839 7419
Neutral words 598 93
36982
33951
7618
Positive words 578 77 6642
Incidental Learning and Free Recall
(med. imagery, #words)
Imagery neg. words 3.68 .84 3.69 .96
Imagery pos. words 4.20 .70 3.93 .99
Memory neg. words 4.36 1.96 3.15 1.56
Memory pos. words 5.36 1.68 4.38 2.00
*NDs refers to non-depressed individuals and FDs refers to formerly depressed individuals
Bias
 The means (these are in fact means of median RTs) and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 2. On the dot probe task, processing of the three facial expression differed 
from each other, F(2,131)=4.33, p<.05, f=.26. Specifically, preferential processing of sad faces 
was found with F(1,132)=6.64, p<.05, f=.22 comparing sad to happy faces and F(1,132)=6.48, 
p<.05, f=.22 comparing sad to angry faces. No significant difference was found between the 
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angry and happy faces, F(1,132)=.18, p=.67, f=.03. On the Emotional Stroop task, RTs for 
positive, neutral and negative words differed from each other, F(2,89)=6.98, p<.005, f=.40. 
NDs demonstrated shorter RTs for positive words compared to neutral words F(1,90)=14.11, 
p<.001, f=.40 and compared to negative words F(1,90)=5.14, p<.05, f=.24. Neutral and 
negative words resulted in comparable color naming RTs, F(1,90)=2.73, p=.10, f=.28. Results 
of the Incidental Learning task showed that NDs were better able to imagine themselves in a 
scene with positive than with negative words, F(1,115)=34.66, p<.001, f=.55. NDs recalled 
more positive than negative words, F(1,115)=29.78, p<.001, f=.51.
Coherence
 Table 3 presents the simple zero order correlations between the bias difference-
scores. None of the correlations were significant. Only PCA factor loadings higher than .4 
are presented (see Table 4). Two distinct components were uncovered. The Dot Probe task, 
the Emotional Stroop task and the Free Recall rates on the memory task cluster on one 
component. The second component consists of the imagery ratings and the recall rates 
within the Incidental Learning task and Free Recall phase. No co-variation between the 
factors was uncovered with a correlation of r=-.02. 
Table 3 Correlations* among the attentional and memory bias difference-scores per sample (NDs in Study 1, 
FDs in Study 2**). 
Dot Probe Stroop Imagery Memory 
Non-depressed
(Study 1)
Dot Probe        -
Stroop .16       -
Imagery -.08 -.07       -
Memory .04 .13 .04       -
Formerly depressed
(Study 2)
Dot Probe        -
Stroop .07       -
Imagery -.03 -.00       -
Memory -.06 .05 .11       -
*None of the correlations reached p<.05 level of significance
**NDs refers to non-depressed individuals and FDs refers to formerly depressed individuals
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Table 4 Factor loadings from Pattern Matrix per bias difference-score and sample (NDs in Study 1, FDs in 
Study 2*)
Component
1 2
Non-depressed
(Study 1)
Dot Probe .61
Stroop .71
Imagery .83
Memory .58 .55
Formerly depressed
(Study 2)
Dot Probe .70
Stroop .76
Imagery .70
Memory .73
*NDs refers to non-depressed individuals and FDs refers to formerly depressed individuals
Association Components with Depressive Symptomatology 
 The linear regression analyses did not yield a significant association between the 
attentional and memory bias component score (Dot Probe, Emotional Stroop and Free Recall) 
and BDI-II total score, β=.10, t=.92, p=.36, nor between the memory bias component score 
(imagery ratings and Free Recall) and BDI-II total score, β=-.18, t=-1.64, p=.11.
Discussion of Study 1
 Upon inspection of the factor loadings of the PCA analysis, the results revealed 
coherence between bias measures on the Dot Probe task, the Emotional Stroop task and 
the Free Recall task. This suggests that attentional biases and memory bias may share the 
same underlying process in non-depressed individuals in a sad mood state. Imagery and 
memory of the same valenced verbal stimuli clustered together on a second component. 
However, these components may not be associated with depressive symptomatology in non-
depressed individuals. As expected, NDs selectively attended to sad facial expressions and 
exhibited mood-congruent attention interference of negative words compared to positive 
words. Contrary to our expectations, sad mood state did not result in preferential imagery 
or recall of negative words. Fostered by the self-referential instructions, the positive self-
image non-depressed individuals generally have might not be overwritten by an induced 
negative mood state and sad non-depressed individuals might promote strategies to restore 
their original mood state during distraction (Parrott & Sabini, 1990). The finding that angry 
facial expressions attracted the least attention in this group may indicate that this facial 
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expression is not relevant for sad individuals. Is it important to note that undergraduate 
students represent a highly homogeneous and non-clinical group. To increase clinical 
relevance, coherence between attention and memory bias was studied in formerly depressed 
individuals in Study 2.
Study 2
Method
Participants
 A total of 337 formerly depressed individuals (FDs) participated in the study. 
This sample was recruited at the department of psychiatry of the Radboud University 
Medical Centre, as well as via HSK (multi-centred clinique). Participants were included if 
they met the criteria of the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) for a previous 
depressive episode. Exclusion criteria were: current depressive episode, current or lifetime 
bipolar disorder, current psychotic symptoms, alcohol or substance abuse within the past 6 
months, deafness, blindness, neurological disorder, sensorimotor handicaps and IQ estimate 
less than 70. Trained professionals interviewed eligible participants with the Structured 
Clinical Interview for the DSM–IV Axis-I disorders (SCID-I; First et al., 1995). The SCID-I has 
been demonstrated to have a good reliability (Skre et al., 1991; Williams et al., 1992). All 
interviewers had extensive training in the use of the SCID-I, as well as previous experience 
in administering structured clinical interviews to psychiatric patients. Participants received 
a gift certificate for their participation. Sample descriptive are presented in Table 1.
Materials and Apparatus
 Mood Induction FDs underwent a similar negative mood induction procedure as 
the sad mood group to activate biased processing (Segal & Ingram, 1994). Similar to study 
1, only participants for whom the mood induction was successful were selected (N=291, 
representing 86% of the total sample of FDs). Dot Probe Task In order to keep demands to 
a minimum, the trials with angry faces were not part of the Dot Probe task. Besides this 
difference, the Dot Probe task was identical to Study 1.
 Emotional Stroop Task In this study, a card version of the Emotional Stroop task was 
used with neutral, positive and negative words. After a practice card containing 15 words 
of mixed categories, the experimental cards containing 48 words each were presented in 
random order. Presentation of each card started when the researcher (blind to the words’ 
valence) pressed the space bar on the computer keyboard. It ended as soon as the participant 
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named the print color of the last word on the card and the researcher pressed the space bar 
again. Participants were instructed to correct errors, which was represented by a slightly 
longer response time. Total response time per card was used as the dependent variable. The 
words were selected from two databases (Bradley & Lang, 1999; Phaf et al., 2006) and were 
matched in length.
 Incidental Learning Task and Free Recall The procedure was the same in Study 2 as it 
was in Study 1, the only difference was that the negative words for the formerly depressed 
individuals were selected to be depression-specific. 
Procedure and Statistical Analysis 
 The procedure was similar for Study 1 and Study 2, with the only difference being 
that the formerly depressed individuals in Study 2 did not receive a third mood induction 
because a pilot study had learned that a third mood induction after the brief memory task 
put too much of a burden on the participants. Data cleaning procedures and analyses were 
similar for Study 1 and Study 2, except that age and sex were included as covariates in the 
ANCOVAs in Study 2. Furthermore, the association of the PCA component scores with number 
of past episodes was also analyzed.
Results
Mood Induction
 FDs showed a significant decrease in mood during both the first (pre M=3.49 
SD=3.96, post M=.04 SD=4.19) and second mood induction (pre M=3.30 SD=3.78, post 
M=-.60 SD=4.32), respectively F(1,253)=187.54, p<.001, f=.86 for the first mood induction 
and F(1,258)=341.90, p<.001, f=1.15 for the second.
Bias
 Mean bias scores and standard deviations are presented in Table 2. On the Dot 
Probe task, FDs showed preferential processing of sad versus happy faces, F(1,263)=4.01, 
p<.05, f=.12. On the Emotional Stroop task, a trend significant effect of Valence was found, 
F(2,220)=2.70, p=.07, f=.16. FDs showed longer RTs for depression-specific negative than 
for positive words, F(1,242)=48.29, p<.001, f=.45. They demonstrated most interference 
from neutral words, F(1,242)=19.72, p<.001, f=.28 comparing neutral to depression-specific 
negative and F(1,243)=112.40, p<.001, f=.68 comparing neutral to positive words. On the 
Incidental Learning task and Free Recall, FDs showed no difference on imagery of positive 
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and depression-specific negative words, F(1,264)=1.47, p=.23, f=.08. FDs recalled more 
positive than depression-specific negative words, F(1,253)=13.30, p<.001, f=.23. 
 Although all participants were in remission at the time of testing, there was 
variability in depressive symptomatology (range BDI-II total scores 0 to 46). To control for 
the effect of depressive symptoms on biased processing, the bias analyses were repeated 
including BDI-II total score as covariate. The effect of Valence remained significant on the 
Dot Probe task, F(1,262)=4.70, p<.05, f=.14, and on recall, F(1,252)=14.61, p<.001, f=.24. 
The results on the Emotional Stroop task went from trend significant to non-significant, 
F(2,219)=1.73, p=.18, f=.13. When correcting for variation in depressive symptomatology, 
FDs are more successful in positive than negative imagery, F(1,263)=7.74, p<.01, f=.17.
Coherence Among the Tasks
 Table 3 presents the simple zero order correlations between the bias difference-
scores. None of the correlations reached significance, although the correlation between 
imagery and recall had a trend significant p-value of .09. The variables of the Dot Probe task 
and the Emotional Stroop loaded on one factor. Imagery ratings and the recall rates within 
the Incidental Learning task and Free Recall phase loaded on a second component (see Table 
4). The two factors were not related with r=-.03. 
Association Components with Depressive Symptomatology
 The linear regression analysis yielded a significant association between the memory 
bias component score and the BDI-II total score, β=-.26, t=-3.84, p<.001, as well as with the 
number of past episodes, β=-.16, t=-2.37, p<.05. The attentional bias component score (Dot 
Probe and Emotional Stroop) was not significantly associated with BDI-II total score, β=-.06, 
t=-.92, p=.36, nor with the number of past depressive episodes, β=-.11, t=-1.63, p=.10. 
Discussion of Study 2
 With regard to coherence, two clear clusters of biases were present: attentional 
processing biases on the one hand and imagery and memory biases on the other hand. Only 
the memory bias component was associated with depression severity measures. Furthermore, 
FDs showed a mood-congruent bias pattern on attention interference as well as selective 
attention, but not on memory. Looking at selective attention, experiencing past depressed 
episodes might facilitate general avoidance of emotional facial expressions, albeit stronger 
for happy than for sad faces (conform behavioral avoidance; Vrijsen et al., 2013). Current 
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depressive symptoms had little influence on biased processing. However, the pronounced 
variability in depressive symptomatology in FDs indicates that it represents a heterogeneous 
group and current symptoms are important to take into account.
General Discussion
 The results indicate that in NDs, memory bias cohered with both self-referent 
imagery during encoding as well as with attentional biases. The coherence pattern in NDs is 
in accordance with studies that have reported dependence between attentional and memory 
biases as well as between biased processing of identical information in dysphoric students 
(Ellis et al., 2011b; Koster et al., 2010; Wells et al., 2010) and indicates that in NDs attentional 
and memory biases may be related to the same underlying process. In FDs, no evidence for 
one underlying bias process was uncovered, which is in accordance with earlier findings in 
depressed individuals (Gotlib et al., 2004a). Memory bias was associated with self-referent 
imagery and the attentional bias measures were associated with each other, indicating 
that in formerly depressed individuals memory bias may be specifically dependent of self-
referent processing during encoding. Although speculative, in ND’s as well as FDs, sad mood 
may activate a negative ‘‘associative network’’ as proposed by Bower (1981), resulting in 
negatively biased mood-driven information processing. In FDs, self-referential processing 
may additionally activate latent dysfunctional mental representations about the self, also 
called ‘‘schemas’’. Consistent with Beck’s theory (1976, 2008), schema-driven information 
processing might have affected memory bias, resulting in a distinction between attention 
and memory in FDs. 
 The results of the two studies underscore that without more knowledge of the 
underlying process, we cannot simply regard the concept ‘biased processing’ as a global 
vulnerability factor for emotional disorders. This is corroborated by the finding that in FDs, 
the memory bias component and not the attention bias component was associated with 
depressive symptomatology and number of past episodes. Biased processing in memory 
may represent an especially strong characteristic of depression vulnerability. In NDs, no such 
association was found, probably due to a low variation of depressive symptomatology in 
non-depressed undergraduates. The current findings are especially relevant now studies have 
started manipulating biases and studying the effects on emotional symptoms using CBM. 
In affected individuals, biased processing may operate under different conditions than in 
healthy individuals. This may partly explain why the results of CBM in depressed have been 
mixed (Beard et al., 2012; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). In non-clinical samples (dysphoric students 
or NDs), coherence between attentional and memory biases was found with identical as well 
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as different stimuli sets. This indicates that the association between biases may be rather 
robust in non-affected individuals. Both studies with clinical samples (Gotlib et al., 2004a 
and Study 2) found no evidence for one underlying bias process using different stimuli across 
the tasks. In order to establish lack of coherence in affected individuals, efforts should be 
directed at examining coherence between biased processing of identical stimuli in (formerly) 
depressed samples. 
 The limitations of the present studies warrant mention. First, different versions 
of Emotional Stroop task were used in Study 1 and Study 2. Given that Stroop effects were 
examined within samples using highly comparable stimuli (see Salo et al., 2001), we are 
confident that both Emotional Stroop tasks measured the same attentional interference 
process. Secondly, participants in Study 1 were selected on sad mood state. However, because 
baseline mood ratings were missing, we were not able to select participants on decrease in 
mood, which might have been a more appropriate mood measure. Another limitation is the 
relatively low reliability of our bias measures (Eide et al., 2002; Schmukle, 2005), which might 
have contributed to the lack of unitary coherence in FDs as well as in depressed individuals 
(Gotlib et al., 2004a). Increasing reliability of bias measures is therefore of importance, 
possibly by adapting current paradigms or through multiple sampling of bias measures 
within individuals. Furthermore, processing of emotional information on one task may have 
influenced processing on a subsequent task. It was however expected that any order effects 
would be eliminated by the fairly strong effect of the mood induction. Although the current 
setup allowed for elegant examination of coherence within groups, direct comparison 
between groups was not possible because of the large demographic differences. 
 The present findings suggest an avenue for intervention, though such possibilities 
obviously go beyond the data. Cognitive therapy generally focuses on adapting current 
dysfunctional assumptions and attentional processes (Beck, 1983). Our findings indicate that 
it could be effective to address both attentional as well as memory processes in cognitive 
therapy; focusing on the here and now as well as challenging dysfunctional beliefs from the 
past. Moreover, considering the emotionality of memory in trainings such as the MEmory 
Specificity Training (Raes et al., 2009) may offer a structural methodology for targeting 
memory bias and improving patients’ wellbeing. In conclusion, biased processing in different 
cognitive domains may operate according to the same underlying principle in non-depressed 
individuals, while processing of self-referent information in memory may be a distinct 
process in affected individuals. Experiencing a depression alters the schema’s about oneself 
(Beck, 1976, 2008), which possibly influences memory processes.
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Approach and avoidance of emotional faces 
in happy and sad mood
This chapter is based on Vrijsen, J.N., van Oostrom, I., Speckens, A., Becker, E.S. & Rinck, M. (2013). 
Approach and avoidance of emotional faces in happy and sad mood. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 
37, 1-6.
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Abstract
 Since the introduction of the associative network theory, mood-congruent biases 
in emotional information processing have been established in individuals in a sad and 
happy mood. Research has concentrated on memory and attentional biases. According 
to the network theory, mood-congruent behavioral tendencies would also be predicted. 
Alternatively, a general avoidance pattern would also be in line with the theory. Since 
cognitive biases have been assumed to operate strongly in case of social stimuli, mood-
induced biases in approach and avoidance behavior towards emotional facial expressions 
were studied. 306 females were subjected to a highly emotional fragment of a sad or a happy 
movie, to induce either a sad mood or a happy mood. An Approach-Avoidance Task was 
implemented, in which single pictures of faces (with angry, sad, happy, or neutral expression) 
and non-social control pictures were presented. In contrast to our expectations, mood states 
did not produce differential behavioral biases. Mood-congruent and mood-incongruent 
behavioral tendencies were, however, present in a subgroup of participants with highest 
depressive symptomatology scores. This suggests that behavioral approach-avoidance biases 
are not sensitive to mood state, but more related to depressive characteristics.
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Introduction
 According to network models of emotion (e.g. Bower, 1981), individuals in a positive 
or negative mood show preferred cognitive processing of mood-congruent stimuli, for 
instance, by automatically attending to mood-congruent stimuli and remembering it better. 
Indeed, there is strong evidence for biased memory processes, favoring memory for negative 
information in sad mood and for positive information in neutral or happy mood (Matt et 
al., 1992). Moreover, depression (in remission) and dysphoria are also characterized by 
cognitive biases (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Williams et al., 1997). In sub-clinical samples, 
biases generally become more pronounced when individuals are primed with a negative 
mood induction (Segal & Ingram, 1994). Taken together, this suggests that mood-congruent 
processing occurs in both clinical depression and subclinical negative affective states, and in 
naturally occurring moods as well as in experimentally induced states. Preferred processing 
of negative information by sad individuals may be a risk factor for maladaptive levels of 
negative mood and even clinical depression (Compton, 2000). Gaining more insight into 
mood-congruent processing in sad mood thus seems of importance. 
 The network theory, together with the extensive research conducted on mood-
congruent biases, suggests that such tendencies might prevail in other automatic processes 
as well. Therefore we aimed to study a very basic motivated behavioral tendency, namely 
automatic approach-avoidance behavior. Individuals generally aim to approach a reference 
stimulus when a positive outcome or affect is expected and avoid information with a 
possible negative outcome such as negative affect (Carver et al., 2008). Behavioral approach-
avoidance has not been studied so far with regard to mood, however (Trew, 2011). Mood 
is a strong motivator for our automatic behaviors. In fact, sad mood is characterized by 
behavioral avoidance, which seems to be especially salient in the social domain (Ottenbreit 
& Dobson, 2004). Studying social avoidance behavior in sad mood is important because this 
behavior generally reduces satisfying experiences, and therefore maintains a sad mood state 
and might even contribute to the development of clinical depression (Ferster, 1973). 
 For humans, social information communicated through facial expressions bears 
high social relevance (Lee et al., 2008). Moreover, biases have been assumed to operate most 
strongly in case of social or interpersonal stimuli, like faces (Hammen, 1992). Therefore, we 
studied the effects of mood on approach-avoidance tendencies for facial stimuli. Automatic 
behavioral approach and avoidance tendencies to different facial expressions were studied 
using the Approach Avoidance Task (AAT; Rinck & Becker, 2007) in social anxiety (Heuer et 
al., 2007; Lange et al., 2008), where socially anxious individuals tended to avoid angry as 
well as happy faces more than control participants did. The AAT is based on the finding that 
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stimulus valence is related to behavioral approach and avoidance inclinations. Positively 
valenced stimuli produce immediate approach tendencies, whereas negative stimuli produce 
avoidance tendencies (Chen & Bargh, 1999). In the present AAT, we used facial stimuli 
expressing different emotions (namely sad, happy, angry and neutral). Sad as well as angry 
faces were included to provide an indication of whether avoidance behavior is mood-specific 
(i.e., only towards sad faces) or more general. 
 We induced a sad mood state in half and a happy mood in the other half of the 
participants. The study aimed at providing novel insights into emotion-specific behavioral 
tendencies of individuals in a sad mood. Based on before mentioned theories, several 
behavioral tendencies would be predicted for both mood states. Individuals in a sad mood 
could be expected to approach the negative and avoid mood-incongruent facial expressions 
and individuals in a positive mood could be expected to approach happy and neutral faces 
while avoiding negative ones. Thinking in lines of the network models and (biological) 
theories of motivational orientation (e.g. Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Davidson, 1992, 1993), one 
could also argue that sad mood would facilitate avoidance tendency, while positive mood 
would be characterized by a general approach tendency, regardless of the valence of the 
reference object. Sad mood functioned as an analogue for more clinical levels of negative 
mood, as in depression, and also as a prime for biased processing. Stronger behavioral 
tendencies were therefore predicted in more vulnerable participants with a higher level of 
depressive symptomatology after the mood induction.
Methods
Participants
 We tested 318 female undergraduate students of Radboud University Nijmegen. 
They were randomly subjected to either a sad or a happy mood induction. Individuals who 
were taking antidepressant medication or sleeping aids were excluded, resulting in a sample 
of 158 individuals in a happy mood (HMs) and 148 participants in a sad mood (SMs). At 
baseline, SMs and HMs did not differ with regard to depressive symptoms; mean scores were 
5.1 (SD=5.0) and 5.9 (SD=5.4), respectively, on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck 
et al., 1996), and 5.9 (SD=6.1) and 6.7 (SD=8.1) on the depression subscale of the Symptom 
Checklist (SCL-90; Derogatis et al., 1973). Neither did SMs and HMs differ with regard to 
overall level of psychopathology on the SCL-90; mean scores were 27.5 (SD=24.5) for SMs and 
31.0 (SD=31.4) for HMs. The two experimental groups were comparable with regard to age 
(mean age SMs=21.0 SD=3.5, mean age HMs=21.0 SD=3.0). 
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 More vulnerable populations, with a higher level of depressive symptomatology, 
were expected to have stronger behavioral tendencies. Therefore, based on their total BDI 
scores, the sample was divided into three groups, each consisting of as close to 1/3 of the 
participants as possible. The lowest-BDI group had a mean BDI score of 1 (SD=0.9, range 
0–2) and consisted of 29% of the participants, N=92. The medium-BDI group had a mean BDI 
score of 4.3 (SD=1.1, range 3–6) and contained 41% of the participants, N=118. The highest-
BDI group contained 30% of the participants, with a mean BDI score of 11.3 (SD=5.5, range 
7–30), N=96. Of these, 25 participants had a total BDI score above 12, indicating clinical 
dysphoria or depression (Dozois et al., 1998). 
Materials and Apparatus
 Color photos of the faces of 10 individuals (5 female, 5 male) from the Radboud Faces 
Database (RaFD; Langner et al., 2010) were used. For each individual, an angry, sad, happy 
and neutral expression was selected. Additionally, 10 control pictures displaying the same 
chessboard pattern were included. By placing either a purple or a blue color filter over the 
picture, two versions of each of the 50 pictures were created, resulting in 100 picture stimuli. 
An additional set of 18 mixed social and control pictures served as practice trials. A computer 
screen with a resolution of 1,024 x 768 pixels and a ‘‘Logitech Attack 3’’ joystick were employed. 
 A ‘zooming-effect’ was used to create the visual impression that the pictures were 
actually being approached or avoided: The pictures grew and seemed to come closer upon 
pulling of the joystick and to shrink and move away upon pushing it. When the maximum 
possible movement of the joystick was made, the picture would disappear. The time from 
initiation of the trial to disappearance of the picture was automatically recorded and used as 
the participant’s reaction time (RT; see Rinck & Becker 2007, for details).
Procedure
 The participant first completed the BDI, the SCL-90 and some questions about 
biographical data. Then the mood induction started. It consisted of a 12 minute fragment 
from an emotional movie (‘Happy Feet’ for happy mood and ‘Sophie’s Choice’ for sad mood). 
The participant was instructed to watch the movie, listen to the sounds of the movie, and 
to let the emotionality of the movie influence her mood. The participant was asked to rate 
her current mood state using a computerized visual analogue scale that ranged from -10 
(indicating saddest mood) to 10 (indicating happiest mood) at baseline and after the mood 
induction. She continued with the AAT, for which instructions appeared on the computer 
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screen. She was instructed that pictures of faces would be appearing on the screen, one 
by one, and to either push the picture away or pull it towards herself in order to make the 
picture disappear as soon as possible. Pictures with a blue filter had to be pushed away, while 
purple pictures had to be pulled.
Results
 The mood induction procedure was successful. A t-test conducted on these data 
points indicates that SMs (M=5.4 SD=3.1) and HMs (M=4.5 SD=3.4) did not differ on 
mood state at baseline, t(80)=1.19, p=.23. Due to a programming error, the baseline mood 
state ratings of only 82 participants were available. SMs (M=-0.4 SD=4.2) and HMs (M=6.3 
SD=2.4) differed significantly on mood after the mood induction, t(300)=16.91, p<.001. 
Within the lowest-BDI group, the mood groups differed marginally significant at the baseline 
mood rating (SMs M=7.1 SD=1.2, HMs M=6.1 SD=1.7), t(24)=1.81, p=.08. This difference 
was non-significant for the medium-BDI group (SMs M=5.6 SD=2.29, HMs M=4.8 SD=2.5), 
t(26)=.77, p=.45, as well as for the highest-BDI group (SMs M=3.4 SD=3.5, HMs M=3.0 
SD=4.6), t(24)=.28, p=.78. SMs and HMs differed on mood after the mood induction in 
all subgroups: SMs M=0.4 SD=4.0 and HMs M=6.6 SD=2.0 with t(90)=9.08, p<.001 the 
lowest-BDI group, SMs M=-1.0 SD=4.4 and HMs M=6.6 SD=1.9 with t(115)=12.46, p<.001 
the medium-BDI group, and SMs M=-0.5 SD=4.4 and HMs M=5.8 SD=3.2 with t(91)=8.01, 
p<.001 the highest-BDI group. When comparing baseline to post induction mood ratings in 
the highest-BDI group, a significant decrease of mood in SMs, F(1,13)=17.62, p<.05, f=1.16, 
and an increase of mood in HM, F(1,11)=19.81, p<.05, f=1.34, was uncovered. 
 The top and bottom 1% of trial RTs as well as participants with a mean overall RT of 
>1,000 ms and/or >20% errors (6 participants in total) were deleted after outlier analyses. 
Error rates were low, on average less than 5%. Mean RT scores were then computed for 
each participant for each combination of picture type (angry, sad, happy, neutral, or control) 
and response direction (push, pull) for correct responses only. Next, AAT effect scores were 
computed for each participant by subtracting the mean RT of the pull trials from the RT of 
the corresponding push trials, separately per picture type. Negative scores mean that the 
participant was relatively faster pushing the pictures away than pulling them closer. SMs 
(mean=615 SD=90) and HMs (mean=612 SD=90) did not differ in mean overall reaction 
time, neither did the two groups differ in approach-avoidance tendencies towards the non-
social control pictures (mean=-20 (SD=84) for SMs and mean=-14 (SD=97) for HMs). No 
Mood x Depressive Symptoms interaction was found for the non-social control stimuli, 
F(2,300)=0.64, p=.53, f=0.06. 
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 The AAT effect scores for correct responses depending on group and facial expression 
are shown in Table 1. The 2 (Mood State) x 3 (Depressive Symptoms) x 4 (Facial Expression) 
mixed analyses of variance (ANOVA) for repeated measure of the AAT effect scores, with the 
first two factors varying between participants, yielded a main effect of Facial Expression, 
F(3,298)=7.20, p<.001, f=0.15. Here angry, happy and neutral faces were all avoided more 
than sad faces. This effect was observed in the lowest-, medium- and highest-BDI groups, 
for whom significant or marginally significant main effects of Facial Expression were found, 
F(3,88)=4.48, p<.05, f=0.15 for the group lowest, F(3,114)=2.17, p=.09, f=0.15 for medium, 
and F(3,92)=4.01, p<.05, f=0.15 for the group highest on BDI.
 The Mood x Facial Expression interaction yielded non-significant results, F(3,298)=1.80, 
p=.14, f=.14, indicating that mood state did not seem to affect automatic behavioral tendencies 
towards the different facial expressions. The Mood x Depressive Symptoms interaction was 
also non-significant, F(2,300)=0.96, p=.39, f=0.08. However, the 2 x 3 x 4 ANOVA yielded a 
significant three-way interaction, F(6,596)=2.20, p<.05, f=0.15. Additional analyses revealed 
that this interaction was mostly driven by the mood effects in the highest-BDI group: For these 
participants, the Mood x Facial Expression interaction was marginally significant, F(3,92)=2.42, 
p=.07, f=0.15 (see Figure 1). Here, angry faces were avoided more by HMs than by SMs, while 
the reverse was true for sad faces. Happy and neutral facial expressions seem to be avoided by 
both mood groups within the highest-BDI participants.
Table 1 AAT effect scores (push minus pull) with SDs depending on mood, level of depressive symptoms and 
facial expression.
Facial Expression Group
SM HM
BDI Group
Angry Lowest
Medium
Highest
Total 
-12 (66)
-30 (79)
12 (77)
-11 (75)
-35 (84)
-9 (67)
-20 (79)
-19 (76)
Sad Lowest
Medium
Highest
Total
19 (84)
5 (93)
-4 (70)
7 (84)
12 (72)
0 (86)
19 (89)
10 (83)
Happy Lowest
Medium
Highest
Total
4 (104)
-14 (85)
-37 (83)
-14 (92)
-20 (91)
4 (94)
-16 (76)
-9 (88)
Neutral Lowest
Medium
Highest
Total
-24 (82)
-29 (93)
-21 (86)
-25 (88)
4 (99)
-14 (70)
-23 (71)
-12 (79)
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Figure 1 AAT effect scores depending on mood and facial expression in the group highest on depressive 
symptoms. Positive score represent approach and negative scores avoidance.
 HMs were more avoidant of angry expressions than SMs, t(94)=2.00, p<.05, while 
no differences were found for the other expressions, t(94)=1.42, p=.16 for sad, t(94)=1.28, 
p=.20 for happy, and t(94)=0.08, p=.94 for neutral faces. Within HMs highest on BDI, 
angry faces were avoided more than sad faces, t(52)=2.25, p<.05. Angry faces were also 
avoided more than happy, t(52)=2.40, p<.05, and neutral faces, t(52)=2.56, p<.05. The 
other expressions elicited similar responses. For SMs in the highest-BDI group, happy faces 
evoked more avoidance tendencies than angry faces, t(42)=2.65, p<.05, as well as sad faces, 
t(42)=2.04, p<.05. Neutral expressions were also avoided more than angry expressions, 
t(42)=2.19, p<.05. The remaining expressions elicited similar reactions in SMs.
Discussion
 As expected, the results of the current study suggest that some facial expressions 
are avoided while others are more easily approached. However, no indication of mood-
congruent biases or more global approach or avoidance tendencies were found. Since mood-
congruent biases as well as avoidance behavior have often been observed most strongly 
in clinical samples, we expected more pronounced effects of the mood induction at higher 
levels of depressive symptoms. Here, the mood induction was expected to function as a 
prime for biased processing. Indeed, an indication of mood-congruent as well as incongruent 
behavioral biases was found in the group scoring highest on depressive symptomatology. 
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The mood induction seems to elicit processing biases (in line with e.g. Joormann & Siemer, 
2004). In contrast, the behavior tendencies elicited by non-social control stimuli were 
similar in both moods, even in the sub-group highest on depressive symptomatology. This 
demonstrates that only emotional social stimuli elicit differential behavioral responses and 
presumably the strongest in more vulnerable individuals. 
 In the group with the highest depressive symptomatology, SMs tended to avoid 
happy faces the most. Neutral expressions were also avoided more than angry faces. These 
results corroborate nicely with associative-network theories. In line with earlier findings on 
mood-congruence, happy and neutral faces are incompatible with SMs’ mood state, and those 
expressions are therefore avoided most. The finding that sad and angry faces are avoided less 
or even approached, signifies that both negative expressions are considered most mood-
congruent for this group. So not only mood-specific stimuli, but negatively valenced stimuli 
in general, seem to be congruent with a sad mood. 
 For HMs in the group with the highest depressive symptomatology, however, the 
picture is not as clear. This group tended to avoid angry, happy and neutral faces more than 
sad expressions. The avoidance of angry faces might be evolutionary-based as an angry 
expression is generally considered aversive and threatening (Marsh et al., 2005). Strikingly, 
HMs scoring highest on the BDI generally approached sad faces. This was unexpected, because 
according to mood-congruence, happy individuals should approach happy faces and avoid 
sad ones. If sad faces do indeed elicit approach, then perceivers might perhaps experience 
feelings of rapport as it encourages the formation of social bonds. Indeed, some evidence 
suggests that sadness elicits not only the desire for affiliation, but also emphatic behavior 
(e.g. Batson et al., 1981). Individuals who received a happy mood induction probably have 
the capacity and drive to act emphatically and approach sad faces. As an addition to this 
paradigm, we would therefore be interested in testing whether HMs explicitly report more 
empathic experiences than SMs. 
 Neutral faces were avoided equally by SMs and HMs in the group with the highest 
depressive symptomatology. Apparently, neutral facial expressions were regarded as mood-
incongruent by both mood groups. Since the mood induction was successful, it seems 
plausible that for individuals in an induced sad mood, only negative faces were mood-
congruent. The same would hold for individuals in a pronounced happy mood: Only clearly 
positive expressions would be conceived as congruent. Taken together, behavioral biases 
seem to be characterized by mood-congruent and incongruent processing. Since no evidence 
was found for a general avoidance pattern in sad mood or a general approach tendency 
happy mood, it appears that the valence of the stimulus affects the automatic behavioral 
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tendencies. Furthermore, the results might indicate that behavioral biases are more related 
to depressive symptomatology than to state mood effects and it also indicates that such 
tendencies might not be as sensitive to mood differences as cognitive biases are. Such 
conclusions can however not be drawn based on these finding, underscoring the need for 
further investigation. 
 Although the current findings must be interpreted with care, since only a specific 
segment of behavioral avoidance was assessed in a controlled setting, behavioral avoidance 
of positive interpersonal information might be a dysfunctional automatic tendency in 
dysphoria and depression. Avoiding positive social experiences may keep vulnerable sad 
individuals from feeling better and hence help maintain their current mood state and perhaps 
even worsen it (Compton, 2000). Avoidance behavior holds a central role in mood disorders 
and contributes to the development and maintenance of depression (Ferster, 1973). One may 
hypothesize that specifically the avoidance of positive social information (e.g. happy faces) 
by vulnerable sad individuals is a maladaptive automatic tendency which could be one of the 
determinants of the eventual development of depression. 
 A few words of caution seem appropriate, however. First, gender effects were 
not taken into account, since an all female sample was tested. This might limit the study’s 
generalizability, because men might exhibit different behavioral approach-avoidance 
tendencies than women. For future studies, it would be recommended to include male 
subjects so potential gender influences can be studied. Secondly, although induced sad mood 
state is often thought of and used as an analogue for depression, it is not perfectly comparable 
to depressed mood. Besides sad mood, many other deficits characterize depression which are 
not as salient in individuals in which sad mood is experimentally induced. Furthermore, only 
a portion of the group highest on depressive symptomatology had BDI scores indicating 
clinical levels of dysphoria or depression. In order to make any statements about behavioral 
tendencies in depression, this study first needs to be replicated in a depressed patient sample, 
preferably including a group without mood manipulation. As for now, we can only speculate 
that such studies will yield more compelling results. On the other hand, the fact that the task 
revealed results even in a sub-clinical sample suggests that automatic behavioral tendencies 
might be an important factor in the maintenance of depression. 
 In sum, the current study provides an exploration of the automatic avoidance 
tendencies in response to social information in sad and happy mood. Induced mood states did 
not seem to result in mood-congruent behavioral tendencies. When in addition to mood states 
depressive symptomatology was taken into account, however, specific automatic approach 
and avoidance tendencies did become apparent in the most vulnerable group. No general 
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pattern of approach of avoidance was discovered. This signifies that, compared to memory 
and attention biases, behavioral biases may be more related to depressive characteristics 
in combination with (or exacerbated by) a mood manipulation than to transient moods per 
se. Hence, this study stresses the need for studying approach-avoidance behavior in clinical 
depression. 
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Chapter 4
Attention allocation for emotional faces in current and 
remitted depression: evidence from eye-movements
This chapter is based on Isaac, I., Vrijsen, J.N., Rinck, M., Speckens, A. & Becker, E.S. Attention allocation 
for emotional faces in current and remitted depression: evidence from eye-movements. Resubmitted for 
publication.
54
Chapter 4: Shorter gaze duration for happy faces in current but not remitted depression: evidence 
from eye-movements
Abstract
 Cognitive theories of depression propose that depressed individuals preferentially 
attend to negative information and that such cognitive biases constitute important 
vulnerability and maintenance factors for the disorder. Most studies examined this bias 
by registration of response latencies. The present study employed a direct and continuous 
measurement of attentional processing for emotional stimuli by recording eye-movements. 
Currently depressed (CD), remitted depressed (RD) and healthy control (HC) participants viewed 
slides presenting sad, angry, happy and neutral facial expressions. For each expression, four 
components of visual attention were analyzed: onset of first fixation, maintained fixation, 
relative fixation frequency and glance duration. Results showed that healthy controls were 
characterized by longer gaze duration for happy faces compared to currently depressed 
individuals but not compared to remitted depressed individuals. Both patient groups (CD, RD) 
demonstrated longer maintained fixation (dwelling time) on all emotional faces compared 
to healthy controls. The present findings are in line with the presumption that depression is 
associated with a loss of elaborative processing of positive stimuli that characterizes healthy 
controls. Importantly, successful remission of depression (RD group) may result in positive 
attentional processing as no group differences were found between healthy controls and 
remitted patients on glance duration for happy faces. 
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Introduction
 A wealth of research has been devoted to examining cognition in depression, 
which has been primarily motivated by cognitive schema models (Beck, 1976; Beck & 
Clark, 1988) and cognitive theories of depression vulnerability (Teasdale, 1988). Cognitive 
theorists propose that depressed individuals preferentially attend to and remember negative 
information over positive information and that such biases in cognition constitute important 
vulnerability and maintenance factors for the disorder (Beck, 1967). Consistent with this 
prediction, decades of research has established that depression is associated with biased 
attention and memory for negative information (for review, see Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). 
While there is robust evidence for depression-linked differences in memory (Ridout et. al, 
2002), the evidence for attentional biases in depression is mixed, with attentional biases for 
sadness emerging under some conditions (Gotlib et. al, 2004; Peckham et. al, 2010) but not 
others (Wisco, 2009). This has led some researchers to conclude that disengagement deficits 
are a hallmark feature of attentional bias in depression (Koster et al., 2011; Mogg & Bradley, 
2005; Wisco, 2009). Attentional biases are thought to play a crucial role in maintaining a 
vulnerability to depressive episodes (e.g. De Raedt & Koster 2010; Gotlib & Joormann 
2010; Koster et al., 2011). In a recent study previously depressed individuals were found to 
attend to facial emotional stimuli differently than never depressed individuals (Joormann & 
Gotlib, 2007). Specifically, Joormann and Gotlib reported that both currently and formerly 
depressed participants selectively attended to the sad faces, whereas the control participants 
selectively avoided the sad faces and oriented toward the happy faces, a positive bias that 
was not observed for either of the depressed groups. However, Gotlib and Cane (1987) found 
that a group of depressed patients had longer colour naming latencies to negative content 
words on a Stroop task while they were experiencing depressive episodes but not when they 
had recovered. In subsequent studies, similar results were reported by Gilboa and Gotlib 
(1997) and Hedlund and Rude (1995). Wenzlaff and colleagues (2001) found that previously 
depressed individuals performed similarly to non-depressed individuals, identifying more 
positive than negative words. Although cognitive models presume that biases in attention 
are stable vulnerability factors that endure beyond depressive episodes, researchers have 
argued that these biases are not consistently observed in recovered depressed individuals 
(Just et al., 2001; Mathews & MacLeod 2005). A potential explanation may be that treatment 
for depression affects the depression itself as well as the biases that were etiologically 
important in precipitating and maintaining it. In addition, as Scher and colleagues (2005) 
have pointed out, attentional biases may be latent and unexpressed until activated by 
stressors or negative moods, in which case they will be observed only under such conditions 
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(Parker et al., 2003). In fact, in a number of studies differences between previously depressed 
and never depressed individuals were observed only when previously depressed individuals 
experienced a negative mood induction (Ingram et al., 1994). Overall, while the study of 
attentional bias and current and remitted depression has rallied much research effort and 
enthusiasm, the findings remain inconclusive. 
Previous Eye-tracking Studies on Depression & Dysphoria
 Eye-tracking has proved to be an important tool for the study of attentional bias in 
both subclinical (dysphoria) as well as clinical samples. A major advantage of this technique 
is that it can provide both a direct and continuous record of the allocation of attention 
over an extended interval of time while multiple stimuli compete for attention. Depression 
researchers utilizing eye-tracking technology have typically used free-viewing tasks, in which 
participants are presented with multiple emotional stimuli in the form of emotional scenes, 
faces, words or a combination of stimuli types and are given few instructions (Caseras et al., 
2007; Eizenman et al., 2003; Kellough et al., 2008; Mathews & Antes, 1992). Considering the 
inherent information emotional faces convey about interpersonal evaluation (Davidson et al., 
1989), a topic that is of high relevance to the study of the effects of depression, the exclusive 
use of facial stimuli in the present study was deliberate. It follows that we, along with others 
(e.g. Joormann & Gotlib, 2007, Langenecker et al., 2005) argue that studying emotional faces 
is especially critical to understanding attentional bias in depression. Interpersonal theories 
of depression (e.g. Coyne, 1976; Joiner & Metalsky, 1995) posit that depressed individuals are 
particularly alert for signs of interpersonal rejection and engage in reassurance seeking and 
other behaviors to reduce this sense of rejection. Facial expressions might more easily attract 
the attention of depressed individuals because these stimuli signal the emotional state of 
others and are therefore of higher interpersonal relevance, for example related to fear of 
personal rejection or disapproval (Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 2004). Moreover, emotional 
faces are preferable to emotional words for use in tasks assessing top-down influences on 
attention to emotion, as they do not require semantic processing. 
 Eye tracking studies have consistently found that depression is not associated with 
differences in the initial shift of gaze, but is associated with longer fixation times to negative 
versus neutral stimuli (Caseras et al., 2007; Eizenman et al., 2003; Kellough et. al, 2008). 
Two studies have found that depressed individuals spend significantly more time viewing 
negative images than healthy controls (Eizenman et al., 2003; Kellough et al., 2008). With 
respect to positive images the results have been mixed. Whereas Eizenman and colleagues 
(2003) reported that depressed and non-depressed individuals did not differ in their attention 
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to positive images, Kellough’s work found that depressed individuals attended to positive 
images less than non-depressed individuals. For studies comparing dysphoric and non-
dysphoric individuals the results have also been somewhat inconsistent. Mathews and Antes 
(1992) found that dysphoric individuals attended more to ‘‘sad’’ regions of complex images 
composed of spatially separate ‘‘sad’’ and ‘‘happy’’ regions (e.g. a picture of a flower next to 
a skull), whereas Sears and colleagues (2010) found that dysphoric individuals did not attend 
to depression related images any differently than non-dysphoric individuals. The study by 
Sears and colleagues also reported that dysphoric individuals attended to positive images 
less than non-dysphoric individuals and Mathews and Antes reported a similar result. A 
recent study by Ellis and colleagues (2010b) examined dysphoria related differences in the 
distribution of attention to a matrix of dysphoric, aversive, positive and neutral words over 
a ten second interval. These authors found that dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals 
differed only in their attention to positive words: dysphoric individuals spent significantly 
less time viewing positive words than non-dysphoric individuals. Similarly, in another recent 
eye-tracking study that presented sets of sad, happy, angry and neutral faces, it was also 
found that dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals differed only in their attention to happy 
faces (Leyman et al., 2011). Taken together, the results of these studies support the conclusion 
that positive stimuli do not engage the attention of depressed and dysphoric individuals 
as they do for never-depressed, healthy individuals. Furthermore, negative stimuli across 
various modalities (verbal, pictorial, facial) is likely to capture the attention of individuals in 
sad, dysphoric or depressive states.
The Present Eye-Tracking Study
 To our knowledge, this is the first study to include a currently depressed group, a 
remitted depressed group and a never-depressed healthy control group to assess attentional 
bias using eye-tracking methodology. The present study also extends previous work by 
including a wider range of emotions. Similar to Joormann and Gotlib (2007), we did not use 
a negative mood induction or other stressor designed to activate a negative schema in our 
remitted sample. 
 In the present study we examined attentional biases in both current and remitted 
depressed individuals in which participants’ gaze was continuously recorded while they 
viewed emotional faces. First, in this study, facial expressions of different emotional content 
(angry, sad, happy and neutral faces) were presented, compared to the presentation of 
emotional scenes or emotional words in most of the above mentioned studies (Caseras et al., 
2007; Eizenman et al., 2003; Kellough et al., 2008). The main purpose of the present study 
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was to investigate attentional interference among participants who are currently depressed, 
remitted depressed and among healthy controls by determining interference for negative 
stimuli (e.g. sad faces) and to establish whether this interference is evident at an early (onset 
fixation), or late (maintained fixation) stage of information processing. Also of interest was 
time spent on positive (happy) faces across the three groups. Moreover, we aimed to assess 
whether the three groups differed when attentional set-shifting is taken into account (glance 
duration). We hypothesized the following:
1. Based on research findings indicating attentional biases for negative information in 
depression at later stages of information processing (e.g. Eizenman et al., 2003), we 
predicted that currently and remitted depressed individuals would be characterized 
by a bias in the maintenance of gaze (longer fixation and glance duration) toward 
negative (sad, angry) information relative to neutral and happy facial expressions and in 
comparison to healthy control individuals.
2. With regard to the happy facial expressions, we predicted that healthy control 
participants would be characterized by a bias toward positive information relative to 
the negative and neutral facial expressions in comparison to the currently and remitted 
depressed participants.
Method
Participants
 Three groups of participants took part in the study: 21 currently depressed (CD), 21 
Remitted Depressed (RD), and 21 healthy controls (HC). Patient participants were recruited 
from the Radboud University Medical Center of Nijmegen, Department of Psychiatry. We 
excluded 3 currently depressed patients with a co-morbid social anxiety disorder because 
of evidence indicating that these patients may be characterized by a different pattern of 
attentional bias than individuals with clinical depression (see Becker et al., 1994). Eye-
tracking data from two participants in the currently depressed group was excluded due to 
excessive artifacts and calibration problems. Therefore, the final group of depressed patients 
consisted of 16 participants. We excluded one female participant in the remitted depressed 
group that was deemed cognitively impaired (below average cognitive flexibility) and one 
participant in this group due to calibration problems resulting in a final sample of 19 remitted 
depressed patients. Twenty-one healthy participants were recruited through newspaper 
advertisements and flyers posted in the community. The research protocol was approved by 
the local ethics committee. See Table 1 for complete participant characteristics.
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Table 1 Participant characteristics
Variable CD (N=16) RD (N=19) ND (N=21)
Age 46 (8.6) 42 (6.2) 44 (8.3)
Gender 10 (females) 12 (females) 13 (females)
Medication (yes) 40% 10% 2%
Disease duration (+2yrs) 45% 72% N/A
Level of education 4 (2.3) 4 (.3.6) 5 (2.2)
BDI 23.4 (5.7) 9.8 (8.5) 2.3 (2.7)**
STAI-S
STAI-T 
49.4 (9.0)
52.9 (5.9)
40.5 (6.7)
43.7 (6.8)
32.5 (5.2)**
31.1 (7.8)**
DART 111.8 (8.2) 112.2 (6.3) 114 (6.0)
Digits-back 5.9 (1.0) 6.2 (1.4) 6.3 (1.9)
Trails B (s) 61.1 (18.0) 60.0 (16.2) 50.9 (7.8)*
Face-emotion Task (accuracy%) 86% 88% 90%
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Significant group differences denoted by: *Currently 
depressed and Remitted depressed compared to Never-depressed **Current depressed group compared 
to both Remitted depressed and Never-depressed groups. Levels of education coded as follows: 1= 
did not finish high school, 2=high school or equivalent, 3=two-year college, 4=four-year college, 
5=master’s degree, 6=advanced degree (PhD, MD, JD, etc.). BDI=Beck Depression Inventory, 
STAI=State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, DART=Dutch Adult Reading Test. Note: 5 patients met criteria for 
partial remission and therefore the group RD includes both partially and fully remitted patients.
 Selection criteria All participants in this study were native speakers of Dutch, had 
normal or corrected to-normal vision. Each participant was further screened for various 
exclusion criteria (e.g. other psychiatric conditions besides depression such as Bipolar 
Disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD), Panic Disorder and Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) all of which present with 
unique attentional patterns that could potentially confound the results of the present study. 
Additional exclusion criteria included neurologic conditions, substance abuse and head 
injury that might negatively impact cognitive functioning. The Structured Clinical Interview 
for DSM–IV (SCID; First et al., 1995) was used to determine psychiatric diagnosis. All of the 
participants in the depressed group had a primary diagnosis of Major depression disorder 
according to the Diagnositic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–IV; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2002). All remitted depressed patients were screened by the Dutch 
version of the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Inventory (Overbeek et al., 1999) for 
potential symptoms of depression and included only if there was a history of depression and 
patients were either partially remitted or in complete remission for a minimum of 6 months. 
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A supervising psychiatrist was always readily available to discuss differential diagnosis 
(author AS). Participants in the healthy control group presented with no current or past 
psychiatric disorder assessed the MINI. The three groups of participants were matched for 
age, gender distribution, verbal intelligence, education, baseline working memory ability and 
face-emotion identification ability. At the end of the experimental session, participants were 
fully debriefed and were financially compensated 10 euros per hour for their participation in 
the study.
Materials 
 All participants completed the Dutch versions of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Van der Ploeg et al., 1980) and the Beck Depression Inventory-II (Bouman et al., 1985). 
Each questionnaire consists of 21 items that assess cognitive, affective, behavioural 
and physiological symptoms of depression or anxiety respectively, with the total score 
representing a combination of the number of symptoms endorsed and the severity of the 
particular symptoms.
 Neuropsychological Tests A series of well-established neuropsychological tests were 
administered following the completion of all questionnaires and general screening information 
was obtained prior to experimental testing including a measure of verbal intelligence (Dutch 
Adult Reading Test; Schmand et al., 1991) as a measure of pre-morbid intelligence as verbal 
ability is relatively spared in depression. In line with the recommendation of Langeneker 
and colleagues (2005), several neuropsychological tests were administered to rule out poor 
functioning and baseline impairments in the domains of visual-spatial processing, basic 
attention, memory and fine motor skills, all of which might raise the possibility of poor 
effort and limited cognitive capacity. Importantly, these measures were used to screen 
out those participants with global performance difficulties. This is particularly important 
in light of possible motivation and effort confounds in depression that could artificially 
produce significant results. Our goal, as noted in the hypotheses, was to demonstrate group 
differences in potential attentional biases that result from emotional faces and not from 
baseline component cognitive differences in our samples. 
 Facial-Emotion Stimuli & Task Photographs of faces of Caucasian adult males and 
females with a direct gaze posing in different emotions (sad, angry, happy and neutral) 
were selected from the validated Radboud Faces database (Langner et al., 2010). A criteria 
threshold was set for all images prior to stimuli selection which included excellent (98%) 
ratings on parameters of: (a) genuineness of expression, (b) clarity of expression, and (c) 
intensity of expression. Final image selection consisted of 44 identities across the 4 different 
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emotion categories resulting in 176 images. There were 44 trials in total, the first four trials 
being practice trials to familiarize participants with the procedures before beginning data 
collection. Four trial sequences were created to control for order effects and these were 
alternated across participants. All of the images were digitized and edited with Image 
Manipulation Program for Windows systems (GIMP, 2.6) to be approximately the same size 
(377 pixels) matched identically on monochromatic parameters (grey scale), luminance, 
dimensions of saturation and contrast. Faces were cropped, free from hair or other external 
  
Figure 1 Sample experimental slide.
  
 (a) (b)
  
Figure 2 Sample eye-data recording from: (a) remitted depressed participant, (b) current depressed participant 
(red marks denote prolonged fixation, green marks denote saccades).
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attributes that could serve as distracters or distinguishers. Importantly, we controlled for 
a potential confound for identity processing by presenting the same identity across the 
4 emotions per slide opposed to different actors displaying the various emotions within 
a slide. Each face was presented only once. An equal number of male and female actors 
portrayed each emotion. The projected stimuli appeared on a 19 inch computer screen 
presented against a black background. The display size of each facial image was 105cm in 
width x 100cm in height to represent visual angles of 13 degrees horizontally and 12 degrees 
vertically. The vertical and horizontal distance between images was respectively 37 and 68 
cm. See figure 1 for sample experimental slide and figure 2 for sample eye-data recording 
taken from a remitted participant and a current depressed participant.
 Eye-Tracking Apparatus, Calibration, & Data Preparation Line of visual gaze 
was assessed using a stable, optics eye tracking system model monocular iView X™ 
(Sensomotorics Instruments, Version 2.4, Germany). Head location was fixed using a chin rest 
and forehead bar. The monocular mode measured eye line of gaze in conjunction with the 
pre-calibrated fixed screen space. The direction of gaze, measured with x and y coordinates, 
was sampled every 10 milliseconds (100hz). Eye movements that were stable for more than 
100ms within a 1° of visual angle were classified as a fixation. The consensus among eye-
tracking researchers follows that after the onset of a target, it takes an estimated 100ms for 
eye movement to follow an attentional shift and therefore all data below this threshold were 
considered “saccadic preparation” and removed from final data analysis. Areas of interest 
(AOIs) were also identified for each trial and corresponded with the total area for each of the 
four images. Thus, it was possible to determine location of first fixation, number of fixations, 
and total time spent viewing each of the four images presented during each trial. Participants 
viewed sets of emotional and neutral images while their eye fixations were continuously 
tracked and recorded throughout 10-s trials. After calibration, eye-movement registration 
was initiated with each slide separated by a brief 100ms inter-trial interval. Delphi software 
was used to present the stimuli and to automate the recording of eye location with the 
eye tracker software. The eye movement data were initially processed using the iView Data 
Viewer analysis software to filter for blinks, missing data and other recording artifacts. 
Smaller confounding eye movements were removed that occurred during fixations, such as 
mild tremors, drifts and flicks. The data were checked for distributional anomalies and none 
were present. A fixation identification algorithm was applied for data analysis described in 
detail by Salvucci and Goldberg (2000). 
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 Eye-data Dependent Variables The following dependent variables were calculated: 
early and maintained fixation time: fixation was dichotomized by time-series into two 
separate epochs: (a) location of first fixation (within the first 3 seconds of viewing time); 
see Griffin and colleagues (2001) for details on the first 3-second interval being optimal for 
indexing early onset attentional fixation), and (b) maintained fixation (post 3-seconds + of 
viewing time). Importantly, maintained fixation is the total duration (in seconds) a participant 
has fixated on a particular facial expression over the forty study slides, independent of 
any attentional shifts. The total fixation time for each facial expression was generated by 
summing up fixation times for each face type over the 40 study slides, (c) Relative fixation 
frequency: this is the proportion of fixations of a participant on a particular facial expression 
relative to the total fixations per slide, and (d) Glance duration: this is the extent of time a 
participant’s gaze remains fixated within the boundaries of a particular facial expression, 
taking into account the amount of attentional shifts. 
 Eye-Movement Data Analysis Plan In order to test our specific hypotheses of (1) 
attentional biases for negative information in currently depressed patients, specifically at 
the level of gaze maintenance (longer fixation and glance duration), (2) a positive and/or 
protective bias in healthy control participants, and (3) to check whether remitted depressed 
patients also show an attentional bias for negative stimuli, a 3 x 4 mixed-plot ANOVA 
(multivariate approach) with Group (currently depressed, remitted depressed and healthy 
control) as a between subjects factor and Facial emotional type (neutral, happy, angry and 
sad) as a within-subjects factor was conducted for each dependent variable. A Bonferroni 
correction was applied to all post-hoc comparisons with a 95% confidence interval. The data 
were first screened for outliers and the resulting z-scores were utilized to identify outliers in 
the data. A data point was considered an outlier when a standardized score was greater than 
three. This process failed to reveal any outliers in the data.
Procedure
 After providing their informed consent, participants completed a demographics 
form, the BDI-II and STAI questionnaires. The Mood Disorders Module from the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; First et al., 1998) was administered by highly trained and 
experienced graduate students under the supervision of a clinical psychologist (author LI). 
Subsequent to this, participants were administered the neuropsychology battery. Participants 
were then escorted to the eye tracking room and seated in a height adjustable chair and 
placed their chin firmly in a chin rest. The chin rest was positioned so that participants’ eyes 
were level with the middle of the 19-inch monitor on which the stimuli were presented. This 
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ensured that all participants’ eyes were in the same location relative to the camera and the 
monitor. Camera adjustments were made to best capture the participant’s right eye and a 
9-point calibration was completed to confirm that the eye tracker was recording line of visual 
gaze within 1° of visual angle for each calibration point. Calibration was repeated until this 
criterion was met. Finally, all participants were instructed to minimize head movement as 
much as possible and refrain from speaking. Once calibration was successful, participants 
were instructed via the computer screen to view the images naturally, identical to task 
instructions reported in an eye-tracking study by Leyman and colleagues (2011). The only 
constraint was that they were to view the images at all times during each trial. Tracking of eye 
movements was not mentioned in order to minimize demand effects. Further, participants 
were instructed to look at the fixation cross prior to each trial in order to standardize the 
starting location of their gaze. The experimenter (located adjacently in the same room) then 
monitored the stimulus presentation and eye tracking throughout each trial to monitor and 
remove artifacts in real time. The experimenter was unable to manipulate the experiment in 
any other manner other than real-time artifact correction. Neither the experimenter nor the 
participant was able to abort the experiment until completion. 
Results
Location of First Fixation 
 Results for early onset fixation to engage emotional faces failed to reveal any 
between group differences F(2, 49)=1.6, p=.45 (h2=.03) suggesting that all three groups 
took an equal amount of time to orient their initial attention to the facial images when 
they first appeared for viewing. Also of interest was if the 3 groups differed on initial onset 
fixation for specific emotional faces. With respect to within-subject differences, the ANOVA, 
once again, failed to reveal a significant effect of facial emotion, F(1.90, 93.16)=0.30, p=.22 
(h2=.03). Moreover, no 2-way interaction emerged as significant: all comparisons (p>=.34). 
Maintained Fixation
 The analysis for group differences in maintained fixation revealed a robust between-
subjects significant difference, F(2, 49)=16.08, p<.01 (h2=.40). This indicates that there was 
an overall difference between the groups on maintained fixation. Analyses revealed that 
overall the healthy control group took significantly less time looking at the faces than both 
the currently depressed and remitted depressed groups. In other words, both of the patient 
groups spent more time attending to faces compared to the healthy control participants. 
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Differences between the currently depressed and remitted depressed patients groups was 
not statistically significant (p=> .20) with both patient groups spending an equal amount 
of time maintaining their attention on faces. Of specific interest was if the groups differed on 
maintained fixation for a particular emotional face as was predicted for currently depressed 
and disorder congruent sad faces and for healthy controls and happy faces, but this was 
not the case as the group x facial emotion interaction failed to reach significance, F(3.80, 
93.16)=1.30, p>.33 (h2=.05) leading to the conclusion that the significant difference 
between the groups on this specific fixation parameter was not a function of any particular 
emotional face. 
Glance Duration
 The group x facial emotion interaction was statistically significant, F(3.80, 
93.16)=5.30, p<.05 (h2=.40) for glance duration. The ANOVA revealed a significant within-
subjects main effect by facial emotional type, F(1.90, 93.16)=0.30, p>.05 (h2=.01). This 
indicates there was an overall difference in the participants’ glance duration times among 
the angry, happy, neutral and sad faces. Post-hoc comparisons of the three groups showed 
that healthy controls spent significantly longer attending to happy faces (M=1.89 SD=.42) 
compared to the currently depressed group (M=1.12 SD=.35). This finding is in line with 
our hypothesis regarding healthy controls and a positive attentional bias. The difference 
between the healthy control group and the remitted depressed group (M=1.83 SD=.48) on 
this measure of glance duration (positive attentional bias) for happy faces was not significant 
(p=.13). The remaining comparisons were non-significant (all values=> p=.15). 
Relative fixation frequency for specific emotional faces
 Analyses assessing the proportion of visual fixations of a participant on a particular 
facial expression relative to the total fixations per slide (within each slide) failed to reach 
significance for group F(2,49)=1.2, p=.55 or face type F(3.80,93.16)=3.10, p=.62. Also the 
interaction between group and face type was not significant at all levels (all Fs< 1.9, h2=<.08). 
Analysis of Covariance for State-Trait Anxiety & Trails B
 Given that group differences were observed on measures of State and Trait anxiety 
(see Table 1), an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was performed to examine if any of the 
results were due to anxiety variance in our samples. Results revealed that differences in 
anxiety levels did not impact the present findings (p=>.20 for all outcome variables). 
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Equally, given that group differences were found on the neuropsychology measure Trails 
B (set-shifting) and glance duration included an element of attentional shifting, it was 
important to account for any eye-data differences due to baseline measures of attentional 
shifting. Group differences on Trails B did not impact glance duration results (p=.18). No 
effects were found for the covariates and therefore, we are confident in concluding that the 
biases in attentional deployment obtained in this study are not attributable to differences 
in anxiety levels nor are they driven by differences in baseline ability to shift attention. See 
Table 2 for means and standard deviations for eye-tracking outcome variables. 
Table 2 Means (standard deviation) in seconds for Onset Fixation, Relative Fixation Frequency, Fixation Time 
and glance duration for each stimulus category for depressed (CD), Remitted Depressed (RD) and Healthy 
Control (HC) groups.
Onset Fixation Relative Fixation 
Frequency
Fixation Time (s) Glance Duration
s/glance    
Face Type    M (SD)     M (SD)     M (SD)     M (SD) 
Neutral
CD .42 (.21) .25 (.04) 25.97 (6.29) 1.20 (.33)
RD .46 (.32) .22 (.02) 24.88 (5.30) 1.23 (.23)
HC .44 (.40) .21 (.04) 18.50 (4.82) 1.34 (.49)
Angry
CD .39 (.32) .24 (.02) 26.18 (3.55) 1.38 (.33)
RD .42 (.30) .26 (.04) 27.22 (6.05) 1.40 (.45)
HC .46 (.22) .22 (.02) 21.00 (4.66) 1.32 (.39)
Happy
CD .38 (.34) .22 (.03) 25.65 (7.62) 1.12 (.35)
RD .39 (.25) .25 (.04) 28.90 (8.44) 1.83 (.48)
HC .35 (.29) .27 (.04) 19.95 (4.88) 1.89 (.42)
Sad
CD .32 (.33) .26 (.03) 27.55 (6.58) 1.23 (.38)
RD .37 (.25) .26 (.02) 26.90 (5.59) 1.45 (.47)
HC .38 (.33) .25 (.04) 20.88 (3.10)    1.33 (.44)
Discussion
 The present study investigated attentional biases for emotional facial expressions 
by monitoring the eye movements of currently depressed, remitted depressed and healthy 
individuals using a naturalistic viewing task. Tracking eye movements provides a highly 
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accurate and nuanced method of recording attentional processing at several stages 
ranging from initial orientation, facilitation, maintenance and withdrawal of attention 
(disengagement). The present study provides insights into several aspects that have yet to 
be investigated in previous eye-tracking research in major depression disorder. The inclusion 
of three groups monitored for attentional bias across four valenced emotions at distinct 
time intervals provides a more sensitive and complete analysis of differences that emerge 
as a result of current depression (CD), remitted depression (RD) as well as having never 
experienced depression (HC). A principle finding of the present work is the positive bias in 
healthy controls compared to currently depressed patients. Importantly, remitted depressed 
patients did not significantly differ from healthy controls on glance duration for happy faces 
hinting at the possibility that treatment of depression may result in improved processing 
of positive stimuli. It was also found that all three groups alerted to emotional faces and 
oriented their attention to the stimuli in a comparable manner. Both current and remitted 
depressed patients were characterized by longer fixation duration (maintenance) for 
emotional faces irrespective of the emotional expression. One potential explanation for this 
may be that both patient groups have a pervasive pattern of self-monitoring in the presence 
of socially salient stimuli such as faces. Contrary to previous eye-tracking studies the present 
study did not demonstrate a specific mood-congruent attentional bias in either patient 
group nor were the patient groups characterized by longer glance duration for neutral faces 
as was reported in a dysphoric sample by Leyman and colleagues (2011). Consistent with our 
prediction, healthy control individuals demonstrated significant longer glance duration on 
happy faces compared to the currently depressed patients but not the remitted depressed 
patients. Results of previous information-processing studies indicate that nonclinical adult 
participants focus more on positive emotional information than do clinically depressed 
individuals (Bradley et al., 1997a; Gotlib et al., 1988; Mezulis et al, 2005), however the present 
study is the first to build on this finding using eye-tracking with specific consideration for 
how depressed patients shift their attention for socially salient faces. In accordance with 
the goal pertaining to remitted depression, we suggest that while remitted depressed 
individuals are attentive and may have difficulty disengaging from socially salient stimuli 
(i.e. maintained fixation result) they are not necessarily disinterested in positive stimuli 
evidenced. In other words, successful treatment of depression may ameliorate a disinterest 
in positive stimuli that oftentimes characterizes current depressive episodes. Differences 
were not evident in the very early stage of attentional processing. Thus, the present study 
advances evidence that attentional bias in depression is not defined by an early vigilance-
avoidance pattern as it is in anxiety disorders (Koster et. al, 2005; Rinck et al., 2005; Wilson 
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& MacLeod, 2003). The findings also suggest that remission does not necessarily reverse 
prolonged attention and elaborative processing of socially salient stimuli. Specifically, both 
current and remitted depressed individuals maintained their attention towards all faces to 
a greater extent compared to their healthy counterparts hinting at disengagement deficits 
for emotional content even after depressed patients have been successfully treated. The 
prolonged engagement for all emotional faces is in line with research that shows depressed 
patients are sensitive to emotional signals that arise primarily from a necessity for approval 
and reassurance (Gotlib & Hamman, 1992). Contrary to our prediction, this sensitivity was 
not driven by a specific social signal such as mood-congruent sad faces, but rather attentional 
maintenance for all emotional faces; a result that is consistent with the findings of recent 
work by Wisco and colleagues (2012), who also reported no evidence that depressed persons 
show delayed disengagement from sad faces. Although purely speculative, it has been 
suggested that averted gaze maintenance for sad or angry faces in depression can represent 
avoidance of disapproval and rejection (see Kleinke, 1986). Equally, the same argument can be 
made to contrast healthy individuals in the present study who were able to disengage their 
attention from emotional faces. Those who have never experienced depression may not be 
as attentive to emotional signals around them and are not seeking reassurance from others 
and therefore elaborative processing of emotional signals is not pursued. This study provides 
an important replication of a positive bias and a protective feature in attentional processing 
of stimuli in healthy individuals (e.g. Joormann & Gotlib, 2007). Moreover, the present study 
offers insight into the potential state opposed to trait status of positive attentional bias 
insofar as remitted depressed patients did not significantly differ from the healthy controls 
on glance duration for happy faces which points to the possibility that positivity is restored 
after successful remission of depression. This finding is fully aligned with the theoretical 
framework of depression proposed by Richard Davidson’s model of anterior asymmetry 
and depression that current depression is not necessarily defined by patients actively 
approaching negative stimuli but rather withdrawing from positive stimuli (Henriques & 
Davidson, 2000). This model also suggests this pattern of approach-avoidance tendencies 
presents a vulnerability factor to those with a history of depression. Taken together, strong 
demonstration is provided that depressed individuals’ loss of bias for positive information 
directly contrasts that which characterizes never-depressed individuals. Notably, contrary to 
our prediction that a positive bias for healthy controls would emerge at the fixation level as 
well, this bias in the healthy control group emerged only when attentional shifting was also 
accounted for. This distinct attentional difference between never-depressed and depressed 
persons has been demonstrated by a number of researchers using various experimental 
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paradigms (Gotlib et al., 1988, 2004; Gotlib & Krasnoperova, 2004; Joormann et al., 2007b). 
Whereas anxious individuals show a tendency to orient their eye movements toward threat 
stimuli (Mogg et al., 2000), results from this and other work (Caseras et al., 2007) suggest 
that depressed individuals do not show such a bias. Information processing biases in clinical 
depression are thus more likely to occur in the elaborative stages of information processing. 
This is consistent with other research which has shown that depressed individuals tend to 
demonstrate attentional biases at later stages of information processing (Goeleven et al., 
2006; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). It has been proposed that anxiety is characterized by vigilance 
for threat-related stimuli in the early stages of processing followed by the avoidance of 
threatening stimuli (Rinck & Becker, 2006), whereas depression involves processing biases 
during more elaborative stages of information processing (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). 
 The current study suggests that depressed adults significantly differ from both 
their remitted depressed and healthy control counterparts in how they attend to emotional 
information. Specifically, depressed individuals are more likely to withdraw their attention 
from positive (happy) stimuli. The current results also suggest that this loss of positive 
attentional processing is sustained over a relatively long period of time. That is, depressed 
patients specifically showed reduced attention for happy faces at the stage of glance duration 
where attentional shifting is also taken into account. Research indicates that the development 
of attentional control mechanisms, such as the ability to shift attention away from negative 
stimuli or toward positive stimuli, is related to better regulation of distress and anger (Posner 
& Rothbart, 2000). An interpersonal emphasis is reflected in many models of adult depression 
which focus on impaired relationships as critical antecedents and sequelae of depression 
(reviewed in Gotlib & Hammen, 1992).Guided by the propositions of healthy interpersonal 
relations we have shown that healthy controls had less maintained fixation or dwelling time 
for all emotional faces and consequently possessing an ability to disengage from emotional 
faces. Although speculative, these observations are in accord with both the cognitive 
formulation and the interpersonal model of depression which stipulates that depression is 
marked by disengagement deficits for emotional stimuli due to an increased sensitivity for 
rejection and disapproval and pervasive self-monitoring in the presence of socially salient 
stimuli. It is interesting that in the literature, studies using extended presentations of facial 
expressions instead of short presentations of words have yielded a more consistent pattern 
of findings in depression research (Gotlib et al., 2004b; for a review see Mogg & Bradley, 2005) 
increasing the comparability of the present study to previous investigations. 
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Conclusion
 In conclusion, we have found that current depression is marked by a loss of 
attentional deployment for positive stimuli and that this loss of positivity may be reversed 
in recovered patients. Notably, the finding pertaining to both patient groups’ maintained 
fixation for all emotional faces may serve as a critical marker for interpersonal sensitivity and 
self-monitoring that often plagues depressed patients. Given these findings, it is instructive 
for future longitudinal research to determine whether a decrease in processing positive 
information is associated with increases in vulnerability for experiencing a depressive 
episode. Also of special relevance to informing clinical work is improving our understanding 
of partial remission of depression and attentional bias. Patients with residual symptoms 
of depression are an important outcome of major depression and may probably reflect 
persistence of the original disorder, albeit in a milder form. It is a key indicator of much-
increased risk of relapse and the need for continuing treatment. Finally, we believe that 
eye tracking methodology may provide a direct, sensitive and robust assessment of biased 
processing that is ideal for this important line of research.
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Chapter 5
What is the contribution of different cognitive biases 
and stressful childhood events to the presence and 
number of previous depressive episodes? 
This chapter is based on Vrijsen, J.N., Becker, E.S., Arias-Vásquez, A., van Dijk, M.K., Speckens, A. & van 
Oostrom, I. What is the contribution of different cognitive biases and stressful childhood events to the 
presence and number of previous depressive episodes? Psychiatry Research, in press.
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Abstract
 Negative cognitive biases as well as stressful childhood events are well-known risk 
factors for depression. Few studies have compared the association of different types of biases 
and events with depression. The current study examined whether different cognitive biases 
and stressful childhood events variables were associated with depression and recurrence. 
Three types of childhood events were assessed in 83 never-depressed and 337 formerly 
depressed individuals: trauma within the family, trauma outside the family, and adverse 
events. Furthermore, after a sad mood induction procedure, participants executed a Dot 
Probe task (selective attentional bias), an Emotional Stroop task (attentional interference 
bias) and an incidental learning task (memory bias). The association of these measures with 
case status and recurrence status (one or multiple past episodes) was examined. Negative 
memory bias and traumatic childhood events within the family were associated with case 
status, whereas none of the bias measures or childhood events variables were associated 
with recurrence status. The results indicate that memory bias as well as the experience of 
aggression and/or abuse within the family during childhood are independently associated 
with depression. Biases and stressful childhood events were not associated with did not offer 
differentiation between individuals with one or multiple past episodes.
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Introduction
 Mood disorders result in a high disease burden as well as increased mortality risk 
due to important impairments in social, emotional and physical functioning. The World 
Health Organization estimates that depression will be the number two cause of lost years 
of healthy life worldwide by the year 2020. Moreover, relapse rates are high and increase 
substantially with the experience of multiple depressive episodes (Clark et al., 1999; Curry 
et al., 2011; Pettit et al., 2006; Ramana et al., 1995). It is therefore important to identify risk 
factors for depression and to understand the underlying environmental and psychological 
mechanisms of its pathogenesis.
 The cognitive theories state that biased processing of emotional information is a 
strong contributor to the development as well as the recurrence of depression (Beck, 1976, 
2008; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994, 2005). Depressed individuals are 
inclined to have better memory for negative than for positive information, while the reverse 
is true for never-depressed individuals (Matt et al., 1992; Ridout et al., 2009). Depressed 
individuals also show selective attention towards negative information and more attention 
interference of negative information (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Peckham et al., 2010). What 
is more, after recovery from depression, transient sadness is construed as a stressor able 
to trigger depressogenic factors, such as biased cognitive processing (Gupta & Kar, 2012; 
Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; McCabe et al., 2000; Scher et al., 2005). Sad mood induction 
procedures are often used to trigger cognitive biases in remitted depressed individuals (Liotti 
et al., 2002) and response to such procedures has been associated with risk for depression 
relapse (Kupfer & Frank, 2001; Segal et al., 1999; Teasdale et al., 2000). Attention and memory 
biases are assumed to engender and maintain negative thinking, rumination and low mood 
(Beck, 2008). Cognitive biases have also been observed in highly neurotic, never-depressed 
individuals (Chan et al., 2007), who are at increased risk of depression and in never-depressed 
family members of depressed individuals at a higher rate than in the general population 
(Jaenicke et al., 1987; Joormann et al., 2007; Taylor & Ingram, 1999; Van Oostrom et al., 2013), 
underlining its potential as vulnerability factor. 
 It is well established that stressful childhood events are a risk factor for depression 
in adulthood (Aloy et al., 2006; Hovens et al., 2010; Kendler et al., 1999). Experiencing negative 
events in childhood often leads to dysfunctional basic assumptions about the self and the 
world (Beck, 2008). These assumptions form the basis of cognitive biases, as information 
is processed in accordance with the dysfunctional cognitions. Subsequent stressful events 
may trigger biased processing, such as negatively biased attention and memory, and leave 
individuals vulnerable for developing symptoms of depression or to relapse (see cognitive 
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models of depression, Abramson et al., 1989; Beck, 1976, 2008; Bower, 1981; Williams et al., 
1997). Although many studies have focused on stressful childhood events as a predisposing 
factor, there is generally little understanding of or consensus about the specificity of different 
types of events in association with the depression (Gibb et al., 2001). When it comes to 
stressful childhood events, researchers generally do not distinguish between more general 
adverse events and interpersonal traumatic events nor between traumatic events that 
occurred within or outside of the family of origin, although these distinctions are clinically 
highly relevant (Margolin & Gordis, 2000). Traumatic childhood events are proposed to have 
most detrimental effects (Hovens et al., 2010; Spinhoven et al., 2010; Swanson & Mallinckrodt, 
2001). If a child experiences severely stressful interpersonal events purposely directed at the 
child - especially when inflicted by a caregiver that should ensure safety - negative basic 
assumptions about the self and the world may be formed (Jehu et al., 1985-1986). Traumatic 
events may have stronger effect on the course and severity of depression than non-traumatic 
adverse events.
 In a similar vein, when examining cognitive vulnerability to depression, many 
different measures have been used to study different types of cognitive biases (e.g. Beevers 
et al., 2007; Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Joormann et al., 2007). In depression, some of the 
most widely studied domains are attentional interference, selective attention and explicit 
incidental memory, using the Emotional Stroop task, the Dot Probe task and self-referential 
memory task, respectively (Bradley et al., 1997a/b; Gotlib et al., 2004). Although many studies 
focus on ‘cognitive vulnerability to depression’, the methods used and domains involved 
often differ and are only seldom studied within one sample. Based on the cognitive theories 
of depression, one would expect similar preferential processing of negative information 
in different cognitive domains. However, the evidence for this is limited and inconsistent 
(Everaert et al., 2012; Gotlib et al., 2004; Vrijsen et al., in press). Moreover, some cognitive 
theories and studies indicate that memory bias might be more characteristic of depression 
than biased attention (Ingram, 1984; Matt et al., 1992; Vrijsen et al., in press; Williams et al., 
1997). Notwithstanding the current focus on biases as well as stressful childhood events as 
vulnerability factors for depression, surprisingly little attention has been paid to examining 
the specific contribution of different types of biases and events to depression vulnerability 
within one sample. Moreover, although the cognitive theories assume an association 
between childhood events and biased processing, this has not received much attention so 
far. In order to guide future studies on depression vulnerability, it seems important to study 
different cognitive biases as well as different stressful childhood events measures within the 
same clinical sample. Also the distinction between risk factors for the onset and recurrence 
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of depression have received little attention so far (Monroe & Harkness, 2011). However, the 
conditions that bring on a first episode of depression may differ in from those that bring on 
subsequent episodes (Monroe & Harkness, 2005; Pettit et al., 2006). 
 The aim was to study was twofold. First, the assumption was tested that both 
cognitive biases and stressful childhood events are associated with depression, and that 
they may interact to increase vulnerability. More specifically, the current study examined the 
association of several childhood life events variables, as well as selective attentional bias, 
attention interference bias and memory bias with case status (never-depressed or formerly 
depressed) and recurrence (one or multiple past episodes). The second aim was more 
exploratory in nature, as the differentiating effect of these widely used bias and stressful 
childhood events measures was compared. We expected to find a clear association between 
childhood trauma and case status, whereas we did not have a specific hypothesis for the 
association with childhood adversity (Hovens et al., 2010). Although speculative, memory 
bias may be associated with case status above and beyond attentional biases (Matt et al., 
1992). One could also predict that stronger negative bias and more severe childhood events 
are also associated with relapse. However, after a first episodes, the onset of depressive 
episodes may become more spontaneous and less strongly linked to stressful events (Kessler 
& Magee, 1993; Monroe & Harkness, 2005; Post et al., 1996), and biased processing may not 
offer additional differentiation after individuals have experienced a first episode (in line with 
the ‘scar hypothesis’, Lewinsohn et al., 1981).
Method
Participants
 This study is part of the ‘Info in Genes’ study, which aims to link cognitive biases 
to genetic susceptibility to depression and includes several computer tasks. Only data of 
three computer tasks are discussed here. A sample of 337 formerly depressed and 83 never-
depressed individuals participated in the study. A formerly depressed sample was selected 
to minimize reverse causation (current depressive state influencing retrospective report of 
childhood events), as well as depressive state affecting cognitive biases. In formerly depressed 
individuals, the average number of previous episodes was 3.53 (standard deviation=1.88). 
The formerly depressed individuals were recruited at the department of psychiatry of the 
Radboud University Medical Centre, as well as via HSK, a private regional mental health 
care organization. Participants were included in the formerly depressed group if they met 
the criteria of the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) for a previous depressive 
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episode. Exclusion criteria for both groups were: current depressive episode, current or 
lifetime bipolar disorder, current psychotic symptoms, alcohol or substance abuse within 
the past 6 months, deafness, blindness, neurological disorder, sensorimotor handicaps and 
intellectual disability. The never-depressed individuals were recruited via local newspapers, 
online postings at the medical centre’s website and a local training centre. The never-
depressed individuals did not have a current or previous diagnosis of depression. In order to 
assess in- and exclusion criteria, trained professionals interviewed eligible participants with 
the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV Axis-I disorders (SCID-I; First et al., 1996). 
The SCID-I has been demonstrated to have a good reliability (Skre et al., 1991; Williams 
et al., 1992). All interviewers had extensive training in the use of the SCID-I, as well as 
previous experience in administering structured clinical interviews to psychiatric patients. 
Participants received a gift certificate in return for their participation.
Materials and Apparatus 
 Stressful childhood events, depressive symptomatology, neuroticism and medication 
use Stressful childhood events were assessed with an adapted version of the Life Events 
Questionnaire (e.g. Gerritsen et al., 2011; Van Oostrom et al., 2012). This questionnaire has 
good psychometric properties (Brugha & Cragg, 1990). Participants were asked to indicate 
whether they had experienced a set of life events (e.g. parental loss, sexual abuse or serious 
health problems) before the age 16 of years, after the age of 16 and within the last year. 
Two childhood trauma variables were calculated: one variable representing the number of 
traumatic events (aggression and/or abuse) involving a family member before the age of 16 and 
a second variable representing traumatic events before the age of 16 where the perpetrator 
was not a family member. Also, an adverse childhood events variable was calculated (in 
line with Van Oostrom et al., 2012). This variable represented the sum of several impactful 
events that were not purposely directed at the child (parental loss, divorce of parents and/
or prolonged separation of parents) before the age of 16. Depressive symptomatology was 
measured with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996). Neuroticism was 
assessed using the 12-item subscale from the NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa 
& McCrae, 1992). On both the BDI-II and the NEO-FFI, a sum score was calculated with a 
higher score representing a higher level of respectively depressive symptomatology and 
neuroticism. Current use of medication prescribed for anxiety, mood or sleep problems was 
assessed by a psychiatrist (author AS). 
 Mood Induction The first mood induction lasted 12 minutes and the second 6 minutes. 
Each film segment contained a highly emotional sad scene from the movie “Sophie’s choice”. 
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These film segments have been validated and proven to be reliable (Erber & Tesser, 1992; 
Fitzgerald et al., 2011). Before the onset of each film segment, participants were instructed 
to allow the emotionality of the film to influence their mood as much as possible and to 
maintain the sad mood state. The second mood induction served to boost the mood effect 
and was therefore shorter. Participants rated their mood state using a computerized visual 
analogue scale that ranged from -10 (indicating saddest mood) to 10 (indicating happiest 
mood) before and after the mood inductions.
 Dot Probe task The Dot Probe task required participants to pay attention to a dot 
on the computer screen while ignoring the preceding duo of pictures (selected from the 
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database; Lundqvist et al., 1998). Each pair depicted 
a unique individual with two different facial expressions: 20 pairs had sad and neutral 
expressions and 20 pairs had happy and neutral expressions. The 1000 ms presentation of 
a face pair was preceded by a black fixation cross in the middle of the screen (for 500 ms). 
Following the offset of the pictures, a small gray dot appeared on the screen location where 
one of the pictures had been and remained on the screen until the participant pressed a key 
on the keyboard. Participants were instructed to determine as quickly and accurately as 
possible whether the gray dot was on the left or right side of the computer screen by pressing 
one of two keys. Each of the 40 picture pairs was presented in each of four blocks, with a 
brief rest period between each block. Selective attention bias-scores were computed for sad 
and happy expressions by subtracting the average reaction time on compatible trials (dot 
appeared on the side of the emotional face) from the average reaction time on incompatible 
trials (dot appeared on the side of the neutral face). A more positive bias-score represented 
more selective attention towards the emotional expression. 
 Emotional Stroop task Participants received a card version of the Emotional Stroop 
task, which was delivered via a computer. They were asked to name the print color of the 
words, which were presented per valence on a card. The experimental phase consisted of three 
cards with 48 differently colored words each: neutral words, positive words and depression-
specific negative words. The words were selected from a database (Phaf et al., 2006) and 
matched for length across the valences. The cards were presented in a random order. An 
attention interference bias-score was calculated per emotional valence by subtracting the 
reaction time on the neutral card from the reaction time on each of the emotional cards. A 
longer reaction time represented more attention interference of that specific valence.
 Incidental Learning task and Free Recall In the Incidental Learning task and Free recall, 
participants were presented with 12 depression-specific negative and 12 positive words in 
a fixed order for 10 seconds in capital black letters against a white background. Words were 
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selected from two databases (Dutch translation of the Affective Norms for English Words 
database; Bradley & Lang, 1999; and Phaf et al., 2006). To make encoding self-referential, 
participants were instructed to vividly imagine themselves in a scene with the presented 
word. This task was followed by a short paper-and-pencil distraction task (Raven matrices; 
Raven, 1958). Upon completion, participants were instructed to return to the computer for 
the next task. This was an unannounced free recall of the words presented in the previous 
computer task. A difference score representing memory bias was calculated by subtracting 
the number of correctly recalled negative words from the number of correctly recalled 
positive words. A positive score represented positive memory bias. 
Figure 1 Graphical presentation of the procedure and type of stimuli used
Informed consent
Questionnaires 
Mood induction 1
12 min.
Emotional Stroop task
Positive words  
Depression-specific negative words
Mood induction 2
6 min.
Incidental Learning task and Free Recall
Positive words  
Depression-specific negative words
Debriefing
Payment 
Dot Probe task
Happy-neutral face pairs
Sad-neutral face pairs
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Procedure
 The participants first completed an informed consent form, demographic questions, 
the Life Events Questionnaire, the BDI-II and the NEO-FFI neuroticism subscale. After the 
first mood induction, the Emotional Stroop task would follow. This task was automatically 
followed by a second mood induction and then the Incidental Learning Task, the distraction 
task and Free Recall phase were administered, followed by the Dot Probe task to finalize the 
experiment. Participants did not receive a third mood induction because a pilot study had 
learned that administration of a third mood induction after the brief memory task put too 
much of a burden on the formerly depressed participants. Participants were debriefed before 
they were rewarded for their participation. The whole study lasted for about one hour. The 
study was carried out in accordance with the latest version of the Declaration of Helsinki 
and has been approved by the Dutch central medical ethics review board. An overview of the 
procedure is presented in Figure 1.
Statistical analyses
 Reaction time trials associated with incorrect responses and mechanical errors were 
eliminated from the data (5% of all Stroop data and 1% of all Dot Probe data) as well as 
extreme reaction time trials in the top and bottom 2% of the variance. We corrected for the 
effects of potential outliers by computing the median reaction time of each participant, on 
each task, group and trial type. Due to the data cleaning procedure and some participants’ 
failure to complete all tasks, the sample sizes for the main analyses were 79 never-depressed 
controls and 302 formerly depressed patients. To allow for interpretation of the statistics, 
standardized z-scores were computed for the bias-scores on the Dot Probe task, the Emotional 
Stroop task and the Free Recall task. The variables sex, age, depressive symptomatology 
and neuroticism were included in all models given their known contribution to depression 
vulnerability (Kendler et al., 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Weissman et al., 1996), as well as 
biased processing. Furthermore, medication use (yes, no) and educational level were included 
in all models, given their effect on mood and/or cognitive processing (Harmer et al., 2009).
 The method of logistic regression was used to study the association of the 
independent variables medication use, depressive symptomatology, neuroticism, bias (i.e. 
selective attentional bias, attention interference bias, memory bias), stressful childhood 
events (i.e. trauma within the family, trauma outside the family, adversity) and demographic 
variables (age, sex, educational level), with case status (never-depressed, formerly depressed) 
and with recurrence status (one past episode, multiple past episodes). The odds ratio (OR) 
and 95% confidence interval (CI) was determined per independent variable. Case status 
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was entered as outcome variable and all the bias measures as independent variables. In a 
second model, recurrence status was entered as outcome variable and all the bias variables 
as independent variables. Bias variables were entered in blocks per task. A similar approach 
was used to study the contribution of the three stressful childhood events variables to the 
outcome variables case status and recurrence status. Significant independent variables from 
the previous models were entered into a final model assessing the contribution of these 
independent variables as well as their interaction to case status. The interaction terms were 
calculated by multiplying two independent variables. The models’ fit is reflected by Area 
Under the Curve (AUC).
Results
Sample descriptives
 Sample descriptives are presented in Table 1. The groups did not differ on sex 
distribution or on number of participants who experienced childhood trauma outside the 
family or adverse childhood events. Compared to controls, formerly depressed individuals 
were on average three years older, had a lower educational level, more frequently used 
medication, experienced more depressive symptomatology and a larger percentage 
experienced childhood trauma within the family. Furthermore, formerly depressed individuals 
who experienced a single episode were compared to formerly depressed individuals with 
multiple past episodes. Individuals who experienced multiple depressive episodes were on 
average older, had more depressive symptoms and a higher level of neuroticism.
Mood Induction
 The first mood induction was successful as mood state decreased significantly from 
baseline (M=4.19 SD=3.75) to post (M=1.05 SD=4.29), F(1,384)=266.94, p<.001, Cohen’s 
f=.83. The second mood induction was also successful as mood decreased from pre (M=3.95 
SD=3.55) to post (M=.60 SD=4.54), F(1,391)=346.60, p<.001, f=.94. The never-depressed 
participants did not differ from the formerly depressed participants on mood effect of the 
first, F(1,388)=2.49, p=.116, f=.68, nor the second mood induction, F(1,390)=3.78, p=.053, 
f=.33. Compared to baseline, mood was still lower after the memory task (M=2.67 SD=8.63), 
F(1,385)=14.11, p<.001, f=.19, even though sad mood was not induced again.
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Table 1 Range, means and/or percentages (standard deviations) and statistics comparing (t-test or Chi2 test) 
never-depressed controls and formerly depressed individuals, as well as formerly depressed with a single past 
episode and formerly depressed with multiple past episodes on demographic and clinical variables
Sample
Never-depressed 
controls (N 83)
Formerly depressed 
(N 337)
Variable Range Mean/% (SD) Range Mean/% (SD) t-test/Chi2 test
Age (years) 18-63 43 (11.2) 19-79 48 (12.1) t(418)=-3.63, p=.000
Sex (% female) 67% 66% t(418)=.27, p=.784
Educational levela 2% low
19% average 
77% high 
8% low
39% average 
51% high
χ2(2)=18.09, p=.000
Medication useb 2% 46% t(417)=-7.88, p=.000
Depr. symptomatology 0-20 4 (4.5) 0-46 14 (10.0) t(418)=-9.67, p=.000
Neuroticism 12-42 24 (7.2) 14-59 38 (8.6) t(418)=-14.08, p=.000
Child. trauma within 
fam.
0-2 12% 0-2 29% t(418)=-3.16, p=.002
Child. trauma outside 
fam.
0-1 7% 0-2 15% t(418)=-1.94, p=.053
Child. adverse events 0-2 30% 0-2 30% t(418)=-.03, p=.979
Single past episode 
(N 63)
Multiple past 
episodes 
(N 274)
Variable Range Mean/% (SD) Range Mean/% (SD) t-test/Chi2 test
Age (years) 20-62 44 (13.1) 19-79 49 (11.7) t(335)=-3.00, p=.003
Sex (% female) 60% 67% t(335)=-1.03, p=.304
Educational levela 8% low
48% average 
44% high
8% low
38% average 
53% high
χ2(2)=2.06, p=.358
Medication useb 31% 50% t(335)=-1.03, p=.304
Depr. symptomatology 0-41 10 (8.5) 0-46 16 (10.0) t(335)=-4.30, p=.000
Neuroticism 17-51 32 (7.9) 14-59 39 (8.2) t(334)=-2.73, p=.007
Child. trauma within 
fam.
0-2 22% 0-2 30% t(335)=-1.28, p=.203
Child. trauma outside 
fam.
0-1 13% 0-2 16% t(335)=-.66, p=.507
Child. adverse events 0-2 33% 0-2 30% t(335)=.59, p=.558
a Data of six participants was missing
b Refers to medication prescribed for anxiety, mood or sleep problems
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Case status
 Table 2 presents the association separately of each independent variable with 
the outcome variables. The model examining the association of selective attentional bias, 
attention interference bias and memory bias with case status is presented in Table 3. This 
model had an excellent fit: AUC of .95 (standard error=.01). Memory bias was significantly 
associated with case status, with an OR of .44 (95% CI .28-.68, p<.001). This indicates that 
recalling more positive relative to negative words can discriminate formerly depressed from 
never-depressed individuals. 
 The model with childhood trauma within family, childhood trauma outside family 
and childhood adverse events as independent variables had an excellent fit, with an AUC 
of .94 (standard error=.01) (see Table 3). Childhood traumatic events that involved a family 
member contributed significantly to the model, with an OR of 2.63 (95% CI 1.03-6.71, p<.05). 
This indicates that experiencing an (additional) early life traumatic event may increase one’s 
chance of developing depression. 
 In the combined model with significant predictor variables from the previous models 
(see Table 4), case status was significantly associated with memory bias with an OR of .46 (95% 
CI .27-.77, p<.005), independent of age, sex, medication use, depressive symptomatology 
and neuroticism. Case status was not significantly associated with childhood trauma within 
the family. This model had an excellent fit with an AUC of .95 (standard error=.01). The 
memory bias-childhood trauma interaction term yielded a non-significant effect, indicating 
that the effects of memory bias and childhood trauma are independent of each other.
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Table 2 Contribution of separate independent variables to case status (controls vs. formerly depressed) and 
recurrence status (one versus multiple past episodes). Beta-values, standard errors (SE), p-values, odds ratios 
(OR) and 95% confidence intervals (CI) are presented per independent variable
Sample
Case status
Variable Beta SE p-valuea OR 95% CI
Age  .04 .01 <.001* 1.04 1.02-  1.06
Sex (0=male)  .07 .26 .78 * 1.07 .64-  1.79
Educational level  .21 .02 <.001* 1.23 1.18-  1.29
Medication use 3.55 .72 <.001* 34.68 8.39-143.37
Depressive symptomatology  .23 .03 <.001* 1.26 1.18-  1.34
Neuroticism  .21 .02 <.001* 1.23 1.18-  1.29
Dot Probe Sad faces -.10 .12 .42 * .91 .71-  1.15
Dot Probe Happy faces -.08 .12 .50 * .92 .72-  1.17
Stroop Depr.-specific words  .03 .12 .82 * 1.03 .81-  1.31
Stroop Positive words -.16 .13 .19 * .85 .66-  1.09
Memory bias (Pos.-Depr. words) -.51 .13 <.001* .56 .46-   .78
Childhood trauma within fam. 1.08 .36 <.005* 2.95 1.46-  5.95
Childhood trauma outside fam. .85 .45 .06 * 2.34 .97-  5.66
Childhood adverse events .01 .27 .98 * 1.01 .60-  1.70
Recurrence status
Variable Beta SE p-value OR 95% CI
Age .03 .01 <.005* 1.03 1.01-1.06
Sex (0=male) -.30 .29 .30 * .74 .42-1.31
Educational level .10 .02 <.001* 1.10 1.07-1.15
Medication use .80 .30 <.01* * 2.23 1.24-4.02
Depressive symptomatology .07 .02 <.001* 1.07 1.04-1.11
Neuroticism .10 .02 <.001* 1.10 1.07-1.15
Dot Probe Sad faces .28 .14 <.05* * 1.32 1.00-1.74
Dot Probe Happy faces -.00 .13 .98 * 1.00 .77-1.30
Stroop Depr.-specific words -.02 .14 .90 * .98 .74-1.30
Stroop Positive words -.14 .14 .31 * .87 .66-1.14
Memory bias (Pos.-Depr. words) .18 .15 .22 * 1.20 .90-1.61
Childhood trauma within fam. .42 .33 .20 * 1.52 .80-2.91
Childhood trauma outside fam. .27 .41 .51 * 1.32 .59-2.95
Childhood adverse events -.18 .30 .56 * .84 .47-1.51
aSignificant p<.05 p-values are marked with an asterisk*
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Table 3 Logistic regression models with case status as dependent variable and either bias measures or 
childhood stressful events as independent variables. Models are adjusted for age, sex, educational level, 
mediation use, depressive symptomatology and neuroticism
Case status: controls vs. formerly depressed
Variable Beta SE p-valuea OR 95% CI
Age .02 .02 <.28 1.02 .99-1.05
Sex (0=male) .17 .43 <.69 1.19 .51-2.75
Educational level -.60 .40 <.14 .55 .25-1.21
Medication use -3.22 .84 <.001* .04 .01- .21
Depressive symptomatology .04 .05 <.40 1.07 .95-1.14
Neuroticism .21 .04 <.001* 1.23 1.15-1.32
Dot Probe Sad faces -.20 .24 <.40 .82 .52-1.30
Dot Probe Happy faces -.01 .25 <.97 .99 .61-1.60
Stroop Depr. words .27 .27 <.31 1.31 .78-2.21
Stroop Positive words .14 .29 <.62 1.15 .66-2.03
Memory bias (Pos.-Depr. words) -.83 .23 <.001* .44 .28- .68
Age .03 .02 <.05* 1.03 1.00-1.07
Sex (0=male) .24 .42 <.57 1.27 .56-2.86
Educational level -.42 .36 <.24 .66 .33-1.32
Medication use -3.06 .78 <.001* .05 .01- .22
Depressive symptomatology .08 .04 <.08 1.08 .99-1.17
Neuroticism .18 .03 <.001* 1.19 1.12-1.27
Childhood trauma within fam. .97 .48 <.05* 2.63 1.03-6.71
Childhood trauma outside fam. .88 .62 <.16 2.41 .72-8.11
Childhood adverse events .62 .43 <.15 1.86 .81-4.29
aSignificant p<.05 p-values are marked with an asteriks*
Table 4 Combined logistic regression model with case status as dependent variable and memory bias, trauma 
within the family, and the interaction term as independent variables. The model is adjusted for age, sex, 
educational level, medication, depressive symptomatology use and neuroticism
Case status: controls vs. formerly depressed
Variable Beta SE p-valuea OR 95% CI
Age .02 .02 <.28 1.02 .99-1.05
Sex (0=male) .08 .42 <.85 1.08 .47-2.48
Educational level -.64 .39 <.10 .53 .25-1.13
Medication use -3.11 .81 <.001* .05 .01- .22
Depressive symptomatology .05 .05 <.33 1.05 .96-1.15
Neuroticism .20 .04 <.001* 1.22 1.13-1.31
Memory bias (Pos.-Depr. words) -.79 .27 <.005* .46 .27- .77
Childhood trauma within fam. .59 .51 <.24 1.81 .67-4.88
Memory bias x trauma in fam. .17 .49 <.73 1.19 .45-3.13
aSignificant p<.05 p-values are marked with an asteriks*
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Recurrence status
 The model examining the association of selective attentional bias, attention 
interference bias and memory bias with recurrence status (whether formerly depressed 
individuals experienced one or multiple past episodes) is presented in Table 5. This model 
had a good fit, with an AUC of .82 (standard error=.03). No bias measures were significantly 
associated with recurrence status. The model examining the contribution of childhood 
trauma within family, childhood trauma outside family and childhood adverse events had a 
good fit with an AUC of .80 (standard error=.03). No significant effects were uncovered (see 
Table 5). 
Table 5 Logistic regression models with recurrence status (one versus multiple past episodes) as dependent 
variable and bias measures or childhood stressful events as independent variables. Models are adjusted for 
age, sex, educational level, medication, depressive symptomatology use and neuroticism
Recurrence status: one vs. multiple past episodes
Variable Beta SE p-valuea OR 95% CI
Age .05 .02 <.005* 1.05 1.02-1.08
Sex (0=male) -.18 .37 <.62 .83 .41-1.70
Educational level .42 .28 <.14 1.51 .88-2.62
Medication use -.57 .36 <.12 .57 .28-1.15
Depressive symptomatology .03 .03 <.27 1.03 .98-1.09
Neuroticism .11 .03 <.001* 1.12 1.05-1.18
Dot Probe Sad faces .34 .20 <.08 1.41 .96-2.07
Dot Probe Happy faces .28 .18 <.13 1.32 .92-1.90
Stroop Depr. words .34 .21 <.10 1.41 .93-2.13
Stroop Positive words -.29 .20 <.15 .75 .51-1.11
Memory bias (Pos.-Depr. words) .27 .18 <.14 1.33 .92-1.88
Age .05 .01 <.001* 1.05 1.02-1.08
Sex (0=male) -.24 .34 <.48 .78 .40-1.57
Educational level .46 .26 <.08 1.58 .94-2.64
Medication use -.71 .33 <.05* .49 .26- .94
Depressive symptomatology .02 .03 <.42 1.02 .97-1.07
Neuroticism .10 .03 <.001* 1.11 1.05-1.16
Childhood trauma within fam. .46 .38 <.23 1.58 .75-3.33
Childhood trauma outside fam. .38 .47 <.41 1.47 .59-3.67
Childhood adverse events -.17 .34 <.63 .85 .43-1.66
aSignificant p<.05 p-values are marked with an asteriks*
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Discussion
 This study is the first to examine the association between childhood adversity, 
biased information processing and depression onset and recurrence in a large sample of 
formerly depressed individuals. The findings suggest that specifically negative memory bias 
and childhood trauma within the family or origin may differentiate between individuals with 
a history of depression and individuals without a depressive past. Once an individual has 
experienced a first depressive episode, factors such as traumatic childhood events and biased 
memory may not offer subsequent differentiation for recurrence of depressive episodes. These 
findings may have implications for the ‘scar hypothesis’: the notion that the experience of 
a depressive episode instigates changes in cognitive emotional functioning (Lewinsohn et 
al., 1981). Experiencing a first episode may alter the way an individual processes emotional 
information, resulting in a rather stable processing bias. Given the retrospective nature of the 
current study, it is, however, unclear whether cognitive biases are a result of or a precipitant 
for a depressive episode. A first episode may have a stronger link with cognitive biases and 
stressful childhood events than later episodes (the latter has already been reported by Kessler 
& Magee, 1993; Monroe & Harkness, 2005). Instead, other factors, such as recent stressors, 
may influence relapse to a greater extent. This is in accordance with the ‘kindling hypothesis’ 
(Post, 1992) that states that an individual becomes more sensitive to stressful events after 
experiencing a first depressive episode. With the experience of multiple episodes, the stress 
level that can trigger relapse decreases and episodes may in time even occur in the absence 
of life stress. Such interpretations of the results, however, remain highly speculative and in 
need for substantiation.
 Memory bias was associated with depressive cases status independent of current 
depressive symptoms and neuroticism. Neither selective attentional biases or attention 
interference biases were significantly associated with depressive case status. These findings 
suggest that memory bias is most characteristic of depression. This is in accordance with 
cognitive theories as well as with past findings (Ingram, 1984; Matt et al., 1992; Vrijsen et 
al., in press; Williams et al., 1997). Here we must note that, in contrast to explicit memory 
measures (Buchner & Wippich, 2000), reaction time tasks like the Emotional Stroop task and 
the Dot Probe task are generally considered to be unreliable in measuring biased processing 
because the measures are neither internally consistent nor stable (Eide et al., 2002; Schmukle, 
2005). So, attention biases may also be at the core of depression, as suggested by others 
(Peckham et al., 2010), but may be more difficult to tap because of lower reliability of its 
current measures. 
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 We found that childhood adverse interpersonal events within the family that were 
purposely directed at the child, i.e. aggression or physical or sexual abuse, were related to 
depression incidence. Trauma inflicted by a person that should secure the basal trust for 
a child, may affect basic assumptions about safety, trust and power that are developed in 
childhood, resulting in negative schemata (Jehu et al., 1985-1986). This in turn may foster 
cognitive distortions such as biased processing of emotional information (Beck, 1987; McCann 
& Pearlman, 1990). Our results did not support the assumption of the cognitive theories 
that childhood events affect biased processing, as the associations of childhood events and 
biases with depression were unrelated. This underscores that further examination of the 
interplay between bias and childhood events is needed before we can conclude whether 
the assumption of the cognitive theories is supported by empirical evidence. Although not 
strongly predictive on its own, the effect of adverse childhood events might also be catalyzed 
by biological risk factors, such as genetic markers for depression (Charney & Manji, 2004). 
 The main limitation to the current study is that it is not a prospective study, therefore 
no causal conclusions can be drawn. In formerly depressed individuals, biased processing 
might reflect a susceptibility factor as well as scars from previous episodes (Lewinshon 
et al., 1981). Unfortunately, the study design does not allow for proper differentiation. 
Single episode cases may subsequently experience more episodes. Some data indicate 
that the probability of another episode decreases dramatically after approximately 6 years 
(Monroe & Harkness, 2011). The fact that no data on the time from the last episode or on 
interrater reliability of the number of episodes was recorded is another limitation to the 
study. Furthermore, due to a fixed order of the tasks, processing of emotional information 
on one task may have influenced processing on a subsequent task. Another limitation is 
the reliance of participants’ recall of childhood events; negative bias might affect recall of 
negative events. The life events questionnaire we used assessed the occurrence of several 
factual events during pre-determined periods of life. It is therefore unlikely that recall was 
distorted. Moreover, adults’ recall of specific childhood events seems fairly accurate (Brewin 
et al., 1993). In this study, we applied a rather stringent selection of adverse childhood events 
(in line with Van Oostrom et al., 2012). This might have resulted in a lower incidence of 
adversity than in related studies (e.g. Geen et al., 2010; Kessler et al., 2010). Not administering 
a mood induction before the Dot Probe task is a limitation, as mood might not have been 
comparable for all bias tasks. Furthermore, formerly depressed participants were on average 
older and had a lower average educational level than never-depressed control participants. 
More optimal matching of groups is recommended for future studies. Longitudinal studies 
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would be best suited to confirm our findings and could in addition improve the reliability of 
the assessment of childhood events. 
 Taken together, the current results indicate that memory bias may be an important 
vulnerability factor for depression, while negative biases might not be related to the number 
of episodes vulnerable individuals go through. Furthermore, individuals who were victim 
of aggression or abuse as a child might await more emotional problems than individuals 
who experienced stressful - but not as interpersonal - childhood events. The current study 
underscores the importance of differentiating between type and severity of childhood 
stressful events in research and treatment of depression. Gaining knowledge about the specific 
cognitive characteristics and type of life events that are associated with depression, may be a 
first step to improve clinical interventions in the future (Charney & Manji, 2004; Nanni et al., 
2012; Southwick et al., 2005). Although still a distant prospect, tailoring treatment to specific 
risk profiles based on cognitive vulnerability and childhood stress could be promising.
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Chapter 6
Remitted depressed individuals show an interaction 
between variance in the mineralocorticoid 
receptor NR3C2 gene and childhood trauma on 
negative memory bias
This chapter is based on Vrijsen, J.N., Vogel, S., Arias-Vásquez, A., Franke, B., Fernández, G., Becker, E.S., 
Speckens, A. & van Oostrom, I. Remitted depressed individuals show an interaction between variance in 
the mineralocorticoid receptor NR3C2 gene and childhood trauma on negative memory bias. Submitted 
for publication.
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Abstract
 Depression is a heritable disease and cognitive biases have been associated with 
depression risk genes. Recently, the mineralocorticoid receptor NR3C2 gene, and in particular 
one polymorphism (rs5534), has been associated with negative memory bias, at least in 
healthy individuals who experienced severe life adversity. The current study examined the 
interaction between the rs5534 genotype and different types of adverse life events in a sample 
of remitted depressed individuals. A total of 298 remitted depressed individuals performed 
an incidental emotional memory task (positive and negative words). Life adversity, childhood 
trauma and recent adversity were measured with a self-report questionnaire. NR3C2 rs5534 
by life adversity, as well as childhood trauma and recent adversity interactions were analyzed 
for positive and negative memory bias using ANCOVAs. The significant interaction between 
NR3C2 rs5534 and childhood trauma on negative memory bias (p=.046) indicated that risk 
allele carriers (AA, AG) with childhood trauma tended to show more negative memory bias 
compared to individuals homozygous for the G allele who had experienced childhood trauma, 
and to A allele carriers without childhood trauma. No association between rs5534, memory 
bias and life adversity nor recent adversity was found. An association of the NR3C2 gene and 
childhood trauma with negative memory bias was found in remitted depressed individuals, 
which extends previous findings in a healthy population. 
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Introduction
 Depression is a complex multifactorial condition with considerable heritability, but 
genetic studies so far have yielded mixed findings (Sullivan et al., 2000). A potential way 
to increase the power to detect genetic effects is to investigate cognitive characteristics of 
depression (Gottesman & Gould 2003; Kendler & Neale 2010). Biased memory for emotional 
information is considered a rather stable cognitive vulnerability factor for depression (De 
Raedt & Koster, 2010; Hasler et al., 2004), and currently depressed individuals show better 
memory for negative than for positive information (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Matt et al., 1992; 
Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Ridout et al., 2009). Upon remission, stress and negative mood 
re-activates biased processing (McCabe et al., 2000). Several recent studies have successfully 
associated depression candidate genes with memory bias and life adversity (Firk & Markus, 
2009; Van Oostrom et al., 2012; Woudstra et al., 2013). These studies found that explicit 
memory for emotional verbal stimuli was associated with different depression candidate 
genes (i.e. SLC6A4, BDNF, COMT, PCLO). For example, the study by Van Oostrom and colleagues 
(2012) found less positive memory bias in male BDNF risk allele (Met) carriers who reported 
adverse childhood events. Generally, the interaction between genetic susceptibility and 
adverse life events is considered an important mechanism in the development of depression, 
as life adversity may modulate genetic effects (Caspi et al., 2003, 2010; Caspi & Moffitt, 2006). 
Especially the experience of adversity during childhood - when the brain is still developing 
- affects the development of cognitive processes (Perry et al., 2011). This is in line with the 
cognitive models of depression that state that the experience of negative events in childhood 
often leads to dysfunctional basic assumptions about the self and the world, which form 
the basis of cognitive biases, and leaves individuals vulnerable for developing symptoms of 
depression or to relapse (Beck, 1976, 2008; Bower, 1981).
 A recent study examined the association of the mineralocorticoid receptor NR3C2 
gene with negative memory bias in a healthy population (N=514) using a novel gene-
wide association approach (Vogel et al., 2014). The NR3C2 gene codes for a receptor that 
interacts with the stress hormone cortisol. Together with the glucocorticoid receptor, the 
mineralocorticoid receptor regulates the hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis and 
responds to stress-induced increases in cortisol levels through which it presumably mediates 
the effects of stress (Joëls et al., 2008). NR3C2 has been associated with emotional memory, 
anxiety, depression, rumination, and hopelessness (the latter two being characteristics of 
depression; Hlavacova et al., 2010; Karst et al., 2010; Klok, 2011a/b; Otte, 2010). The study 
by Vogel and colleagues (2014) implicated the SNP rs5534 as a functional element in the 
NR3C2 gene to be associated with negative memory bias, especially in individuals who 
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had experienced adverse life events. Individuals homozygous for the ‘A’ allele with high 
life adversity displayed strongest negatively biased memory processing. Life adversity was 
assessed using a questionnaire, and explicit verbal emotional memory bias was measured 
with a computer task. 
 The current study aimed to extend the previously reported interaction between 
the NR3C2 rs5534 polymorphism and life adversity on negative memory bias in a sample of 
remitted depressed individuals. Examining interactions between genes and environment in 
an affected sample is rather novel (e.g. Woudstra et al., 2012). A remitted depressed sample 
can offer insights above and beyond the study of healthy individuals as results can speak 
to the generalizability of gene-environment interactions. Moreover, selecting a sample 
of remitted depressed individuals offers the opportunity to study genetic risk effects in 
affected individuals, without current cognitive concomitants or depressive states affecting 
biased processing and dominating small genetic effects, as in a currently depressed sample 
(Bhagwagar & Cowen, 2007). 
 The previous study by Vogel and colleagues (2014) examined the modulating effect 
of low versus high life adversity by combining traumatic and more generally adverse events 
from different stages of life (i.e. childhood as well as recent events). Besides examining the 
association between the NR3C2 rs5534 polymorphism and low versus high life adversity 
on memory bias in an affected sample, the current study aimed to shed light on the 
differential effect of different types of life adversity on the mineralocorticoid system. The 
specificity of adverse life events was examined by differentiating between the influence 
of childhood traumatic events and recent adversity on the association between the NR3C2 
rs5534 polymorphism and memory bias. NR3C2 gene A allele carriers who experienced high 
life adversity, childhood trauma and/or recent adversity were expected to show strongest 
negatively biased memory. A sad mood induction procedure was used to reactivate biased 
processing and align mood state levels in the remitted depressed sample, as depressogentic 
processing styles reemerge especially after stress such as a transient sad mood state (Segal & 
Ingram, 1994).
Methods and Materials
Participants
 This study is part of a larger study, which aims to link cognitive biases to genetic 
susceptibility for depression (see also Vrijsen et al., in press). A total of 325 remitted depressed 
participants (RDs) took part in the study. The RDs were recruited at the Department of 
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Psychiatry of the Radboud University Medical Centre in Nijmegen, The Netherlands, as 
well as other regional outpatient psychiatric services. Participants were included if they 
met the criteria of the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) for a previous 
depressive episode. Exclusion criteria were: current depressive episode, current or lifetime 
bipolar disorder, current psychotic symptoms, alcohol or substance abuse within the past 6 
months, deafness, blindness, neurological disorder, sensorimotor handicaps and intellectual 
disability. Trained professionals interviewed eligible participants with the Structured Clinical 
Interview for the DSM-IV Axis-I disorders (SCID-I; First et al., 1996). The SCID-I has been 
demonstrated to have a good reliability (Skre et al., 1991; Williams et al., 1992). Current use 
of psychotropic medication that might influence memory bias was assessed by a psychiatrist 
(author AS). Depressive symptomatology was measured with the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996). Participants received a gift certificate for their participation. The 
study had been approved by the Dutch central medical ethics review board (P04.0599C) and 
was performed in accordance with guidelines and regulations for human studies.
Measurements
 Stressful life events Stressful childhood events were assessed with an adapted version 
of the Life Events Questionnaire (Brugha & Cragg, 1990). This version has previously been 
used in comparable studies (Gerritsen et al., 2011; Van Oostrom et al., 2012; Vogel et al., 
2014). Participants were asked to indicate whether they had experienced a set of life events 
before the age of 16 years, after the age of 16 and/or within the last year. In line with Vogel 
and colleagues (2014), a life adversity variable was calculated as the sum of all experienced 
events. As Vogel and colleagues (2014), we stratified our sample according to the number of 
adverse events using a median split into a low life adversity (below the median of 4 events) 
and a high life adversity (≥ 4 events) group. 
 Furthermore, a childhood traumatic events variable was calculated. This variable 
indicated whether or not participants had experienced traumatic events (aggression and/
or abuse) before the age of 16 years (no vs. yes). A recent adversity variable was also 
calculated. This variable reflected whether participants had experienced health problems, 
health problems of a close one, death of a family member, problems within the romantic 
relationship, divorce, a conflict at work, monetary problems or legal issues within the last 
year (no vs. yes).
 Mood Induction Before the task, participants saw a highly emotional negative film 
segment from the movie “Sophie’s choice” (Erber & Tesser, 1992). Participants were instructed 
94
Chapter 6: Remitted depressed individuals show an interaction between variance in the    
mineralocorticoid receptor NR3C2 gene and childhood trauma on negative memory bias
to let the emotionality of the film influence their mood as much as possible and to maintain 
the sad mood state. 
 Memory bias Participants were presented sequentially with 12 depression-specific 
negative and 12 positive words in fixed randomized order, with the restriction that no more 
than two words of the same valence would be presented consecutively. Words were selected 
from two databases (Dutch translation of the Affective Norms for English Words database; 
Bradley & Lang, 1999; and Phaf et al., 2006). Each word was presented for 10 seconds in 
capital black letters against a white background. To make encoding self-referential, 
participants were instructed to vividly imagine themselves in a scene with the presented 
word. Before the onset of the next trial, participants were asked to rate how well they were 
able to imagine themselves in the scene on a 5-point Likert scale. This task was followed by 
a short paper-and-pencil distraction task (Raven matrices; Raven, 1958). Upon completion, 
participants were instructed to return to the computer for an unannounced free recall test 
of the 12 depression-specific negative and 12 positive words. Participants were instructed to 
type in all the words they could remember within 3 minutes. Spelling errors were permitted 
since all responses that did not match exactly with study words were checked manually. The 
proportion of negative recall (negative memory bias) and the proportion of positive recall 
(positive memory bias) were calculated. The number of correctly recalled words in a given 
valence category was divided by the total number of correctly recalled words. For example, a 
negative memory bias score of 0.25 indicated that 25% of the words the participant recalled 
had a depressotypic negative emotional content. This method of scoring ensures that 
memory bias is not confounded with possible differences in overall memory performance 
(Gotlib et al., 2004). 
Genotyping 
 Blood was taken by venapuncture and DNA was isolated using standard protocols. 
Molecular analyses were performed in a CCKL-accredited laboratory at the Department of 
Human Genetics of the Radboud University Medical Centre. The NR3C2 rs5534 polymorphism 
was genotyped using Taqman® analysis (Watson & Li, 2005). The NR3C2 allele frequency 
distribution in RDs was AA: N=43 (14.4 %), AG: N=161 (53.8 %), GG: N=95 (31.8 %). 
Testing for Hardy–Weinberg equilibrium (HWE) did not show deviations from the expected 
distribution of genotypes (χ²=3.65, df=1, p=.056). For reference, the allele frequency 
distribution in the Vogel and colleagues (2014) population was similar: 18.9% AA, 46.5% AG 
and 34.6% GG. Because our sample was smaller than in the Vogel and colleagues study (2014), 
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genotype groups were created based on allele frequency: carriers of at least one risk allele (A 
homozygotes and heterozygotes) were compared to GG individuals (G homozygotes). 
Procedure
 The participants were invited for the study by means of an information letter. 
Before the onset of the experiment, participants were again given the opportunity to ask 
questions and they were instructed that they could stop at any time, without specifying 
any reason. Subsequently, they completed an informed consent form and the questionnaires 
before performing the mood induction and memory task as described. Finally, participants 
were debriefed before they were rewarded for their participation.
Statistical analyses
 Genotype groups were compared on relevant demographic and clinical variables 
using t-tests. The interaction effect of genotype (AA/AG vs. GG) and life adversity (yes vs. 
no for all events, childhood trauma and recent adversity) on the proportion of positive 
and negative recall was examined using analysis of co-variance (ANCOVA). Because of their 
known effect on cognitive functioning and emotional processing, age, sex and medication 
use were included as covariates in the analyses.
Results
 Sample descriptives are presented in Table 1. The genotype groups did not differ 
on age, sex, medication use, depressive symptomatology (BDI-II total score), number of 
past episodes, the number of adverse life events or the percentage of individuals who had 
experienced life adversity, childhood trauma or recent adversity. For a total of 298 participants, 
complete genotype, memory performance and life events data were available. 
NR3C2 rs5534 genotype 
 The ANCOVA yielded a non-significant main effect of the NR3C2 rs5534 genotype 
on negative, F(1,291)=.50, p=.481, f=.04, as well as positive memory bias, F(1,291)=.001, 
p=.970, f=.00. 
NR3C2 rs5534 genotype – life adversity interaction
 Separate 2 x 2 ANCOVAs were executed for negative and for positive memory bias. 
The Genotype (AA/AG vs. GG) x Life adversity (< 4 vs. ≥ 4) interaction was non-significant for 
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negative, F(1,291)=.22, p=.639, f=.03, and for positive memory bias, F(1,291)=.00, p=.969, 
f=.00. Mean negative and positive memory bias scores are presented in Table 2.
NR3C2 rs5534 genotype – childhood trauma interaction
 The Genotype (AA/AG vs. GG) x Childhood trauma (no vs. yes) interaction was 
significant for negative memory bias, F(1,291)=4.03, p=.046, f=.12, see Figure 1, but 
not for positive memory bias, F(1,291)=.37, p=.544, f=.03. See Table 2 for means. Post-
hoc analyses revealed that A allele carriers with childhood trauma tended to show more 
negative memory bias compared to G allele homozygote RDs who experienced childhood 
trauma, F(1,110)=3.82, p=.053, f=.19, and compared to A allele carriers without childhood 
Table 1 Range, means and/or percentages (standard deviations) and t-tests comparing the remitted depressed 
genotype groups on demographic and clinical variables 
Variable Genotype AA/AG
Mean (SD) / %
Genotype GG
Mean (SD) / %
t-test
Age 47.9 (12.3) 48.0 (11.7) t(309)=.04, p=.966
Sex (% female) 63% 70% t(309)=1.20, p=.230
Medication use 45% 52% t(308)=1.14, p=.257
BDI-II 14.5 (9.9) 13.9 (9.6) t(309)=.46, p=.649
Number of episodes 3.6 (1.9) 3.4 (1.8) t(309)=.82, p=.415
Life adversity (#) 4.0 (3.1) 4.1 (3.1) t(309)=.22, p=.825
Life adversity (yes) 91% 90% t(309)=.40, p=.689
Childhood trauma (yes) 35% 43% t(309)=1.47, p=.142
Recent adversity (yes) 59% 65% t(309)=1.01, p=.311
Figure 1 NR3C2 genotype x Childhood (CH) trauma interaction with negative memory bias score as dependent 
variable in remitted depressed individuals. Error bars represent standard deviations
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trauma. F(1,198)=2.88, p=.091, f=.12. No effect of childhood trauma was found in G allele 
homozygotes, F(1,90)=1.82, p=.181, f=.14.
Table 2 Means and standard deviations (SD) for negative and positive memory bias score per NR3C2 genotype 
and life events variable (life adversity, childhood trauma, recent adversity) in remitted depressed individuals
Genotype Life adversity Negative memory bias
Mean (SD)
Positive memory bias 
Mean (SD)
AA/AG No .40 (.17) .58 (.18)
Yes .41 (.16) .57 (.17)
GG No .40 (.15) .58 (.16)
Yes .40 (.16) .56 (.18)
Childhood trauma
AA/AG No .39 (.17) .58 (.19)
Yes .43 (.15) .57 (.15)
GG No .41 (.14) .57 (.15)
Yes .37 (.17) .58 (.19)
Recent adversity
AA/AG No .42 (.16) .57 (.17)
Yes .39 (.17) .58 (.18)
GG No .41 (.14) .59 (.14)
Yes .39 (.16) .56 (.19)
NR3C2 rs5534 genotype – recent adversity interaction
 The Genotype (AA/AG vs. GG) x Recent adversity (no vs. yes) interaction was non-
significant for both negative and positive bias, F(1,291)=.00, p=.962, f=.00 and F(1,291)=.78, 
p=.377, f=.05 respectively. Mean negative and positive memory bias scores are presented in 
Table 2. 
Discussion
 Remitted depressed NR3C2 rs5534 risk allele carriers (AA, AG) who had experienced 
childhood trauma showed more negative memory bias compared to risk allele carriers 
without a traumatic childhood and non-risk allele homozygotes (GG) with childhood trauma. 
The NR3C2 rs5534 genotype did, however, not interact with life adversity nor recent adversity 
on biased memory. This study extends previous findings on the interaction between the 
NR3C2 rs5534 polymorphism with life events on memory bias (Vogel et al., 2014). In this 
98
Chapter 6: Remitted depressed individuals show an interaction between variance in the    
mineralocorticoid receptor NR3C2 gene and childhood trauma on negative memory bias
study, Vogel and colleagues (2014) found a main effect of the NR3C2 rs5534 polymorphism 
as well as an interaction effect with life adversity on negative memory bias in a healthy 
population. Contrary to the results in the healthy sample, no main effect of the NR3C2 rs5534 
polymorphism on memory bias and no interaction effect between NR3C2 rs5534 and life 
adversity (i.e. traumatic and adverse events throughout all stages of life) was uncovered in 
the remitted depressed sample. The rs5534 interacted specifically with childhood trauma on 
memory bias in the remitted depressed sample. This indicates that the NR3C2 genotype may 
be associated with stress-sensitivity during development in individuals who are particularly 
vulnerable to depression (Bockting et al., 2006). The finding that severely stressful childhood 
events is related to biased processing is in line with the cognitive models of depression (Beck, 
1976, 2008; Bower, 1981), as the experience of aggression or abuse during childhood may lead 
to dysfunctional belief that in turn stimulate negatively biased processing of information. 
This association may be most pronounced in genetically susceptible individuals.
 Taken together, the current results and the results of Vogel and colleagues (2014) 
indicate that the effect of life adversity may be different in healthy than in affected 
individuals. However, because no distinction between type and timing of adverse events was 
made in the study by Vogel and colleagues (2014), we do not know whether the results in the 
healthy sample might have been stronger when examining the interaction with childhood 
trauma specifically. It is important to note that no mood induction was used in the Vogel 
and colleagues study (2014), and that positive and negative verbal explicit memory bias was 
examined using a slightly different task.
 The rs5534 polymorphism may influence the regulation of mineralocorticoid 
expression through which it in turn might affect the excitability and structural integrity of 
the amygdala and hippocampus (Gass et al., 2000; Groeneweg et al., 2011; Klok et al., 2011a). 
This has been associated with fear, anxiety and mood disorders in general and negative 
memory bias in particular (Bremner et al., 2000; Frodl et al., 2002; Gerritsen et al., 2011). 
As proposed by Vogel and colleagues (2014), this is a hypothetical pathway through which 
this polymorphism affects emotional memory processing and hence acts as a susceptibility 
factor for depression. The current interaction between NR3C2 rs5534 and childhood trauma 
may be important since the stress-systems such as the HPA axis are more malleable during 
childhood, when the brain is developing and most plastic (Perry et al., 2011). Presumably, 
dysfunctional changes of cortisol secretion in NR3C2 gene A allele carriers may leave young 
individuals vulnerable to severely stressful events and influence the development of emotional 
processing styles. Although speculative, this may be reflected by subtle depression-related 
neurobiological abnormalities, which appear to persist after remission (Davidson et al., 2002; 
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Kempton et al., 2011; Leppanen, 2006). Once the stress-system has been developed, genetic 
NR3C2 differences may be less sensitive to external stressors. Moreover, stress-systems may 
be more sensitive to severely stressful interpersonal events (aggression or abuse) than to 
more non-personally directed adverse events, such as death of a family member or monetary 
problems. Future studies should aim to compare the effects of different types and severity 
levels of adverse life events. 
 Our results should be viewed in the context of some strengths and limitations. 
Strengths are that we tested the specificity of life events and the validity of the previously 
reported (Vogel et al., 2014) gene-environment interaction by using a slightly different 
memory task in a different sample (Moffitt et al., 2006). Also, studying gene-environment 
interactions in an affected sample is still rather novel and informative of the robustness of 
such an interaction. A possible limitation is the measurement method of the childhood events, 
as negative bias might have affect participants’ recall. The Life Events Questionnaire assesses 
the occurrence of several factual events during pre-determined periods of life. Because such 
specific events were assessed, it is in our opinion unlikely that recall was distorted. Moreover, 
adults’ recall of specific childhood events seems fairly accurate (Brewin et al., 1993). Another 
limitation concerns the sample size. Although selecting considerable clinical samples is 
challenging, large samples are required when studying the genetic associations of behavior, 
because minor allele frequencies are often low and a single mutation within a gene explains 
only a small percentage of the variance in behavior. Our results provide a first indication of 
the association between a polymorphism in the NR3C2 gene, stress-sensitivity and bias in an 
affected sample, but replications using larger samples are necessary for substantiation of the 
findings. 
 In conclusion, the current results complement the previously reported NR3C2 gene 
and life adversity interaction on negative memory bias by inclusion of an affected sample. 
Results indicate that the genetic association with childhood trauma may be more important 
than adversity in affected individuals. This study underscores the importance of repeating 
genetic studies in clinical samples in order to inform about state- and trait-specific features 
of the interaction and providing an indication of the generalizability of the association
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Chapter 7
Interaction between depression candidate genes 
and childhood trauma in association with emotional 
processing bias in formerly depressed individuals
This chapter is based on Vrijsen, J.N., van Oostrom, I., Arias-Vásquez, A., Franke, B., Becker, E.S. & 
Speckens, A. Interaction between depression candidate genes and childhood trauma in association 
with emotional processing bias in formerly depressed individuals. Resubmitted for publication.
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Abstract
 The BDNF and COMT gene are relevant candidates for depression. Variation in these 
genes is associated with stress-sensitivity and biased cognitive processing, a characteristic 
of depression. The interaction between genes and life stress is considered an important 
mechanism in the development of depression. This study examined the effects of the 
BDNF and COMT gene on biased processing and the interaction with childhood trauma in 
a vulnerable sample. A total of 198 remitted depressed individuals performed an n-back 
task with emotional facial stimuli (happy, sad). Childhood trauma was measured with a 
questionnaire. Genotype by childhood trauma interaction was analyzed for happy and sad 
expressions for BDNF (Val66Met; rs6265) and COMT (Val158Met; rs4680), individually and 
combined. BDNF and COMT both interacted significantly (p=.006 and p=.014, respectively) 
with childhood trauma on reaction time for happy faces. For both genes, Met-carriers with 
childhood trauma showed less positive bias for happy faces than Met-carriers without 
childhood trauma. Val-carriers did not show a differential bias. In the combined risk effect 
analysis, remitted depressed individuals with 3 or 4 risk alleles and childhood trauma were 
less distracted by happy faces than those without childhood trauma (p=.011). A potential 
weakness is the measurement method of the childhood events, as negative bias might have 
affected participants’ recall. Our findings endorse the association of BDNF and COMT with 
stress and depression and provide a possible intermediate, i.e. biased processing of positive 
information. Tailoring treatment to specific risk profiles based on genetic susceptibility and 
childhood stress could be promising.
103
Introduction
 Depression is a complex multifactorial condition with considerable heritability but 
genetic studies so far have yielded mixed findings (Sullivan et al., 2000). A way to increase 
the power to detect genetic effects is to investigate cognitive characteristics of depression as 
endophenotypes for the disorder (Gottesman & Gould, 2003; Kendler & Neale, 2010). Biased 
processing of emotional information is considered a fitting endophenotype for depression 
(De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Hasler et al., 2004). Depressed and depression susceptible 
individuals show preferential processing of negative rather than positive information (Gotlib 
& Joormann, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). They have difficulties in limiting the access 
of irrelevant negative information to working memory (WM) and removing negative content 
that is no longer relevant, while the reverse is true for positive information (De Lissnyder et 
al., 2012; Joormann et al., 2007a; Lo & Allen, 2011). This WM bias has been associated with 
biases in other cognitive domains, such as attention and memory (De Raedt & Koster, 2010; 
Joormann et al., 2007a). 
 When studying biased processing in depression, the gene encoding the brain-derived 
neurotrophic factor (BDNF) and the catechol-O-methyltransferase gene (COMT) are relevant 
candidates (Savitz et al., 2006). The BDNF Val66Met polymorphism (rs6265; Chen et al., 
2004a) codes for a the BDNF neurotrophin that exerts long-term effects on neuronal survival, 
migration and growth (Chen et al., 2004a). In the brain, BDNF is active in the hippocanpus, 
cortex and basal forebrain - areas vital to learning, memory and executive functioning 
(Yamada & Nabeshima, 2003). A large body of evidence supports the involvement of the 
BDNF Val66Met polymorphism in depressive states, stress-sensitivity and the development 
of brain structures that are implicated in depression and emotional processing (Gatt et al., 
2007; Kempton et al., 2011; Shirayama et al., 2002; Urani et al., 2005; Van Wingen et al., 
2011). The Met allele has been associated with lower BDNF secretion (Egan et al., 2003) and 
reduced hippocampal activity (Chen et al., 2004a). Compared to BDNF Val-homozygotes, Met-
carrriers seem especially sensitive to emotional information and stressful (childhood) events 
(Gerritsen et al., 2011; Lau et al., 2010; Montag et al., 2008; Scharinger et al., 2010; Schofield 
et al., 2009; Van Oostrom et al., 2012).
 The COMT Val158Met polymorphism (rs4680) has also explicitly been associated 
with biased processing. A G-to-A transition at codon 158 leads to lower rates of catabolisis 
for the Met allele, resulting in higher synaptic dopamine levels following neurotransmitter 
release (Met-homozygotes versus Val-carriers; Chen et al., 2004b; Lachman et al., 1996). 
The Met allele is associated with greater stress-sensitivity and better executive functioning 
(Egan et al., 2001; Goldberg et al., 2003). More specifically, the Met allele is related to risk for 
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depression, bias, memory functioning and sensitivity to stressful childhood events (Aberg 
et al., 2011; Barnett et al., 2008; Bishop et al., 2006; Buckert et al., 2012; Drury et al., 2010; 
Enoch et al., 2003; Massat et al., 2005; Schellekens et al., 2012; Smolka et al., 2005; Williams 
et al., 2010). Generally, the interaction between stressful life events and genes is considered 
an important mechanism in depression (Caspi et al., 2010) and especially traumatic 
childhood events are a strong risk factor for depression (Hovens et al., 2009; Kendler et al., 
1999; Swanson & Mallinckrodt, 2001). What is more, the brain structures the BDNF and COMT 
polymorphisms are associated with mature late (Monk et al., 2003) and may therefore be 
especially susceptible to severe childhood stress.
 We aimed to study emotional processing bias in association with the BDNF and the 
COMT gene and the modulating effect of childhood trauma, in a sample especially vulnerable 
for depressive episodes based on their depressive past (Bockting et al., 2006). Examining 
interactions between environment and genes in a remitted depressed sample is still novel 
and offers the possibility to study cognitive processes in highly vulnerable individuals, while 
minimizing depressive symptoms or concomitants affecting cognitive biases (Bhagwagar & 
Cowen, 2007). A sad mood induction procedure was used to activate depressotypic cognitive 
processing (McCabe et al., 2000; Scher et al., 2005). Met-carriers in both candidate genes were 
expected to display biased processing and this effect was anticipated to be moderated by a 
history of trauma.
Methods and Materials
Participants
 This study is part of a larger study, which aims to link cognitive biases to genetic 
susceptibility to depression. This study implements several tasks to assess biased processing 
in different cognitive domains in samples of non-depressed and formerly depressed 
individuals. A total of 325 remitted depressed participants (RDs) took part in this section of 
the study. The RDs were recruited at the Department of Psychiatry of the Radboud University 
Medical Centre, as well as other regional outpatient psychiatric services. Participants were 
included if they met the criteria of the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) for 
a previous depressive episode. Exclusion criteria were: current depressive episode, current 
or lifetime bipolar disorder, current psychotic symptoms, alcohol or substance abuse within 
the past 6 months, deafness, blindness, neurological disorder, sensorimotor handicaps and 
IQ estimate less than 70. Trained professionals interviewed eligible participants with the 
Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM–IV Axis-I disorders (SCID-I; First et al., 1996). The 
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SCID-I has been demonstrated to have a good reliability (Skre et al., 1991; Williams et al., 1992). 
Participants received a gift certificate for their participation. Genotype groups were created 
based on allele frequency: in BDNF, Met-carriers (Met-homozygotes -and heterozygotes) were 
compared to Val-homozygotes and in COMT, the Met-homozygotes were compared to Val-
carriers. The study has been approved by the Dutch central medical ethics review board and 
was performed in accordance with guidelines and regulations for human studies.
Measurements
 Childhood trauma Stressful childhood events were assessed with an adapted version 
of the Life Events Questionnaire (Brugha & Cragg, 1990; Gerritsen et al., 2011; Van Oostrom et 
al., 2012; Vogel et al., 2014). Participants were asked to indicate whether they had experienced 
a set of life events before the age of 16 years, after the age of 16 and/or within the last year. 
A childhood traumatic events variable was calculated. This variable indicated whether or not 
participants experienced traumatic events before the age of 16 years: aggression within the 
family of origin, aggression involving a non-family member, abuse within the family and/or 
abuse involving a non-family member. The childhood traumatic events variable was coded 
‘0’ when the participant did not experience aggression or abuse before the age of 16 and ‘1’ 
if the participant did experience childhood trauma.
 Mood Induction Before the task, participants saw a negative film segment from the 
movie “Sophie’s choice” (Fitzgerald et al., 2011). They were instructed to let the emotionality 
of the film influence their mood as much as possible and to maintain the sad mood state. 
 Emotional n-back task A classical 2-back paradigm was modified to create an 
emotional version. Color pictures of happy and sad faces were selected from the Radboud 
Faces Database (Langner et al., 2010). Eight faces (four male, four female) were selected per 
expression based on distinctness of the expression. The individual’s hair was pulled back and 
the pictures had a white background. Pilot data revealed that a presentation time of 2050 
milliseconds (ms) per face was suitable for measuring differential responses to the facial 
expressions. Pictures (401 x 570 pixels) were presented in the centre of a white computer 
screen. Expressions were presented per gender per block to avoid differential carry-over 
effects (Orozco & Ehlers, 1998). Gender-expression combinations were counterbalanced over 
the participants: participants with an odd participant number were presented with happy 
females and sad males and participants with an even number saw the other gender per 
expression. The order of the blocks was randomized per participant. The practice phase 
consisted of 16 trials of mixed valence and gender. Each experimental block consisted of 
80 trials (presentation of a total of 80 pictures) with a 200 ms inter-trial interval. Reaction 
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times (RT) were automatically recorded per trial. Participants were instructed to respond 
as fast and accurately as possible by pressing the space bar if the face was the same face 
as two frames back (see Figure 1 for example). On 2-back trials (presentation of the same 
stimulus as two trials back; representing 40% of all trials), no response would be marked as 
an error. Responses on no-go trials were also marked as errors. In case of an error, the word 
‘ERROR’ (in Dutch) was displayed for 400 ms in the centre of the screen. To minimize stress 
or frustration, participants were informed that the task might be hard, but that they should 
keep trying to respond to 2-back trials. The task lasted for approximately 15 minutes. A block 
of pictures of neutral facial expressions was also included, but not reported on. 
tim
e
2-back trial
press space bar
Figure 1 Example trial from happy block of the emotional n-back task. Stimuli were presented consecutively 
for 2050 ms and participants were instructed to press the space bar as fast as possible when a picture was 
the same as the picture two frames back. The gender-expression combinations were counterbalanced across 
participants.
 Genotyping Blood was taken by venipuncture and DNA was isolated using 
standard protocols.. The BDNF Val66Met polymorphism (rs6265) and the COMT Val158Met 
polymorphism (rs4680) were genotyped at the using Taqman® analysis (Watson & Li, 
2005). Testing for Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium did not show deviations from the expected 
distribution of genotypes: for BDNF χ²=1.54, df=1, p=.21, and for COMT χ²=.34, df=1, 
p=.56.
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Statistical analyses 
 On trial level, RT trials associated with incorrect responses were eliminated from 
the data as were extreme RT trials in the top and bottom 2% of the variance. We corrected 
for the effects of potential outliers by computing the median RT for each participant per 
expression. A longer RT indicates that the emotional expression has been active in WM for a 
longer period and represents more bias for the specific emotional facial expression (Joormann 
et al., 2007a). The effect of novel emotional stimuli tends to vanish easily (Bradley et al., 
1993), therefore strongest biased processing can be found in the first part of the experiment 
(Bluemke & Friese, 2008). Therefore, RTs of correct 2-back trials in the first 20 presentations 
(representing 25% of all trials) were also selected per facial expression as dependent variable. 
Because of their known effect on cognitive functioning and emotional processing, age and 
sex were included as covariates in all analyses. The effect of genotype, childhood trauma and 
their interaction effect on RT responses to happy and sad faces was examined using analysis 
of co-variance (ANCOVA). 
Procedure
 Before the onset of the experiment, participants were given the opportunity to ask 
questions and they were instructed that they could stop at any time, without specification of 
a reason. Subsequently, they completed an informed consent form, demographic questions, 
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) and the Life Events Questionnaire. 
After the sad mood induction, the Emotional n-back task would follow. This task was 
automatically followed by short fragment of the cheerful movie (‘Happy Feet’) to diminish 
any possible negative effects on participants’ mood. Participants were debriefed before they 
were rewarded for their participation. 
Results
 Sample descriptives and the BDNF and COMT allele frequency distributions are 
presented in Table 1. Participants who had <55% correct on 2-back and/or no-go trials were 
excluded (N=117). These participants likely did not adhere to the instructions of the task 
as they either probably ‘gave up’ at a certain point or adapted a strategy to just respond 
on most trials regardless of the expected response. We examined whether participants who 
scored<55% correct on the emotional n-back task differed from participants who were able 
to properly execute the task. These participants did not differ on genotype distribution, sex, 
medication use or depressive symptomatology measured with the BDI-II. However, excluded 
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participants had on average experienced more depressive episodes and were generally older 
(see Table 2). Data of ten participants were missing due to six participants refusing to provide 
a blood sample, missing genotypes for two participants and another two participants who 
did not complete the Emotional n-back task. One participant did finish the sad block of the 
n-back task, but not the happy block, resulting in a difference in sample size (N=198 and 
N=197, respectively).
Table 1 Range, means and/or percentages (standard deviations) of demographic variables, clinical variables 
and allele frequencies in formerly depressed individuals.
Variable Mean (SD)/%
Age 45.2 (11.8)
Sex (% female) 68%
BDI-II 13.6 (9.2)
Childhood trauma 42%
Number of episodes 3.3 (1.8)
Allele frequency BDNF Met/Met: N=10 (5.1%)
Met/Val:  N=56 (28.3%)
Val/Val:    N=132 (66.7%) 
1 missing genotype
Allele frequency COMT Met/Met: N=51 (25.8%) Met/Val: N=103 (52.0%) Val/Val: N=44 (22.2%) 
1 missing genotype
Table 2 Percentages or means (standard deviations) and statistics comparing excluded participants with 
participants who had above change level correct on the N-Back task in formerly depressed individuals.
Sample
Variable Included
Mean (SD)/%
Excluded 
Mean (SD)/% F-test
Sex (% female) 68% 63% F(1,323)=.69, p=.408
Medication (% yes) 46% 45% F(1,323)=.02, p=.882
BDI-II total score 13.6 (9.2) 15.7 (10.76) F(1,323)=3.57, p=.060
Age 45.2 (11.7) 52.3 (11.1) F(1,323)=28.91, p=.000
Number episodes  3.3 (1.8)  3.8 (1.9) F(1,323)=5.29, p=.022
BDNF genotype 
distribution 
Met-carriers: N=66 
Val-homoz.:   N=132 
Met-carriers: N=45
Val-homoz.:   N=67 
F(1,308)=1.46, p=.229
COMT genotype 
distribution
Met-homoz.: N=51 
Val-carriers:  N=147
Met-homoz.: N=31 
Val-carriers:  N=82 
F(1,309)=.10, p=.000
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BDNF genotype main effect
 When examining the first 20 correct 2-back RT trials for happy and for sad faces, a 
main effect of BDNF genotype was uncovered, F(1,193)=9.99, p=.002, Cohen’s f=.23. BDNF 
Met-carriers showed longer mean RT than Val-homozygotes for both happy, F(1,193)=5.51, 
p=.020, f=.17, and sad faces, F(1,194)=6.39, p=.012, f=.18. There were no significant effects 
when taking all correct 2-back RT trials for happy and for sad faces as dependent variable.
BDNF genotype – childhood trauma interaction
 The BDNF Genotype x Childhood trauma interaction was significant for the first 20 
correct 2-back RT trials for happy faces, F(1,191)=7.86, p=.006, f=.20, see Figure 2. More 
specifically, Met-carriers who had experienced childhood trauma had a shorter mean RT for 
happy faces than Met-carriers without childhood trauma, indicating less positive bias. See 
Table 3 for statistics comparing subgroups. 
 The BDNF Genotype x Childhood trauma interaction was non-significant for sad 
faces, F(1,192)=.05, p=.825, f=.00. The interaction effect for happy faces differed from sad 
faces, as the BDNF Genotype x Childhood trauma x Expression analysis yielded a significant 
interaction, F(1,191)=4.00, p=.047, f=.15. The pattern of results is the same with difference-
scores (mean RT emotional face – mean RT neutral face) as dependent variables: the BDNF 
Genotype x Childhood trauma x Expression analysis also yields a significant interaction, 
F(1,191)=4.00, p=.047, f=.15.
COMT genotype main effect
 When examining the first 20 correct 2-back RT trials for happy and sad faces, no 
significant main effect of COMT genotype was uncovered, F(1,193)=.27, p=.606, f=.03. 
COMT genotype – childhood trauma interaction
 Comparable to the finding for BDNF genotype, a significant COMT Genotype 
x Childhood trauma interaction was uncovered for the first 20 trials for happy faces, 
F(1,191)=6.10, p=.014, f=.18, see Figure 3. More specifically, Met-homozygotes who had 
experienced childhood trauma had a shorter mean RT for happy faces than Met-homozygotes 
without childhood trauma. See Table 3 for statistics comparing subgroups. 
110
Chapter 7: Interaction between depression candidate genes and childhood trauma in  association 
with emotional processing bias in formerly depressed individuals
Figure 2 BDNF genotype x Childhood (CH) trauma interaction with reaction time (RT) in ms for happy faces 
as dependent variable in remitted depressed individuals. Sample sizes are presented below the corresponding 
bars and error bars represent standard deviations.
Table 3 Statistics comparing the interaction between different genotypes and childhood trauma (yes=CH 
trauma +, no=CH trauma- ) per depression candidate gene (BDNF, COMT) for reaction times on the first 20 
correct 2-back trials for happy faces in formerly depressed individuals. Correlations between the genotypes 
and the number of traumatic childhood events are also presented per candidate gene.
Comparison BDNF
Met-carriers CH trauma+ vs. Met-carriers CH trauma- F(1,62)=6.96, p=.010, f=.34
Val-homoz. CH trauma+ vs. Val-homoz. CH trauma- F(1,127)=.65, p=.423, f=.07
Met-carriers CH trauma- vs. Val-homoz. CH trauma- F(1,111)=11.23, p=.001, f=.32
Correlation genotype and traumatic childhood events r(198)=.00, p=.950
COMT
Met-homoz. CH trauma+ vs. Met-homoz. CH trauma- F(1,46)=5.80, p=.020, f=.36
Val-carriers CH trauma+ vs. Val-carriers. CH trauma- F(1,143)=.11, p=.745, f=.03
Met-homoz. CH trauma+ vs. Val-carriers CH trauma+ F(1,78)=4.87, p=.030, f=.25
Correlation genotype and traumatic childhood events r(198)=-.03, p=.688
Figure 3 COMT genotype x Childhood (CH) trauma interaction with reaction time (RT) in ms for happy faces 
as dependent variable in remitted depressed individuals. Sample sizes are presented below the corresponding 
bars and error bars represent standard deviations.
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 The COMT Genotype x Childhood trauma interaction was non-significant for 
sad facial expressions, F(1,192)=.03, p=.864, f=.00, and the interaction effect for happy 
faces differed from the interaction effect for sad faces, as the COMT Genotype x Childhood 
trauma x Expression analysis was significant, F(1,191)=4.35, p=.038, f=.15. The results are 
the same with difference-scores as dependent variables: the COMT Genotype x Childhood 
trauma x Expression interaction with difference-scores for happy and sad faces is significant, 
F(1,191)=4.35, p=.038, f=.15.
Combined risk of BDNF and COMT
 To examine the combined effect of BDNF and COMT, a risk variable was calculated 
representing the number of risk (Met) alleles of both genes; a method frequently used to 
assess complementary gene functions (e.g. Bondy et al., 2002; Clasen et al., 2011). A score of 
0 indicated that the participant was Val-homozygote on both the BDNF and the COMT gene, 
while a score of 1 represented carriership of one Met allele, etc. Given that only three RDs 
were Met-homozygote on both genes, we combined this groups with the group carrying a 
total of three Met alleles. The risk allele frequency distribution was as follows: 0 risk alleles: 
N=28 (14.1%), 1 risk allele: N=91 (46.0%), 2 risk alleles: N=50 (25.3%), 3 or 4 risk alleles: 
N=29 (14.6%).
 The Risk (0, 1, 2, 3/4 Met alleles) x Childhood trauma interaction was significant 
for RTs for happy faces, F(3,187)=3.43, p=.018, f=.23. The effect of Childhood trauma was 
significant only in the group carrying 3 or 4 Met risk alleles, F(1,25)=7.44, p=.011, f=.54. 
RDs with 3 or 4 risk alleles who had experienced childhood trauma had a shorter mean RT 
for happy faces than those who had not experienced childhood trauma.
Discussion
 In a remitted depressed sample, the BDNF Val66Met polymorphism was associated 
with emotional processing bias. Carriers of the Met allele were most sensitive to the 
emotionality of the stimuli. The experience of childhood traumatic events modulated the 
association of the BDNF gene with biased processing. Moreover, comparable results were 
found with the COMT Val158Met polymorphism. This theory-guided internal validation of the 
association is considered a crucial step in ascertaining the robustness of findings (Moffitt et 
al., 2006). Met-carrying RDs who had experienced traumatic childhood events showed less 
positive bias than Met-carrying RDs without a traumatic childhood. Furthermore, processing 
of sad faces was independent of genotype and childhood events, indicating that specifically 
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the processing of positive information is biased in highly vulnerable individuals (Gupta & 
Kar, 2012; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007). This confirms and extends existing associations of the 
BDNF and COMT gene with depression, by again implicating the Met allele as risk allele and 
by providing a possible intermediate (Gottesman & Gould, 2003; Kendler & Neale, 2010), i.e. 
biased processing of positive information. 
 The development of emotional processing styles may have been influenced by 
reduced BDNF secretion and increased synaptic dopamine in BDNF and COMT Met-carriers 
who experienced high levels of stress during childhood. Although speculative, this may be 
reflected by subtle depression-related neurobiological abnormalities, that may persist after 
remission (Beevers et al., 2009; Davidson et al., 2002; Kempton et al., 2011; Leppanen, 2006). 
It has been proposed that BDNF and COMT may share a molecular pathway, possibly by 
affecting dopaminergic regulation (Egan et al., 2003; Levine et al., 2012; Savitz et al., 2006).
 Genetically susceptible individuals who experienced abuse or aggression during 
their developmental years may not be able to regain a positively biased processing style after 
remission, in contrast to Met-carriers with no traumatic childhood. This pattern of results 
is in line with the differential susceptibility account (Belsky et al., 2009; Belsky & Pluess, 
2009a/b). Risk allele carriers may be more susceptible to environmental influences, both 
negative ánd positive. Because a clear operationalization of positive environmental events is 
lacking, many studies have looked at the absence of adversity (Belsky et al., 2009), as in our 
study. Expression of the genes may be dependent on both, genetics and environment, the 
latter possibly through DNA methylation (Murgatroyd et al., 2009,2010). 
 Our findings may help elucidate the heterogeneity in response to treatment of 
depression and in relapse rates (Harkness & Monroe, 2006, Ravindran et al., 2002). Because 
emotional sensitivity may differ depending on genetic susceptibility and past experiences, 
certain individuals may benefit more from psychological or pharmacological treatment than 
others (Eichelbaum et al., 2006; Harmer et al., 2003; Moffitt et al., 2006). Tailoring depression 
treatment and (relapse) prevention to specific risk profiles based on genetic susceptibility 
as well as stressful childhood events could be promising (Moffitt et al., 2006). In susceptible 
individuals (risk allele carriers + childhood trauma), it might be particularly important 
to restore positive cognitive biases by making use of techniques such as mindfulness or 
Cognitive Bias Modification (Geschwind et al., 2011; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Hertel & Mathews, 
2011). Implementation of genotyping in clinical diagnostics and treatment is, however, still 
a distant prospect. Moreover, the findings underscore the necessity for testing the validity 
of gene-environment interactions by replacement of candidate genes or environmental 
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measures and studying such interactions in both non-clinical ánd clinical samples (Moffitt et 
al., 2006).
 Our results should be viewed in the context of some strengths and limitations of 
the study. Strengths are the possible validation of the gene-environment interaction effect 
with two different depression candidate genes and the analysis of their combined risk 
effect. Furthermore, studying gene-environment interactions in an affected sample is still 
rather novel and a crucial step to clinically applicable results. A potential weakness is the 
relatively high number of participants who made many errors the n-back task. This indicates 
that the task was too difficult for some participants, especially for older individuals and/
or individuals who had experienced several depressive episodes. However, by analyzing 
data from participants who were able to perform in accordance with the instructions, we 
are confident that general cognitive impairments did not distort our findings. Because 
strongest differential effects of stimulus valence were found during the first set of trials 
(Bradley & Lang, 1993), using fewer presentations per facial expression will help optimize 
the task for studying clinical samples. Another possible limitation is the measurement 
method of the childhood events, as negative bias might have affected participants’ recall. 
The Life Events Questionnaire assesses the occurrence of several factual events during pre-
determined periods of life. Because such specific events were assessed, it is to our opinion 
unlikely that recall was distorted. Moreover, adults’ recall of specific childhood events seems 
fairly accurate (Brewin et al., 1993). Although aggression and abuse are generally considered 
highly aversive, the emotional experience of these events was not assessed. We cannot be 
sure that the experience of these events was indeed traumatic to the individual. Also, genes 
and events are not independent as the experience of certain family-based events, such as 
abuse, may be partly explained by genetic factors.
 In conclusion, the results endorse the BDNF Val66Met and COMT Val158Met 
polymorphism as candidates for depression and provide evidence for the modulating effect 
of life stress. Tailoring treatment to specific risk profiles based on genetic susceptibility and 
childhood stress could be promising.
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Chapter 8
Can memory bias be modified? The effects of an explicit 
cued-recall training in two independent samples
This chapter is based on Vrijsen, J.N., Becker, E.S., Rinck, M., van Oostrom, I., Speckens, A., Whitmer, A. 
& Gotlib, I.H. (in press). Can memory bias be modified? The effects of an explicit cued-recall training in 
two independent samples. Cognitive Therapy and Research.
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Abstract
 Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) has been found to be effective in modifying 
information-processing biases and in reducing emotional reactivity to stress. Although 
modification of attention and interpretation biases has frequently been studied, it is not 
clear whether memory bias can be manipulated through direct training of emotional recall. 
In two studies (in undergraduate students and in a community sample), memory bias for 
emotional verbal stimuli was trained with cued recall of either positive or negative words. 
We did not find evidence for malleability of memory bias for trained stimuli or induction of 
emotional reactivity to stress in either study. The training did, however, stimulate training-
congruent incorrect recall in the community sample. Although we found no evidence for the 
direct modification of memory bias, the more global effect obtained with respect to retrieval 
of emotional information from memory holds promise for CBM-memory studies in clinical 
samples.
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Introduction
 Cognitive models of emotional disorders posit that anxious and depressed 
individuals prioritize negative over positive and neutral information (Beck, 1976, 2008; 
Bower, 1981; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). In addition, emotionally distressed individuals seem 
to lack the positive processing bias that characterizes healthy individuals (Bradley et al., 
1997a/b; Deldin et al., 2001; Tamir & Robinson, 2007). Biased processing has most frequently 
been studied in three cognitive domains: attention, interpretation and memory. Negative 
biases in attention and interpretation have been well documented in anxiety and depression 
(e.g. Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Peckham et al., 2010). Generally, anxious individuals are 
vigilant for disorder-specific threat information, while depressed individuals elaborate more 
on negative information. Regarding interpretation, both anxious and depressed individuals 
tend to interpret ambiguous situations negatively (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). 
 Moreover, over-general as well as negatively biased memory seems especially robust 
in depression (Matt et al., 1992; Ridout et al., 2009; Rinck & Becker, 2005; Williams, 1996; 
Williams et al., 2007). Depressed individuals tend to encode and recall negative information 
more easily than positive or neutral information. Biased memory in depression has been 
found most frequently using explicit memory tasks (Denny & Hunt, 1992; Ellwart et al., 2003; 
Watkins et al., 1992). More specifically, neuroimaging studies indicate the encoding phase 
as especially important in biased memory processing (e.g. Arnold et al., 2011; Hamilton & 
Gotlib, 2008; Van Wingen et al., 2010). Information-processing biases have been proposed 
to be related to the development and maintenance of emotional disorders (Clark & Steer, 
1996). To test the causal relation between cognitive biases and emotional symptoms, 
studies using experimental manipulation of biases, Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM), have 
been conducted. In CBM, cognitive biases are directly altered using computerized training 
procedures, and the consequences for clinically relevant symptoms are assessed (Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2002). 
 Studies applying CBM paradigms to healthy samples have shown that, in addition 
to manipulating biases, CBM also affects reactivity to subsequent stressors (Beard et al., 2012; 
MacLeod et al., 2002; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Wilson et al., 2006). Individuals who have 
been trained to preferentially process negative information exhibit elevations of negative 
mood state in response to stress, relative to individuals who have been trained towards 
positive information. In addition to altering stress reactivity in healthy individuals, CBM has 
been found to be effective in the treatment of anxiety (see review and meta-analyses: Beard et 
al., 2012; Hakamata et al., 2010; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). In contrast, investigators examining 
CBM have focused far less frequently on depression (Beard et al., 2012; Hertel & Mathews, 
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2011). Researchers have found positive-imagery training to affect interpretation bias and 
depressive symptoms in some depressed patients, but not in others (Blackwell & Holmes, 
2010). Furthermore, whereas Wells and Beevers (2010) found attention bias manipulation 
to lead to a reduction of depressive symptoms in dysphoric undergraduate students, Baert 
and colleagues (2010) found no general beneficial effect of attention training in dysphoric 
students or depressed individuals. Thus, although CBM appears to affect emotional reactivity 
to stress in healthy individuals, the few studies conducted examining the effects of CBM in 
depression have yielded mixed results (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). Given the prominent role of 
memory bias in depressed mood, CBM-memory paradigms might provide stronger effects. 
 In contrast to interpretation and attention, manipulation of memory biases has 
received relatively little attention (Hertel & Mathews, 2011). Some studies have successfully 
manipulated interpretation bias in healthy individuals and have found a subsequent effect 
on recall of emotional stimuli, although they do not provide evidence of changes in mood 
as a consequence of the training (Hertel et al., 2011; Salemink et al., 2010; Tran et al., 2011). 
Joormann and colleagues (2009) manipulated mechanisms involved in memory suppression 
in depressed individuals. After learning to associate neutral cue words with either positive or 
negative targets, participants were instructed not to think about the negative targets when 
shown the neutral cues. There was an unaided condition, a positive-substitute condition and 
a negative-substitute condition. They found effects of the manipulation on emotional recall 
in both the positive and negative substitute conditions. Taken together, these studies suggest 
that memory biases can be manipulated; it is not known, however, whether memory biases 
can be manipulated directly by training emotional recall. Moreover, although investigators 
have yet to demonstrate that CBM of memory can affect mood, direct manipulation of 
emotional recall might instigate stronger effects, especially given that memory of emotional 
events has been found to exert a clear effect on mood and well-being (e.g. Charles et al., 2003; 
Joormann & Siemer, 2004). In the present paper, explicit verbal episodic long-term memory 
of emotional verbal stimuli was manipulated in two experiments through a cued-recall 
training of either positive or negative words. A student sample was tested in the first study 
and a sample from the general population in the second study. Participants were expected 
to adapt a strategy during training to preferentially encode training-congruent valenced 
stimuli (e.g. Van Wingen et al., 2010), resulting in stronger training-congruent biased recall 
after the training than before. In order to examine how the training affected memory bias, 
we distinguished between specific and global memory bias. Here, specific memory is related 
to correct recall of learned stimuli, whereas global memory refers to (incorrect) recall of non-
learned verbal emotional information. The effect of the training on mood and emotional 
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reactivity to stress was also assessed. Participants in the negative training condition were 
expected to display more negative emotional reactivity after a stressor. If direct manipulation 
of emotional recall alters emotional memory in healthy individuals and affects mood and 
emotional reactivity to stress, emotional recall training might offer relief for depressed 
individuals.
Study 1
Method
Participants
 A total of 80 undergraduate students from Radboud University Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands, participated in this study. Participants were randomly assigned to the negative 
memory training (NMT) or positive memory training (PMT) conditions. The two groups did 
not differ on age (M=19.7 SD=1.9 for NMT; M=19.7 SD=2.4 for PMT), F(1,78)=.01, p=.959, 
f=.01, or sex (85% female NMT, 75% female PMT), F(1,78)=1.24, p=.269, f=.13. There was, 
however, a significant group difference on total Beck Depression Inventory score (BDI-II; 
M=4.2 SD=4.6 for NMT; M=6.8 SD=6.4 for PMT, F(1,78)=4.65, p=.034, f=.24); the group 
difference was small, however, and the means were low in both groups. All participants 
spoke fluent Dutch and received course credit for their participation. 
Materials, Apparatus and Procedure
 BDI-II The Dutch translation of the BDI-II was used (Van der Does, 2002). The BDI-II 
is a 21-item self-report questionnaire assessing depressive symptoms. BDI-II total scores <14 
reflect minimal level of depressive symptoms (Osman et al., 1997). 
 Memory Bias Assessments To assess memory bias, we presented participants with 20 
Dutch words (10 positive; 10 negative), one at a time, for 10 s each. All words were presented 
on a computer screen in white on a black background. Participants were instructed to 
memorize the words for subsequent recall. Explicit memory instructions were given to make 
sure that the learning processes in the pre- and the post-training bias assessments were 
similar: because the experiment consisted of a series of memory tasks, participants would 
quickly learn that they are asked to recall the presented words after a distraction. Therefore, 
no more than two words of the same valence were presented consecutively, and all words 
were selected on valence and matched for length and frequency in the Dutch language 
(from Dutch translation of Affective Norms for English Words database; ANEW; Bradley & 
Lang, 1999). After a 2-min distraction task (Raven matrices; Raven, 1958), participants were 
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instructed to write down as many of the words they could remember. Memory bias was 
assessed by examining whether participants wrote down more negative relative to positive 
words. Here we examined both correct and incorrect recall. 
 We examined memory bias before and after training. We counterbalanced the 
order of word sets that were used before and after training. To stimulate recall and avoid 
floor effects, the post-training assessment differed from the pre-training assessment in that 
participants were told that they would receive monetary incentive for correctly recalled 
words. 
 Memory Bias Training The memory bias training consisted of six cued-recall memory 
tasks, presented in a random order for each participant. Similar to the bias assessments, 
participants had to memorize 10 positive and 10 negative words. After a 1-min distraction 
task (Raven matrices), participants were presented with training-congruent fragments of the 
previously encoded words. To train a bias towards recall of negative words, we presented 
half of the participants with negative word fragments (negative training). To train a bias 
to recall positive words, we presented the other half of the participants with positive word 
fragments (positive training). To keep the participants from becoming aware of the purpose 
of the training, some training-incongruent fragments were included in the recall phase of 
the memory tasks. Out of the six cued-recall memory tasks, two tasks included one training-
incongruent fragment, two tasks two training-incongruent fragments, one task three 
training-incongruent fragments and one task none. In order to stimulate correct recall, the 
first letter of the word was always presented and only a few letters were missing. Participants 
were instructed to use a computer keyboard to type the correct word. The emotionality of 
the stimuli in the training might have influenced participants’ mood state. We aimed at 
measuring the effect of the training on recall bias and not the effect of mood per se, therefore 
a 4-min distraction task (Raven matrices) preceded the post-training bias assessment in order 
to reduce any possible mood effects of the training. 
 Stress Task Participants were instructed to solve 20 anagrams (presented one at a 
time in white on a black background) as quickly and accurately as possible and to write 
the answers on a sheet of paper. Participants were instructed that verbal intelligence was 
assessed and that they should be able to solve most anagrams, although in fact, the anagrams 
were difficult or unsolvable. To increase stress, participant were given only 20 s to solve each 
anagram; we also presented a count-down clock in the top right corner of the computer 
screen in red. A loud buzzer sounded when the time was up and the next anagram appeared 
automatically. To measure reactivity to the stress induction, participants rated their positive 
mood, negative mood, and their levels of calmness, anxiety, competence and incompetence 
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using Likert scales on which scores ranged from 1 (‘‘not at all’’) to 9 (‘‘extremely’’). In CBM 
studies, emotional reactivity is generally assessed by means of mood and anxiety ratings 
(Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). Questions about (in)competence were added because of the relevance 
to depression (Stanley and Maddux 1986). Mood Ratings We used the same positive mood 
(‘‘How positive, happy or good do you feel right now?’’) and negative mood (‘‘How negative, 
sad or bad do you feel right now?’’) items and Likert scales to measure particpants’ mood 
before the pre-training bias assessment, after the training phase, after the 4-min distraction 
task and after the post-training bias assessment. 
Procedure
 A schematic overview of the procedure is presented in Figure 1. Participants 
first completed an informed consent form, demographic questions and the BDI-II. Next, 
participants completed the pre-training bias assessment, the bias training and the post-
training bias assessment. Participants then completed the stress task. A 4-min clip of a 
cheerful movie (‘Happy feet’) was shown to erase possible negative mood of the training. 
Participants were then debriefed and rewarded for the correctly recalled words during the 
post-bias assessment before they left the session. Participants received one Euro for every 
Figure 1 Schematic overview of procedure. Positive and negative mood assessments are marked with an 
asteriks * 
consent form and questionnaires
pre-training bias assessment
distraction
post-training bias assessment
stress task
cheerful movie
debriefing and payment
positive bias training negative bias training
*only in Study 1
*
*
*
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three words that they recalled correctly. The training phase lasted for approximately 40 min 
and the whole study lasted for about 1.5 h.
Results
Memory Bias
 A difference-score representing recall bias was calculated by subtracting the 
number of correctly recalled negative words from the number of correctly recalled positive 
words. We also calculated a recall-bias score for incorrectly recalled words, pre- as well as 
post-training. An independent rater, blind to the participant’s training condition, rated 
the valence of all incorrect answers. Only distinctly positive and negative answers were 
included (the few neutral and valence-unspecific answers were disregarded). When in 
doubt about the valence, the rater noted the word down including his/her rating and the 
experimenter gave a second opinion. BDI-II total score was included as a covariate in all 
following analyses to control for the baseline difference between NMT and PMT participants. 
The groups did not differ at baseline on correct recall bias, F(1,77)=.16, p=.694, f=.04, or 
incorrect recall bias, F(1,77)=.11, p=.742, f=.03. A Training (positive, negative) x Time (pre, 
post) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANCOVA) on difference scores for correctly and 
incorrectly recalled words during the bias assessments did not yield a significant interaction, 
F(1,77)=1.23, p=.271, f=.13. We also report the Training x Time interaction for correctly 
and incorrectly recalled words separately, because we did not only wanted to compare the 
effect of the training between correct recall and incorrect recall, but also examine the effect 
of the training per memory bias measure. A Training (positive, negative) x Time (pre, post) 
repeated-measures ANCOVA conducted on difference score for correctly recalled words during 
the bias assessments did not yield a significant interaction, F(1,77)=1.10, p=.298, f=.12. An 
ANCOVA conducted on difference score for incorrect recall did not yield a significant two-
way interaction either, F(1,77)=.44, p=.509, f=.08. Taken together, this suggests that the 
training did not differentially affect memory retrieval of valenced verbal information (see 
Table 1 for mean recall rates, mean recall-bias scores and standard deviations).
 When selecting participants with a pre-existing negative memory bias (19 NMPs and 
17 PMTs with pre-training correct-recall difference score<0, indicating more negative than 
positive recall), the Training (positive, negative) x Time (pre, post) interaction on difference 
scores for correctly and incorrectly recalled words remained non-significant, F(1,33)=1.68, 
p=.203, f=.23. Also the Training x Time interaction on correct recall F(1,33)=1.74, p=.197, 
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Table 1 Mean scores and standard deviations (SD) for correct and incorrect recall rates as well as difference 
scores (# positive minus # negative words, in bold) on the pre-training and post-training bias assessments 
per sample (NMT and PMT in Study 1 and Study 2). 
Study 1
NMT PMT
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Pre pos. correct recall 4.25 (1.67) 4.08 (1.82)
Pre neg. correct recall 4.58 (2.07) 4.45 (1.48)
Pre pos.-neg. correct recall -.33 (2.42) -.38 (1.66)
Post pos. correct recall 2.80 (1.64) 2.60 (1.60)
Post neg. correct recall 2.88 (1.51) 3.17 (1.57)
Post pos.-neg. correct recall -.08 (2.08) -.58 (1.65)
Pre pos. incorrect recall .40 ( .59) .40 ( .59)
Pre neg. incorrect recall .50 ( .68) .60 ( .98)
Pre pos.-neg. incorrect recall -.10 ( .87) -.20 ( .99)
Post pos. incorrect recall .98 (1.00) 1.03 (1.03)
Post neg. incorrect recall .93 (1.10) .85 (1.35)
Post pos.-neg. incorrect recall .05 (1.38) .18 (1.50)
Study 2
NMT PMT
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Pre pos. correct recall 3.31 (1.76) 3.38 (1.79)
Pre neg. correct recall 2.92 (1.90) 3.19 (1.77)
Pre pos.-neg. correct recall .38 (2.19) .19 (1.77)
Post pos. correct recall 3.12 (1.66) 2.46 (1.56)
Post neg. correct recall 2.34 (1.87) 3.04 (1.75)
Post pos.-neg. correct recall .77 (1.95) -.58 (1.33)
Pre pos. incorrect recall 1.31 (1.54) 1.42 (1.36)
Pre neg. incorrect recall 1.19 (1.50) 1.46 (1.27)
Pre pos.-neg. incorrect recall .12 (1.21) -.04 (1.43)
Post pos. incorrect recall 1.65 (2.30) 2.65 (2.33)
Post neg. incorrect recall 2.58 (2.63) 1.15 (1.08)
Post pos.-neg. incorrect recall -.92 (3.59) 1.50 (2.04)
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f=.23, and on incorrect recall, F(1,33)=.36, p=.552, f=.11, yielded non-significant results in 
this subgroup of participants.
Emotional Reactivity
 Training type also did not affect emotional reactivity to the stress task, measured by 
positive mood, negative mood, calmness, anxiety, competence and incompetence (see Table 
2; all p-values <.1). 
Mood Throughout Experiment
 Mood state throughout the experiment was assessed for positive mood and 
negative mood separately. The Training (positive, negative) x Time (baseline, after training, 
after distraction, after post bias assessment) interaction was non-significant, F(3,75)=.48, 
p=.695, f=.14, for positive mood ratings. Neither was the Training x Time interaction with 
negative mood ratings as dependent variable, F(3,75)=1.43, p=.242, f=.24. See Table 2 for 
means and standard deviations.
Discussion
 In this study we applied a novel CBM paradigm in a first attempt to modify explicit 
memory bias through cued emotional recall training. Contrary to predictions, we did not find 
evidence of an effect of the training on explicit verbal episodic memory bias (either specific 
recall of trained stimuli or more global retrieval from memory), on reactivity to a stress task, 
or on mood throughout the experiment. The results indicate that these specific emotional 
memory processes may not be easily modified in healthy individuals, nor in individuals 
with a pre-existing negative memory bias. Undergraduate students are, however, a highly 
selective and homogeneous group; they are generally young, highly educated, and often 
have a high socioeconomic status. Therefore, we tested our hypotheses with a community 
sample in the United States. We used the same paradigm, with one adaptation to the post-
memory bias assessment. In Study 1, participants were unaware before encoding that the 
recall phase of the post-training bias assessment differed from the training. To stimulate 
recall, in Study 2 the participants were made aware before encoding that they would not be 
presented with word fragments during the recall phase, but instead would be asked to freely 
recall the encoded words.
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Table 2 Mean scores, standard deviations (SD) and statistics of group comparison for positive and negative 
mood ratings throughout the study as well as calmness, anxiety, competence and incompetence ratings after 
the stress task per sample (NMT and PMT in Study 1 and Study 2). In Study 1, BDI-II total score was included 
as covariate.
Study 1
NMT PMT
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Stat.
Pos. baseline 7.3 (1.0) 7.2 (1.2) -
Pos. after training 6.7 (1.1) 6.6 (1.7) -
Pos. after distraction 6.7 (1.3) 6.7 (1.1) -
Pos. after post assessment 6.5 (1.3) 6.6 (1.3) -
Neg. baseline 1.7 (1.3) 2.0 (1.5) -
Neg. after training 2.2 (1.2) 2.2 (1.5) -
Neg. after distraction 2.0 (1.2) 1.9 (1.1) -
Neg. after post assessment 2.3 (1.4) 2.1 (1.2) -
Pos. after stress 5.7 (1.6) 5.9 (1.7) F(1,77)=1.94, p=.168, f=.16
Neg. after stress 2.8 (1.6) 2.6 (1.6) F(1,77)=1.68, p=.198, f=.15
Calmness after stress 6.4 (1.7) 6.4 (1.6) F(1,77)=.27, p=.606, f=.05
Anxiety after stress 2.1 (1.4) 2.2 (1.3) F(1,77)=.02, p=.888, f=.00
Competence after stress 5.0 (1.8) 5.3 (2.0) F(1,77)=1.53, p=.220, f=.14
Incompetence after stress 3.5 (1.8) 4.1 (2.0) F(1,77)=.31, p=.580, f=.06
Study 2
NMT PMT
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Stat.
Pos. baseline 7.2 (1.0) 6.4 (1.7) -
Pos. after training 6.5 (1.3) 5.8 (1.7) -
Pos. after post assessment 6.1 (1.7) 5.5 (1.9) -
Neg. baseline 1.6 (1.7) 2.6 (2.0) -
Neg. after training 2.2 (1.6) 2.6 (1.9) -
Neg. after post assessment 2.4 (1.6) 3.0 (2.3) -
Pos. after stress 5.0 (2.1) 4.7 (2.2) F(1,48)=.21, p=.648, f=.06
Neg. after stress 3.3 (2.1) 3.8 (2.8) F(1,48)=.46, p=.500, f=.10
Calmness after stress 5.0 (2.0) 5.2 (2.0) F(1,48)=.25, p=.619, f=.07
Anxiety after stress 3.5 (2.0) 4.1 (2.1) F(1,48)=1.08, p=.304, f=.15
Competence after stress 4.8 (2.2) 4.7 (2.4) F(1,48)=.02, p=.902, f=.00
Incompetence after stress 3.8 (2.3) 4.3 (2.4) F(1,48)=.44, p=.509, f=.10
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Study 2
Method
Participants
 A total of 52 individuals from the community in the Stanford area (CA, USA) 
participated in this study. Allocation to the conditions was similar to Study 1, resulting in 
a negative (NMT) and positive memory training group (PMT). The two groups did not differ 
significantly with respect to age (M=39.2 SD=13.7 for NMT, M=34.8 SD=12.5 for PMT), 
F(1,50)=1.50, p=.227, f=.17, sex (52% female NMT, 58% female PMT), F(1,50)=.17, p=.680, 
f=.05, or BDI-II total scores (M=3.8 SD=4.7 for NMT, M=5.4 SD=8.1 for PMT), F(1,50)=.74, 
p=.392, f=.12. One-quarter (25.0%) of the participants had a college degree. All participants 
spoke fluent English and received payment for their participation.
Materials and Apparatus
 Memory Bias Assessments The procedure was the same as in Study 1. There were 
only two differences in the assessment phase: English words were selected from the ANEW 
database (Bradley and Lang 1999) and in the post-training bias assessment, participants 
were informed of the upcoming free recall before encoding began (in contrast to the cued 
recall during the training phase). 
 Memory Bias Training, Stress Task and Mood Ratings The memory bias training phase 
and the stress task were identical to Study 1, except that English words were selected. Due 
to a programming error, there was no mood rating after the 4-min distraction.
Results
Memory Bias
 The groups did not differ at baseline on correct recall bias, F(1,50)=.12, p=.729, 
f=.04, or incorrect recall bias, F(1,50)=.18, p=.677, f=.05. A Training (positive, negative) x 
Time (pre, post) repeated-measures ANOVA on difference scores for correctly and incorrectly 
recalled words during the bias assessments yielded a significant interaction, F(1,50)=11.06, 
p=.002, f=.47. A Training (positive, negative) x Time (pre, post) repeated-measures 
ANOVA conducted on the recall bias for correctly recalled words did not yield a significant 
interaction, F(1,50)=2.70, p=.107, f=.23. We did, however, find a significant main effect 
of Condition, F(1,50)=4.35, p=.042, f=.29; in that, participants in the negative training 
condition correctly recalled on average more positive than negative words compared to 
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participants in the positive memory training condition, when collapsing across Time. A 
Training x Time repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the incorrect recall bias yielded a 
significant two-way interaction, F(1,50)=8.51, p=.005, f=.41. Follow-up analyses revealed 
that the participants in the negative training condition exhibited a greater tendency to 
incorrectly retrieve negative relative to positive words from memory than did participants 
in the positive training condition after the training, F(1,50)=8.95, p=.004, f=.42, but not 
before, F(1,50)=.18, p=.677, f=.05. Incorrect recall bias scores did not correlate significantly 
with any of the mood ratings, BDI-II total score, age, or sex (correlation coefficients between 
-.14 and .24 and p-values between .084 (for sex and incorrect recall post-training) and .946; 
see Table 1 for means and standard deviations). 
 When selecting participants with a pre-training negative memory bias (7 NMPs and 
11 PMTs with pre-training correct-recall difference score <0), the Training (positive, negative) 
x Time (pre, post) interaction on difference scores for correctly and incorrectly recalled 
words remained significant, F(1,16)=17.24, p=.001, f=1.04. Furthermore, the Training x 
Time interaction was non-significant for correct recall, F(1,16)=2.96, p=.104, f=.43, and 
significant for incorrect recall bias, F(1,16)=12.10, p=.003, f=.87. The groups did not differ 
pre-training (M=.0 SD=1.0 for NMT, M=.0 SD=1.8 for PMT), F(1,16)=.00, p=1.000, f=.00. 
Post-training, NMTs (M=-2.9 SD=3.6) incorrectly recalled more negative relative to positive 
words, in comparison to PMTs (M=2.5 SD=2.2), F(1,16)=15.63, p=.001, f=.99. There was 
a trend effect of Time within the negative training group, F(1,6)=4.35, p=.082, f=.85, and 
a significant effect of Time in the positive training group, F(1,10)=8.21, p=.017, f=.91. 
Training-congruent effects on incorrect recall were found when selecting participants with a 
pre-existing negative memory bias.
Emotional Reactivity
 Emotional reactivity and mood ratings were missing for two participants. Training 
type did not affect emotional reactivity to the stress task (see Table 2; all p-values >.3). 
Mood Throughout Experiment 
 A non-significant interaction of Training (positive, negative) x Time (baseline, after 
training, after post-training bias assessment) for negative mood ratings was observed, 
F(2,47)=2.21, p=.121, f=.31. The interaction of Training and Time for positive mood ratings 
was not significant either, F(2,47)=.10, p=.909, f=.06. See Table 2 for means and standard 
deviations.
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Discussion
 The results of Study 2 largely replicated the results of Study 1, in that explicit 
memory bias for trained emotional verbal stimuli was not differentially affected by the 
cued recall training. In addition, no effect on emotional reactivity after the stress task or on 
mood throughout the experiment was found. A training-congruent incorrect recall pattern of 
valenced words was found at the post-training bias assessment, indicating that the negative 
training affected global memory bias towards negative information. Thus, in a community 
sample, directly training recall of emotional words did not affect recall of the trained stimuli 
on a subsequent task, but stimulated a more global retrieval effect as negative words became 
more accessible after the negative training. This pattern of results was also found in a sub-
sample of individuals with preexisting negative memory bias. Here, the positive training 
induced a positive explicit memory bias. 
 In the total sample, the positive training might not have affected correct as well 
as incorrect recall because non-depressed healthy individuals generally tend to display 
positively biased processing (e.g. Tamir & Robinson, 2007). The finding that the positive 
training led to a more positive memory bias in a sub-sample of individuals with pre-existing 
negative memory bias suggests that negative memory biases can be altered. These results 
hold promise for memory bias training studies in clinically depressed samples.
General Discussion
 Studies 1 and 2 were designed to assess whether explicit emotional memory bias 
can be modified in healthy individuals by means of a computerized cued-recall training 
and whether mood and emotional reactivity to stress are affected by such a memory bias 
training. This study provides first tentative insights into the malleability of memory bias. 
We found no indication of a differential effect of the training on explicit verbal memory bias 
for trained stimuli or emotional reactivity to stress. These first results offer little support 
for the effectiveness of directly modifying emotional recall on explicit memory bias and on 
emotional reactivity to a stressor (consistent with Hertel et al., 2011). The effect on incorrect 
recall in the community sample in Study 2 indicates that the training might increase the 
accessibility of training-congruent emotional information in long term memory. A general 
increase in accessibility of negative information in the negative training condition could 
increase the likelihood that an individual will mistake an incorrect negative word for a 
relevant word, whereas it would not improve their ability to distinguish correct negative 
words from irrelevant negative words during retrieval. Based on the results, this tendency 
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may be stronger in individuals with a pre-existing negative memory bias, as they may be 
more sensitive to the training. Although previous CBM studies targeting interpretation and 
attention in depression have not yielded promising results, the effect on emotional incorrect 
recall in Study 2 suggests that it would be productive to examine the effect of CBM-memory 
paradigms in clinical samples, particularly because memory bias is regarded as characteristic 
of depression (e.g. Matt et al., 1992). Although biased memory processing might not be 
malleable by directly targeting recall of emotional events, trying to make the emotionality of 
long term memories less negative might have beneficial effects on more general involuntary 
emotional thought patterns. Certainly, this formulation is speculative and requires empirical 
substantiation. 
 The primary difference between the paradigms in the two studies was the 
instruction at the start of the post-training bias assessment. Participants in Study 2 were 
told before encoding that, in contrast to the training phase, a free recall would follow after 
the brief distraction. This might have led participants to exert more effort during encoding, 
which in turn resulted in a congruent effect of the training on incorrect recall bias. This 
explanation is supported by the overall higher incorrect recall rates in Study 2 than in Study 
1. The difference in the effect on incorrect recall between Study1 and 2 might also be due 
to the student sample generally having stronger executive control. The undergraduates 
in Study 1 were younger than the community participants in Study 2 and had a higher 
level of education and, therefore, may have had a cognitive advantage that led them to 
be more resistant to a direct memory bias training. If substantiated, this would mean that 
memory bias modification might be more successful in clinically depressed individuals, who 
generally suffer from executive dysfunction (Harvey et al., 2004). Taken together with the 
previous studies on memory bias modification (Hertel & Mathews, 2011), it seems that, in 
contrast to cognitive domains like attention and interpretation, memory bias is more easily 
affected through modifying processing in another domain than directly through recall. This 
is consistent with the Combined Cognitive Bias hypothesis, which holds that attention to 
and interpretation of emotional stimuli lead to processing biases in memory (Everaert et al., 
2012). 
 These findings represent a preliminary step in research on memory bias modification, 
given there are several limitations of these studies. We hypothesize that participants 
would adapt a training-congruent encoding strategy due to the valence-specific cued-recall 
training. However, the results do not cater to the questions whether encoding or retrieval 
processes were affected by the training. This paradigm targeted a highly specific domain, 
namely explicit episodic memory bias for positive and negative verbal stimuli. Adaptations 
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to the paradigm—e.g. more implicit training and assessment of bias—may provide more 
compelling results. Moreover, time between encoding and recall might have been too short 
for stimuli to enter long-term episodic memory processes that are biased in depression. 
However, the time interval was too long for short-term memory, and the distraction task 
minimized any possible short-term memory effects. Not using self-referential stimuli or self- 
referent encoding instructions might have contributed to the failure to find an effect of the 
training on biased memory of trained stimuli. Although according to Beck’s schema theory 
(1976, 2008; and see Banos et al., 2001), relatedness to the self-concept is especially relevant 
in depression, it might have hampered the effectiveness of our memory training in healthy 
individuals. Also, incidental learning generally offers stronger results than intentional 
learning (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). Having to provide explicit memory instructions might 
have weakened the training effects. Furthermore, the effect of the training might also be 
weakened by including fragments of training-incongruent valenced words. What is more, 
exhaustion might have contributed to lower recall rates post-training compared to pre-
training, which may have obscured the training effects. Although our results do not provide 
information on the general stability of memory bias, memory processes are regarded to be 
rather stable and robust and might not be easily affected by a brief single session CBM 
paradigm, especially in healthy non-vulnerable individuals (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). In this 
context, it would be interesting to examine the effects of multiple session CBM-memory 
training with self-referential stimuli. In future studies, adding a neutral training-condition 
will help with interpretation of the results. Applying such a memory bias modification 
paradigm to a vulnerable or clinically depressed sample would provide insight into the 
malleability of their negative memory biases.
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Summary of the research findings
 This thesis investigated biased processing of emotional information as an 
endophenotype for depression in non-depressed individuals as well as currently and remitted 
depressed individuals. Induced transient sad mood served as an analogue index for depressed 
mood state (Bradley et al., 1997b; Fitzgerald et al., 2011) and remitted depressed individuals 
were selected because they are especially at risk for depressive episodes and important for 
exploring the enduring, trait-like, irreversible factors in depression (Bockting et al., 2006; 
Kanai et al., 2003). In Chapters 2, 4 and 5, several widely utilized bias measures were applied to 
assess attentional and memory biases, e.g. the Emotional Stroop task, the Dot Probe task and 
a free-viewing eye-tracking paradigm to measure attentional bias, and a self-referent explicit 
memory task to measure memory bias. The results replicate earlier findings indicating that 
attentional and memory biases are associated with sad mood, as well as current and remitted 
depression. However, remitted depressed individuals showed depressotypic attentional 
biases on reaction time tasks (Chapter 2) and on maintained attention (Chapter 4), but not 
attentional disengagement measured with eye-tracking (Chapter 4). After remission, biased 
processing is generally triggered by stress or sad mood (Gupta & Kar, 2012). In contrast to the 
other studies using a remitted depressed sample in this thesis, the study presented in Chapter 
4 did not administer a mood induction to activate biased processing tendencies. This might 
explain the discrepancy in results. Chapter 3 provides first evidence for depressotypic biased 
processing in a novel domain, i.e. behavioral approach-avoidance tendencies. In Chapter 2, 
evidence was found that memory bias may represent a process distinct from attentional 
bias in remitted depressed individuals. The results presented in Chapter 5 further indicate 
that, compared to attentional bias, memory bias may be more strongly associated with 
depression vulnerability. Therefore, we associated memory bias with genetic susceptibility 
for depression in Chapter 6 and found evidence implicating negative memory bias as an 
endophenotype for depression in a remitted depressed sample. In the domain of memory, 
the study discussed in Chapter 7 proposes working memory bias as a novel endophenotype 
for depression. For all three depression candidate genes studied in Chapters 6 and 7 (BDNF, 
COMT and NR3C2), remitted depressed individuals who did not experience childhood trauma 
and carried the risk allele(s) showed less negative and/or more positive processing style 
than risk allele(s) carriers with childhood trauma. This suggest that genetically susceptible 
remitted depressed individuals may be most sensitive to negative environmental effects. 
These findings, although tentative, are in need for replication.
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Memory bias as an endophenotype for depression
 Together, the studies presented in this thesis communicate that memory bias may 
be especially useful as an endophenotype for depression. In relation to the criteria for an 
endophenotype (Gottesman & Gould, 2003; Leboyer et al., 1998), we conclude that biased 
memory is associated with depression in the population, also after remission, indicating 
it is state-independent (Chapters 2 & 5; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). Furthermore, we found 
evidence for its genetic association (Chapters 6 & 7). To confirm the correctness of working 
memory bias as an endophenotype for depression, family-based studies should be conducted 
in line with studies on memory bias (Van Oostrom et al., 2013). This will provide information 
on the co-segregation within families and the heightened prevalence in non-affected family 
members.
Results in light of the cognitive theories of depression
 The results cater to the ongoing debate about the role of attentional bias in 
depression. In line with Beck’s (1976, 2008) and Bower’s (1981) cognitive theories of 
depression as well as the meta-analysis by Peckham and colleagues (2010), attentional biases 
were indeed discovered in sad non-depressed, currently depressed and remitted depressed 
individuals (Chapters 2 & 5). But when focusing on vulnerability for depression (Chapters 
2, 5 & 6), our results underscore the idea put forward by Williams and colleagues (1997): 
we found evidence that self-referential memory bias may indeed be especially strong in 
depression-vulnerable individuals. This is in line with Beck’s schema theory that posits that 
latent dysfunctional mental representations about the self, also called “schemas” drive biased 
memory processing of self-referential emotional information. Our results further indicate 
that experiencing severely stressful events during childhood may foster biased processing 
based on negative schemas (Beck, 1976, 2008) in vulnerable individuals (see Chapters 5, 
6 & 7). Indeed, severely stressful childhood events have been associated with depression 
vulnerability (Hovens et al., 2010; Kendler et al., 1999).
Memory bias is not easily modified
 The finding that memory bias is not altered by a brief training (Chapter 8) may 
underscore that it is indeed a robust depressotypic process. However, given that it was a 
first attempt to directly manipulate explicit memory bias, the training procedure may 
not have been optimal. The results presented in Chapter 8 indicate that, instead of direct 
manipulation of recall, Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) memory techniques may instigate 
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more general emotional memory changes. This finding may be valuable for application in 
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and other psychological interventions. Based on the 
current results, further examination of the effects of (novel) CBM memory paradigms seems 
promising. 
Gene-environment interactions in depression vulnerability
 Our results underscore the importance of studying the combined effect of candidate 
genes and environmental stress on depression. Only a significant main effect of the BDNF 
Val66Met genotype on biased processing was found and not of the other candidate genes 
we studied (i.e. COMT and NR3C2). The association of these candidate genes with biased 
processing only showed when stratifying for stressful life events. The non-significant main 
effects of these genes may indicate that the effect of genetic variation might be limited 
in an affected sample. The emotional and cognitive automatic tendencies associated with 
depression vulnerability as well as scars from previous episodes may partially override the 
subtle effect of one genetic variant. We consistently found an association of depression 
candidate genes with biased (working) memory processing in the wake of stressful events, 
using different tasks and selecting different genes (Chapters 6 & 7). Hence, the relationship 
between genetic susceptibility, stress and biased processing does not seem to be limited to 
the frequently studied 5-HTTLPR genotype, but may be a generic vulnerability mechanism. 
Moreover, the results may indicate there is overlap between the genetic associations of 
processing biases and depression. 
Strengths, limitations and future directions
 Some strengths of this thesis are that we selected widely used paradigms based 
on relevant literature and leading theories. Another strength is that biased processing was 
studied in different clinical and nonclinical groups. This is of importance for the generalization 
and implementation of the results. Examining cognitive, genetic and environmental 
vulnerability factors together in one sample is still rather novel and a crucial step to a 
more integrated theoretical view on depression as well as clinically applicable results. An 
important limitation concerns the sample sizes. Large samples are required when studying 
the genetic associations of behavior, because minor allele frequencies are often low and a 
single mutation within a gene explains only a small percentage of the variance in behavior. 
For the studies within this thesis, we included a total of 398 undergraduate students of the 
Radboud University Nijmegen, 357 remitted depressed and 19 currently depressed patients 
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of the Radboud University Medical Centre, 83 matched never-depressed control participants 
and a sample of 73 community participants. These are large numbers for behavioral studies, 
but the sample sizes are minimal when studying genetic effects. Our results provide a first 
indication of certain associations, but larger samples need to be included in future studies. 
Moreover, the results need to be replicated before any conclusions can be drawn. This is 
especially important for the results in the depression vulnerable sample, given that research 
on endophenotypes in vulnerable individuals is still novel. 
 The method used to assess life events is another potential weakness. Negative 
bias might affect recall of life events, especially in depression vulnerable individuals. The 
life events questionnaire we used assessed the occurrence of several factual events during 
pre-determined periods of life, which probably limited distortion of recall. Moreover, adults’ 
recall of specific events from the past seems fairly accurate (Brewin et al., 1993). However, 
the questionnaire did not allow for assessment of the impact or stressfulness of the events. 
Although costly to excecute, longitudinal studies would be best suited for assessment of 
impact of life events and causal inference. 
 Above and beyond insufficient sample size, need for replication and suboptimal 
measurement of life events, the reliability of the bias measures is uncertain. Especially 
reaction time tasks, like the Emotional Stroop task and the Dot Probe task, are generally 
considered to be unreliable in measuring biased processing because the measures are neither 
internally consistent nor stable (Eide et al., 2002; Schmukle, 2005). Here we must note that 
explicit memory measures are considered to be fairly reliable (Buchner & Wippich, 2000). 
Memory may be a more appropriate endophenotype for depression, because more reliable 
measures are available resulting in few measurement errors. Unfortunately, only a limited 
range of bias measures are available. This means that it is currently difficult to test biased 
processing as an endophenotype for depression in a reliable way. 
Future directions for valid assessment of biased processing
 Computerized bias measures offer a way to objectively assess biases in a controlled 
setting at a certain time point. However, their ecological validity is far from optimal. 
Developing more ecologically valid measures of biased processing is therefore important. 
Fluctuations in mood and external factors have a strong influence on the reliability of bias 
measures. Assessing biased processing, current mood and other relevant external factors at 
multiple time points in a natural setting could yield more reliable and naturalistic results. 
The Experience Sampling Method (ESM; Wichers et al., 2011) might be of interest in this 
regard. ESM in currently mostly used to repeatedly assess fluctuation in mood and well-
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being in depression, using digital instruments people carry with them such as smart phones. 
However, it could also be a method for reliable and ecologically valid assessment of biased 
processing. By monitoring the experience of events as well as the explicit recall of these 
events, the emotionality and accurateness of memory can be assessed. This could then be 
associated with fluctuations in mood and used to discover relevant external factors that 
modulate the effect of depression on biased processing. 
Future directions for studying the association between genetic variants and biased 
processing
 The primary selection criterion of the genetic variants studied was the association 
with depression (Aberg et al., 2011; Gatt et al., 2007). Many endophenotypes, such as biased 
processing, are not solely associated with just one psychiatric disorder. For example, biased 
processing is also characteristic of anxiety (see Chapter 1). Recent studies provide evidence 
for the overlap in genetic association between common psychiatric disorders including 
depression (Cross-Disorder Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium, 2013a/b). 
Using a cross-disorder approach to study biased processing of emotional information as 
an endophenotype for e.g. stress-related disorders such as depression, anxiety and bipolar 
disorder may be a promising future direction. 
 For this thesis, we selected genetic polymorphisms based on their biological 
working mechanisms and association with depression, stress-responses and biased 
processing (Aberg et al., 2011; Buckert et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2004a/b; Gatt et al., 2007; Van 
Oostrom et al., 2012). However, there are presumably many more genetic variants associated 
with depressotypic biased processing. Applying hypothesis-free analyses on the association 
between genetic variability and biased processing, using Genome-Wide Association Studies, 
may be a promising next step. This approach has already been used to identify polymorphisms 
associated with neuroticism, a personality trait that shares genetic determinants with major 
depression and anxiety disorders (Shifman et al., 2008), and can compliment and direct 
candidate gene studies. 
Clinical implications
Biases and stress-sensitivity in standard treatment of depression
 Biased processing of emotional information is considered an important vulnerability 
factor for depression. Our results support that targeting automatic beliefs or biases can be 
valuable in the treatment and prevention of depression and depression relapse (see Chapter 
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5 & 8). Optimizing stress regulation and fostering positive emotion in the treatment of 
depression promises to enhance recovery and resilience. This is an important ingredient of 
CBT, but also of 3rd generation depression treatments such as Mindfulness Based Cognitive 
Therapy (Segal et al., 2012). Results further indicate that addressing the emotional effects of 
severe or traumatic childhood events is important in depression treatments. This also holds 
for relapse prevention: adapting schema’s affected by childhood traumatic events may lower 
changes of relapse. This is of importance in view of the high depression relapse rates (Judd, 
1997).
CBM in depression treatment
 Cognitive biases represent a strong depression vulnerability factor (Beevers & Carver, 
2003; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). The results presented in this thesis underscore this and also 
communicate that it may be especially effective to target cognitive biases in an early stage 
of depression development. The depression treatment guidelines are based on a stepped-
care approach, which involves initially low-intensity interventions which are intensified if 
required. In this light, using CBM paradigms as an add-on in treatment is an exciting and 
promising avenue for future research, as it is a pre-eminently low-intensity intervention 
that can bolster regular treatment effects. Possibilities are implementing CBM in a primary 
care setting for patients with mild depressive symptoms or preventing development of 
depression in vulnerable individuals with a family history of depression, e.g. a mother who 
suffered from depression.
Personalized healthcare
 The results not only speak to the cognitive treatment of depression, but may also 
stimulate hypotheses on the role of genetics in treatment. The differential susceptibility 
hypothesis (Belsky et al., 2007) states that individuals whom are most susceptible to adversity 
because of their genetic make-up are simultaneously most likely to benefit from supportive or 
enriching experiences. If the differential susceptibility hypothesis also holds for individuals 
who have experienced depressive episodes in the past, it would mean that the genetically 
susceptible individuals might not only experience most detrimental effects from adverse life 
events, but may also be more sensitive to positive environmental effects, such as psychological 
treatment or relapse prevention. Tailoring psychological treatment to the individual patient 
based on their genetic susceptibility, or therapy-genetics, seems promising in this light. The 
field of pharmacogenetics has already yielded promising results on the influence of genetic 
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features on the response to pharmacological treatment with e.g. antidepressants (Schosser 
& Kasper, 2009; Serretti et al., 2008). In line with the current results, genetically susceptible 
depressed individuals may possibly also benefit more from psychological treatment such as 
CBT, than individuals who are genetically less predisposed. First support for therapy-genetics 
has been found in children diagnosed with anxiety disorder who were genotyped for the 
5-HTTLPR polymorphism in the SLC6A4 gene (Eley et al., 2012, for review see Lester & Eley, 
2013). A similar trend can been seen in the field of neuroimaging, as neuroimaging studies 
have also led to the identification of neural biomarkers predictive of treatment outcome 
in depression (Fu et al., 2013; McGrath et al., 2013). Studies on genetic susceptibility for 
depression may complement these neuroimaging results and integration of these findings 
seems promising. However, widespread implementation of therapy-genetics is still a distant 
prospect, and many more large-scale gene-environment interaction studies in vulnerable 
individuals need to be conducted before results are in fact clinically implementable.
Conclusions 
 This thesis presents a series of studies on depression vulnerability factors in non-
depressed, remitted depressed and currently depressed individuals. The results replicate 
earlier findings relating biased processing to depression vulnerability. Memory bias seems 
to be a separate process from attentional bias in remitted depression. Furthermore, results 
support memory bias as an endophenotype for depression. The interplay between genes and 
stressful life events seems especially informative when associating this endophenotype with 
depression candidate genes. Although attentional bias is associated with depression, this 
thesis suggests that memory bias may be a stronger characteristic of depression vulnerability. 
It is, therefore, interesting to study memory bias as an endophenotype for depression in 
more detail. For instance, what are the conditions under which memory bias associates with 
genetic vulnerability? And can we adapt current CBM paradigms to manipulate memory 
bias and perhaps yield clinically relevant effects? Moreover, an interesting avenue for future 
research may be the association of genetic variation and cognitive emotional processing 
styles with treatment outcome in depression.
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Vertekende informatieverwerking als een endofenotype voor depressie
 Depressie is een veel voorkomende psychische ziekte met ernstige gevolgen 
voor zowel de persoon zelf, de omgeving en de maatschappij (Kessler et al., 1994; Murray 
& Lopez, 1996). Depressie wordt gekenmerkt door een verlies van levenslust en/of zware 
neerslachtigheid. Men spreekt van een klinische depressie wanneer er aan een aantal 
criteria wordt voldaan, zoals vastgelegd in een diagnostische handboek (de DSM). Mensen 
die depressief zijn hebben de neiging negatieve informatie gemakkelijker te verwerken dan 
mensen die niet depressief zijn (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). Daarnaast verwerken depressieve 
personen positieve informatie minder gemakkelijk. Een voorbeeld: een depressief persoon 
zal op een verjaardagsfeestje waarschijnlijk meer focussen op mensen die er niet vrolijk 
uit zien dan op de uitbundige feestvierders. Ook wanneer de persoon een dag later terug 
denkt aan het feestje, is de kans groot dat hij/zij zich de negatieve dingen van het feestje, 
bijv. de chagrijnige oom van de jarige, beter herinnert dan de positieve dingen, zoals de 
leuke muziek. Deze vertekeningen, of ‘biases’, zijn in verschillende cognitieve processen 
gevonden, onder andere in aandacht en geheugen. Zo lijken depressieve personen hun 
aandacht langer te richten op negatieve informatie, zoals droevige gezichten, dan mensen 
die niet depressief zijn. Ook onthouden depressieve mensen negatieve informatie beter 
dan niet-depressieve mensen. Deze biases blijven bestaan wanneer mensen herstellen 
van een depressie. Na herstel van een depressie worden biases getriggerd door stress of 
een neerslachtige stemming. Ook is gevonden dat kinderen van depressieve ouders meer 
negatieve biases laten zien dan kinderen van ouders die nooit depressief zijn geweest. Biases 
worden daarom gezien als ‘cognitieve kwetsbaarheids factoren’ voor depressie. 
 Naast cognitieve kwetsbaarheids factoren, zijn er ook genetische kwetsbaarheids 
factoren voor depressie. Genen bevatten erfelijk materiaal, waarmee eigenschappen 
doorgeven worden aan het nageslacht. Alle genen samen bepalen het functioneren van 
de cellen waaruit een mens is opgebouwd. Er zijn verschillende genen geïdentificeerd die 
bij lijken te dragen aan het ontstaan van depressie, zogenoemde ‘kandidaat genen’. Een 
depressie kandidaat gen verklaart echter maar een heel klein deel van het depressieve 
gedrag, of de symptomen van depressie. Het is daarom lastig verbindingen te vinden 
tussen specifieke genen en de symptomen van depressie. ‘Endofenotypen’ helpen de kans 
op succes bij genetisch onderzoek te vergroten. Endofenotypen zijn meetbare, aan de 
aandoening gerelateerde kenmerken die genetische bepaald zijn (Gottesman & Gould 2003). 
Endofenotypen liggen dus eigenlijk tussen de genen en de stoornis - in dit geval depressie - 
in. 
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 Wetenschappelijk onderzoek heeft laten zien dat biases in het verwerken van 
emotionele informatie een passend endofenotype voor depressie zijn. Dergelijk onderzoek 
is tot nu toe voornamelijk in gezonde, niet-depressieve mensen uitgevoerd. Het is echter 
belangrijk om biases als endofenotype ook te onderzoeken in mensen die kwetsbaar zijn 
voor het doormaken van een depressieve episode. Mensen die in het verleden een depressie 
hebben doorgemaakt en nu niet meer depressief zijn, hebben grote kans op terugval en 
zijn daarom verhoogd kwetsbaar voor het ontwikkelen van een volgende depressie (Ramana 
et al., 1995). In dit proefschrift zijn verschillende biases onderzocht in niet-depressieve 
mensen, in mensen die tijdens het testen depressief waren en in mensen die in het verleden 
depressief zijn geweest. Als ook in voormalig depressieve mensen gevonden wordt dat 
biases met kandidaat genen geassocieerd zijn, zal dit onderstrepen dat biases een passend 
endofenotype voor depressie zijn. Verder kan dergelijk onderzoek in voormalig depressieve 
mensen informatie bieden die mogelijk relevant is voor de klinische praktijk. 
 Het effect van kandidaat genen op gedrag lijkt echter deels af te hangen van de 
levensgebeurtenissen die mensen meemaken. Genetisch kwetsbare mensen reageren anders 
wanneer zij stressvolle gebeurtenissen meemaken dan wanneer er weinig stress is, en ook 
anders dan mensen die genetisch minder kwetsbaar zijn (Belsky & Pluess, 2009a/b). Zo lijken 
mensen die genetisch kwetsbaar zijn voor depressie én stressvolle levensgebeurtenissen 
meegemaakt hebben meer negatieve en minder positieve biases te hebben dan genetisch 
kwetsbare mensen zonder stressvolle levensgebeurtenissen. Gebaseerd op deze bevindingen, 
hebben we in dit proefschrift enkele depressie kandidaat genen onderzocht waarvan 
gevonden is dat ze samenhangen met biases en stressgevoeligheid. Naast het bevestigen van 
de geschiktheid van biases als endofenotype voor depressie, is in dit proefschrift onderzocht 
welke soort bias het sterkst geassocieerd lijkt te zijn met kwetsbaarheid voor depressie.
 Hoe is dit nou onderzocht? Om een goed beeld te krijgen van hoe biases aan 
depressie gerelateerd zijn, hebben  we verschillende groepen getest: een groep studenten van 
de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, een groep mensen die nooit depressief zijn geweest, een 
groep mensen die momenteel depressief zijn en een groep mensen die nu niet depressief zijn, 
maar in het verleden wel een of meerdere depressies doorgemaakt hebben. Hierbij hebben 
we verschillende soorten biases gemeten middels computertaken. Bij deze taken werden 
deelnemers gevraagd om op verschillende manieren te reageren op emotionele woorden of 
plaatjes. Deze reacties vormden onze uitkomstmaten. Ook hebben we middels vragenlijsten 
verschillende interessante kenmerken van de deelnemers in kaart gebracht, onder andere 
levensgebeurtenissen die mensen doorgemaakt hebben. De genetica data hebben we uit 
speekselsamples en bloedsamples gehaald. Deze samples zijn in het lab verwerkt, waarna 
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wij de informatie over de genetische kwetsbaarheid toegestuurd kregen. De relatie tussen 
deze variabelen is met statistische analyses onderzocht. 
 De onderzoeken die in Hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 besproken worden laten zien dat, 
naast aandacht en geheugen, biases ook te vinden zijn in gedrag. Hoofdstukken 2 en 5 
duiden er verder op dat geheugen bias een losstaand en sterk kenmerk van kwetsbaarheid 
voor depressie kan zijn. Verder laat Hoofdstuk 5 zien dat trauma in de kindertijd samen lijkt 
te hangen met kwetsbaarheid voor depressie. Daarom is dit een interessante variabele om te 
onderzoeken in relatie tot depressie kandidaat genen. In Hoofdstukken 6 en 7 worden twee 
soorten geheugen bias geassocieerd aan kandidaat genen in mensen die in het verleden 
depressief zijn geweest. De resultaten van deze onderzoeken duiden erop dat geheugen 
bias inderdaad een interessant endofenotype voor depressie is. Daarnaast lijken mensen die 
genetisch kwetsbaar zijn voor depressie gevoelig te zijn voor het ervaren van traumatische 
gebeurtenissen in de kindertijd. Voormalig depressieve mensen die genetisch kwetsbaar zijn 
en ook trauma(s) meegemaakt hebben in hun jeugd, laten de sterkste negatieve en de minste 
positieve geheugen bias zien. Dit is hiermee voor het eerst aangetoond in mensen die in het 
verleden een depressie hebben doorgemaakt. In Hoofdstuk 8 hebben we ook de oorzakelijke 
rol van geheugen bias willen onderzoeken. Er is dus bewijs dat geheugen bias een belangrijk 
kenmerk van depressie is en dat geheugen bias gerelateerd is aan genetische kwetsbaarheid 
voor depressie. Als geheugen bias inderdaad een belangrijke kwetsbaarheid factor voor 
depressie is, kan het verminderen van negatieve bias en het stimuleren van positieve bias 
depressieve symptomen wellicht helpen verminderen. Om een eerste stap in deze richting 
te zetten, is in Hoofdstuk 8 onderzocht of het trainen van negatieve bias in gezonde mensen 
hen meer ‘depressie-achtig’ laat reageren. Er is geen effect van deze geheugen bias training 
op stemming of gevoeligheid voor stress (kenmerken van depressie) gevonden, maar het lijkt 
erop dat globale geheugen bias wel te trainen is. Dit moet echter eerst nog verder uitgezocht 
worden voordat het trainen van geheugen bias in de toekomst wellicht de behandeling van 
depressie kan ondersteunen. 
 De onderzoeken in dit proefschrift geven een eerste indicatie van de geschiktheid 
en de kenmerken van biases als endofenotype voor depressie, in niet-depressieve en in 
kwetsbare mensen. Echter is meer onderzoek met grotere groepen nodig voordat betrouwbare 
conclusies getrokken kunnen worden. Wij hopen met dit proefschrift onderzoek naar 
genetische kwetsbaarheid en biases als endofenotype in klinische groepen te stimuleren. 
Dergelijk onderzoek kan hopelijk helpen de behandeling van depressie in de toekomst 
beter aan te passen op het individu en daarmee mensen met een depressie sneller te laten 
herstellen en terugval te helpen voorkomen.
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